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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal cause of action contained in 42 U.S.C. § 19832 permits persons
whose federal rights are violated by defendants acting under color of state law
to bring civil suits for both damages and injunctions. The statute is not a source
of substantive rights. It is, however, the principal civil remedy for the private
enforcement of the federal Constitution against state and local governments
and their employees.
Most § 1983 litigation has taken place in federal courts since the Supreme
Court's 1961 decision in Monroe v. Pape3 resurrected this seldom used legacy of
Reconstruction.4 Monroe established § 1983 as a supplementary federal remedy
and refused to require § 1983 plaintiffs to first seek relief under even adequate
state remedies.5 Consequently, § 1983 plaintiffs may seek redress by going
directly to court.6 As a result, the volume of § 1983 litigation in the federal
courts has increased more than one hundredfold in the last three decades.
7
242 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The statute, in its entirety, provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
3365 U.S. 167 (1961).
4 Prior to Monroe, § 1983 suits against state and local governmental defendants were
relatively rare because of the narrow construction given to § 1983 itself. See Michael G.
Collins, "Economic Rights," Implied Constitutional Actions and the Scope of Section 1983, 77
GEO. L.J. 1493, 1499-1506 (1989). Such suits were also infrequent because of the few
constitutional limits on the states. See Louise Weinberg, The Monroe Mystery Solved:
Beyond the "Unhappy History" Theory of Civil Rights Litigation, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 737,
747 ("The decade immediately following Monroe was marked by increasing absorption
of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment.").
5365 U.S. at 183 ("The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the
latter need not first be sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.").
6 See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 504 (1982) (construing § 1983 as
providing "immediate access to the federal courts notwithstanding any provision of
state law to the contrary").
7 The Administrative Office of the United States Courts collects statistics on the
number of "civil rights" as contrasted to § 1983 cases filed in federal courts. The "civil
rights" category is often used as a shorthand for § 1983 cases, see Patsy, 457 U.S. at 533
n.20 (Powell, J. dissenting), but the use of this statistic overstates the volume of § 1983
cases in federal courts. See Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and
an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 522-38 (1982). Nonetheless, the increase in
"civil rights" cases is a useful proxy for the increase in § 1983 litigation, and it is
significant that in 1961, when Monroe was decided, only 270 "civil rights" cases were
commenced in federal courts, see Patsy, 457 U.S. at 533 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
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Under the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction that characterizes our
system of judicial federalism, state courts may exercise jurisdiction over § 1983
cases,8 and in recent years there has been a sharp increase in the volume of state
court § 1983 litigation throughout the country, including Ohio.9 Unfortunately,
the precise number of state court § 1983 cases is unclear because Ohio, like all
other states, does not collect this statistic. 10 Nonetheless, a review of appellate
court decisions makes clear that for a variety of ad hominem, doctrinal, and
tactical reasons, an increasing number of § 1983 plaintiffs are forsaking the
federal courts and seeking relief in the Ohio courts.11 In fact, the emergence of
state court § 1983 litigation in Ohio is suggested by the recent publication of a
standard jury instruction to provide guidance to Ohio lawyers and judges.12
This review of § 1983 litigation in the Ohio courts has three principal goals.
First, it provides an introduction to state court § 1983 litigation for Ohio lawyers
and judges. Commentators have recognized the importance of state court
§ 1983 litigation, 13 and the Supreme Court has begun to pay greater attention
to state court § 1983 cases.14 Nonetheless, most § 1983 materials focus on the
COURTS 238 (1961), while the comparable figure for 1992 was 40,961, which consisted of
11,316 "other civil rights" cases plus 29,645 prisoner "civil rights" (i.e., non habeas and
non-mandamus) cases. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 25 (1992) (Table C-2).
In 1961, there was no separate category in the published reports of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts for prisoner "civil rights" cases, and
the 270 "civil rights" cases included both prisoner and non-prisoner cases. In 1963, for
the first time, the Administrative Office included a category for "prisoner petitions ...
prison official mandamus, etc.," see ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 199 (1963) (Table C-2), and it was
not until 1971 that the Administrative Office began separately identifying prisoner civil
rights cases in the published reports. Compare ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 232 (1970) (Table C-2) with
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 263 (1971) (Table C-2).
8 See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
9 See Steven H. Steinglass, The Emerging State Court § 1983 Action: A Procedural
Review, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 381,393 n.52 & 435 (1983) [hereinafter Steinglass, Emerging
State Court § 1983 Action].
10See infra note 95.
11For a discussion of choice of forum considerations in Ohio, see infra notes 123-66
and accompanying text.
12See 2 OHIOJURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, Ch. 247 (1992). This model instruction and the
accompanying commentary provide a useful overview of the § 1983 cause of action.
13 See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54
BROOK. L. REV. 1057, 1057 (1989) ("State court is the new frontier of civil rights
litigation.").
14 See, e.g., Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991), rev'g 451 N.W.2d 676 (Neb. 1990);
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990), rev'g 537 So. 2d 706 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989);
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988), rev'g 741 P.2d 1345
(Nev. 1987); Felder v. Casey, 487U.S. 131 (1988), rev'g 408 N.W.2d 19 (Wis. 1987); Spencer
[Vol. 41:407
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federal courts.15 Moreover, the few works addressing litigation of § 1983 claims
in state courts either lack an Ohio focus 16 or, where there is such a focus, deal
narrowly with specific Ohio issues.17 This article seeks to bridge this gap by
providing judges and lawyers with a broad overview of § 1983 litigation in the
Ohio courts.
Second, the article addresses a number of the unique procedural and
remedial issues that have arisen, or are likely to arise, in § 1983 litigation in the
Ohio courts. These issues are sometimes suggested by judicial opinions, but
the special problems of litigating federal claims in state courts are often not
fully appreciated or adequately addressed. Moreover, the article draws on
§ 1983 litigation from other state courts for insights and analysis not always
available from federal court decisions.
Finally, by taking an in-depth look at § 1983 litigation in a particular state,
the article contributes to an understanding of what is actually happening in
§ 1983 litigation throughout the country.
II. RECONSTRUCTION BACKGROUND
Section 1983, which has its origins in the post-Civil War Reconstruction Era,
is the current version of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,18 a statute adopted
v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 471 U.S. 82 (1985) (per curiam), affg by equally divided
court 316 S.E.2d 386 (S.C. 1984); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), affg 405 A.2d 230
(Me. 1979); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), affg 149 Cal. Rptr. 519 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1978).
15 For example, most § 1983 treatises are devoted almost exclusively to federal court
§ 1983 litigation. See, e.g., MICHAEL AVERY & DAVID RUDOVSKY, POLICE MISCONDUCT:
LAW AND LITIGATION (2d ed. 1993); IVAN C. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE B. LEVINSON, STATE
& LOCAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTs LIABILITY (1993); JOSEPH G. COOK & JOHNL. SOBIESKI,
JR., CIVIL RIGHTSACTIONS (1992); SHELDONH. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTSAND CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 (3d ed. 1991); MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E.
KIRKLN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS, DEFENSES, AND FEES (2d ed. 1991); CHARLES
RICHEY, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS (1988).
16 See STEVEN H. STENGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS (rev. ed. 10th
release, 1993) [hereinafter STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION]. Law review articles
dealing generally with the litigation of§ 1983 claims in the state courts include: Herman,
supra note 13; Burt Neubome, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 725 (1983); Steinglass, Emerging State Court § 1983 Action, supra note 9.
17 See, e.g., Linda L. House, Section 1983 and the Collateral Source Rule, 40 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 101 (1992); Richard B. Saphire & Susan W. Brenner, The Effect of the Ohio Court of
Claims Act on Civil Rights Actions in Stateand Federal Courts, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 167 (1991);
Michael J. Solimine, Adjudication of Federal Civil Rights Actions in the Ohio Courts, 9 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 39 (1983); Michael R. Smalz, Statute of Limitations for Section 1983 Claims
in Ohio, OHIO LAW. 10 (Nov.-Dec. 1989).
18 Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current verison at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1988)).
1993]
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to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 19 Ironically, in light of its current
prominence, § 1 was a minor, and not heavily debated, 20 provision of a more
far-reaching statute designed to restore federal supremacy in the face of a
widespread breakdown of law and order in the southern and border states.
2 1
The Act, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, permitted the President to use
the military to protect federal rights22 and to temporarily suspend habeas
corpus,23 restricted federal jury participation by former confederate loyalists,24
and created civil and criminal sanctions to reach the private conspiracies of the
Klan and similar organizations. 2 5 Section one of the Act created a civil remedy
to enforce federal constitutional provisions against state or local officials who
violated the "rights, privileges, or immunities" of persons within the United
States.26
Given § 1983's origin in a period marked by a profound distrust of the state
courts and by a major change in the relationship between state and federal
courts,27 the emergence of state courts during the 1980s as the forum of choice
19 See infra note 52.
20 The absence of controversy surrounding § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 has been
commented upon by the Court in the course of discussing the lack of guidance from the
congressional debate on many § 1983 issues. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978); see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 361 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
2 1See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-83 (1961). For a further discussion
of the events leading to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, see Developments in
the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1141-56 (1977).
22Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 3, 17 Stat. 13, 14 (1871).
23Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 4, 17 Stat. 13, 14 (1871).
24 Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 5, 17 Stat. 13, 15 (1871).
25 See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). Section 2 of the Act
contained the precursor to the civil conspiracy causes of action in 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1988),
which, inter alia, authorizes a civil action for conspiracies to "depriv[e], either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges or immunities under the laws.... See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988). The
1871 Act also contained the precursor to 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988), which provides a
criminal sanction for such conspiracies. For the Supreme Court's latest word on
§ 1985(3), see Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993)
(construing § 1985(3) to not reach private conspiracies to deny women access to abortion
clinics).
26Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 1. This civil cause of action was patterned after the
criminal provision contained in § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27
(1866). See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 360-61. Section two's modem equivalent can be found at
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988). For discussions of this criminal provision, see Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
27 1n Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), the Court characterized the predecessor
to § 1983 as
a product of a vast transformation from the concepts of federalism
that had prevailed in the late 18th century .... The very purpose of
[Vol. 41:407
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for many persons who believed that their federal rights had been violated by
state and local governmental defendants is ironic. It is even more ironic, but
beyond the scope of this article, that many state court § 1983 defendants have
been able to take advantage of the liberal federal question removal statute to
veto plaintiffs' choice of state courts and remove § 1983 cases to federal
courts.28 Nonetheless, an increasing number of § 1983 cases are being litigated
in the Ohio courts.2 9
III. THE § 1983 REMEDY
A. Nature of the § 1983 Remedy
Section 1983 is a remedial statute that only authorizes a private action against
defendants who act under color of state law and violate rights secured by
federal law. In its current form, § 1983 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen.., or other person.., to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
a°
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that § 1983 confers no
substantive rights,31 and the Ohio Supreme Court recognized this in Shirokey
v. Marth.32
Section 1983 provides a remedy to persons whose federal rights have
been violated by governmental officials. However, "Section 1983 does
not itself create any constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for
the vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere."
§ 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the
people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the people
from unconstitutional action under color of state law, "whether that
action be executive, legislative, or judicial."
Id. at 241 (quoting Ex parte Virginia 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)). The period from 1863 to
1875 marked the sharpest permanent expansion of federal court jurisdiction in the
nation's history. See William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power,
1863-1875, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 333 (1969).
28 See infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
29For a statistical review of § 1983 litigation in the Ohio appellate courts, see infra
notes 95-100 and accompanying tables and text.
3042 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
31See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979) ("Standing
alone, § 1983 clearly provides no protection for civil rights since, as we have just
concluded, § 1983 does not provide any substantive rights at all.").
3263 Ohio St. 3d 113, 585 N.E.2d 407, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 186 (1992).
1993]
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Moreover, Section 1983 does not cover official conduct that violates
only state law. Rather, the statute is limited to deprivations of federal
statutory and constitutional rights.
33
Similarly, in 1946 St. Clair Corp. v. City of Cleveland,34 the Ohio Supreme Court,
relying on a United States Supreme Court case, summarized the elements of a
§ 1983 claim as follows:
To establish such a claim, two elements are required: (1) the conduct
in controversy must be committed by a person acting under color of
state law, and (2) the conduct must deprive the plaintiff of rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.
35
Thus, for there to be a viable § 1983 claim, a violation of a substantive or
rights-conferring provision of federal law must exist. Nonetheless, courts and
litigants often assert that defendants have "violated § 1983."36 There is no such
thing, however, and it is a misnomer to speak of "violations of § 1983."
This concern about references to "violations of § 1983" is not simply a law
professor's fetish about the aesthetics of pleading. Such references often mask
3363 Ohio St. 3d at 116, 585 N.E.2d at 410 (citations omitted) (quoting Braley v. City
of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1990)).
3449 Ohio St. 3d 33, 550 N.E.2d 456 (1990).
3549 Ohio St. 3d at 34, 550 N.E.2d at 459 (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535
(1981)). See also Cooperman v. University Surgical Assocs., 32 Ohio St. 3d 191, 199, 513
N.E.2d 288, 296 (1987) ("A complaint alleging Section 1983 as the basis for the action
must meet two requirements. First, there must be an allegation that the conduct in
question was performed by a person under color of law. Second, the conduct must have
deprived... [the plaintiff] of a federal right.') (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635
(1980)).
Some formulations of the elements of a § 1983 claim also include a causation
requirement. See 2 OHIOJURYINSTRUCTIONS§ 247.01(3) ("'The plaintiff must prove by the
greater weight of the evidence: ... (C) [that] the defendant's acts were the proximate
cause of any injuries claimed by the plaintiff."). The use of a causation element is
consistent with the "subjects, or causes to be subjected" language of § 1983. See Monell
v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978) (relying, in part, on the
causation language to reject respondeat superior as a basis of§ 1983 municipal liability).
Cf. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989) (requiring a showing that the
deficiencies in a city's training program caused an injury in order to establish § 1983
municipal liability). It is unclear, however, whether courts should look to state law, such
as the detailed Ohio jury instructions on causation, see 1 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS Ch.
11, or to more general federal principles for the content of the § 1983 causation
requirement.
36 See, e.g., Schwarz v. Board of Trustees of the Ohio State Univ., 31 Ohio St.3d 267,
267, 510 N.E.2d 808, 809 (1987) (noting that "plaintiff alleged that defendants, acting
under color of state law, denied her due process of law in violation of Section 1983");
Medina County Agric. Soc'y v. Swagler, 34 Ohio App.3d 336, 336, 518 N.E.2d 589, 590
(Medina Co. 1987) (syllabus) ("One of two defendants found jointly liable for intentional
acts of discrimination in violation of Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code, in federal district
court, may not bring an action in the court of common pleas for contribution.").
[Vol. 41.407
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serious analytical flaws on the part of judges and attorneys addressing § 1983
issues. For example, some plaintiffs' attorneys seem to believe that outrageous
conduct simpliciter is actionable under § 1983, but such an approach deflects
attention from the essential task of identifying the specific federal
constitutional or statutory provision that the defendants allegedly violated.
Therefore, attorneys defending § 1983 cases (and judges entertaining such
cases) should force plaintiffs (and their attorneys) to identify with particularity
the specific provisions of federal law that they believe the defendants
violated. 37
On the other hand, some defendants' attorneys seem to believe that conduct
which violates state law cannot be actionable under § 1983. This may be true
in the sense that § 1983 is only available to remedy violations of federal law.38
The same conduct, however, may be actionable under both state law and
§ 1983,39 and § 1983 plaintiffs must be prepared to identify the specific
provisions of federal law which they claim have been violated. Moreover, there
is no exhaustion of state judicial remedies requirement under § 1983, and
plaintiffs may join both § 1983 and state law claims in the same action under
the liberal joinder provisions that characterize state and federal rules of civil
procedure.40
B. Color of Law Requirement
The Supreme Court has broadly construed § 1983's color of law requirement
to reach not only conduct that is authorized by state law but also conduct that
is unauthorized (or even barred) by state law. Thus, in Monroe v. Pape,41 the
Court rejected the argument that § 1983 was only available as a remedy for
37This is not to suggest the use of heightened pleading requirements for § 1983
complaints. For a discussion of§ 1983 pleading requirements, see infra notes 214-36 and
accompanying text.
38 See Shirokey, 63 Ohio St. 3d at 116, 585 N.E.2d at 410 ("Section 1983 does not cover
official conduct that violates only state law."); cf. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984)
(violation of clearly established state law is not sufficient to deny a qualified immunity
to a § 1983 defendant who also violated federal law).
39 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[A]
deprivation of a constitutional right is significantly different from and more serious than
a violation of a state right and therefore deserves a different remedy even though the
same act may constitute both a state tort and the deprivation of a constitutional right.").
4OPlaintiffs may join § 1983 and state law claims in federal courts under the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction. See generally United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1965).
The judge-made doctrine of pendent jurisdictionwas recently codified as"supplemental
jurisdiction" in Title ImI of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, which contains the
Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-650,104
Stat. 5089 (1990) (creating 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. 1m. 1990)). See generally Steven H.
Steinglass, State Courts and Supplemental Jurisdiction Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, in
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 93 (1993).
41365 U.S. 167 (1961).
19931
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officially sanctioned conduct42 and held that police officers who conducted an
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of state law could be sued under
§ 1983 for violating the Fourth Amendment.
Most § 1983 cases are brought against governmental officials, and there is
rarely a dispute about whether such defendants are acting under color of state
law.43 Nonetheless, the § 1983 "color of law" requirement also reaches private
individuals who act in concert with governmental officials.44 Moreover, private
conduct that is authorized by state law may sometimes fall within § 1983.45 On
the other hand, the Court has been reluctant to extend § 1983 to private actors
simply because they are performing public functions46 or receiving significant
state aid.
47
421n his Monroe dissent, Justice Frankfurter argued that § 1983 was limited to official
conduct. See id. at 202. See also Eric H. Zagrans, "Under Color of' What Law: A
Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REV. 499 (1985) (defending the
Frankfurter position). For a persuasive critique of the Frankfurter-Zagrans position, see
Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under Color of" Law, 91 MICH. L. REv. 323 (1992).
43 See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,50 (1988) (noting that "generally, a public employee
acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his
responsibilities pursuant to state law," and holding that a prison physician acts under
color of state law). But see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (treating a public
defender as not acting under color of state law in representing an indigent criminal
defendant because public defenders are required to exercise independent professional
judgment on behalf of their clients).
44See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984) (public defender who conspires with other
public officials acts under color of state law); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980) (private
person who conspires with a judge acts under color of state law despite the judge's
absolute immunity).
45 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (private party's use of
statutory prejudgment attachment procedures is stateaction but the misuse of such state
procedures is not).
In Lugar the Court held that challenged conduct that constitutes state action under
the fourteenth amendment is "also action under color of state law and will support a
suit under § 1983." Id. at 935. Nonetheless, the Court noted that not all actions taken
under "color of state law" necessarily satisfy the fourteenth amendment state action
requirement. Id. at 935 n.18; cf. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077,2082
(1991) (pointing out that the thirteenth amendment does not require state action).
46 See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (limiting the public function test
to functions that have traditionally been the exclusive province of government and
holding that the sale of goods under a warehouseman's lien is not state action because
such disputes are frequently resolved without governmental involvement). The Court
has held that a wide range of government activities arenotpublic functions forpurposes
of the state action/color of law inquiry. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) (regulation of intercollegiate sports); Blum v. Yaretsky,
457 U.S. 991 (1982) (provision of nursing home services); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830 (1982) (education of maladjusted students); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345 (1974) (provision of utility services). But see Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. 2077
(finding state action in a challenge to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges,
in part, because jury selection involves a traditional government function).
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In Cooperman v. University Surgical Associates,48 the Ohio Supreme Court
recognized that § 1983 is not limited to conduct that is authorized by state law.
The requirement of action under color of state law encompasses at least
state action. It may, however, encompass conduct which is broader
than state action. At the heart of this requirement is the notion that
individual conduct, to be actionable, must be taken pursuant to powers
granted by virtue of state law and possible only because the actor is
clothed with the authority of state law.4 9
Thus, § 1983 is available in some cases in which public officials act contrary to
state law.
C. Deprivations of Federal Rights
In addition to an act taken under color of state law, a proper § 1983 claim
requires the existence of a "deprivation of... rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws .. "50 This formulation is quite broad,
and the Supreme Court has not limited § 1983 to the types of conduct that led
to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
1. Constitutional Rights
Section 1983 had its origin in a broad proposal, introduced on March 28,1871,
by Representative Shellabarger at the request of -the Grant Administration to
address the state of lawlessness throughout much of the South and 51 to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment.52 The debates on Civil Rights Act of 1871 make
47See, e.g., Blum, 457 U.S. at 1010-11 (discharge of patients by nursing home not state
action despite substantial state funding); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 839-42 (governmental
funding of private school not sufficient to constitute state action in a case involving the
discharge of teachers); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358-59 (termination of utility services by
heavily regulated private utility with a state-created partial monopoly not state action);
Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,171-77 (1972) (possession of state liquor license not
sufficient to make discriminatory refusal to serve blacks state action absent
state-compelled discrimination).
4832 Ohio St. 3d 191, 513 N.E.2d 288 (1987).
4932 Ohio St. 3d at 199, 513 N.E.2d at 297. Moreover, the color of law requirement
that defines the reach of § 1983 is broader than the state law scope of employment
requirement that defines the reach of state immunity and indemnification statutes. See
infra notes 373-82 and accompanying text.
5042 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
51 See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 236 (1871) (President Grant's message to
Congress urgently recommended legislation to deal with "[a] condition of affairs ... in
some of the States of the Union rendering life and property insecure.").
52 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,171 (noting that "the purpose [of § 1983] is plain
from the title of the legislation, 'An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes"') (quoting
§ 1983).
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clear the close nexus between § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.53
Nonetheless, the reference in § 1983 to "rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution" is not, by its terms, limited to Fourteenth
Amendment rights, and the Supreme Court has not construed § 1983 so
narrowly.54
Most § 1983 cases involve constitutional claims that are based directly or
indirectly on the Fourteenth Amendment, and for many years it remained
unclear whether § 1983 reached constitutional claims that were not grounded
in the Fourteenth Amendment. Most courts were reluctant to extend § 1983
beyond the Fourteenth Amendment.55 In Dennis v. Higgins,56 however, the
Supreme Court held that dormant Commerce Clause claims were actionable
under § 1983. As a result, it is likely that § 1983 can also be used to enforce
non-Fourteenth Amendment claims having their origin in the Obligation of
Contract Clause,57 the Ex Post Facto Clause,58 and the Article IV Privileges and
Immunities Clause.59
2. Statutory Rights
As enacted in the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the cause of action that became
§ 1983 did not make any reference to deprivations of federal statutory rights. 60
53 See generally Developmnents in the Law, supra note 21, at 1153-56 (describing
Congressional concern about the abdication of law enforcement responsibilities).
54 But see Collins, supra note 4, at 1502-04 (describing the earlier use of a narrow
definition of what rights are "secured" under § 1983).
55 See STEINGLASS, SECrIoN 1983 LMGATION, supra note 16, § 2.5(b) (2). A number of
these courts took the position that constitutional provisions that addressed the
relationship between the state and federal governments rather than conferred
individual rights were beyond the scope of § 1983. See, e.g., J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Town
of Erie, 767 F.2d 1469, 1476 (10th Cir. 1985); Consolidated Freightways v. Kassel, 730
F.2d 1139,1144-46 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984).
56498 U.S. 439 (1991).
57U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
58 Id.
59U.S. CONST. art. IV. Justice Kennedy, in his Dennis dissent, decried the breadth of
the Court's holding and suggested the likely availability of § 1983 in a wide range of
non-fourteenth amendment cases. 498 U.S. at 463 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
The Court's logic extends far beyond the Commerce Clause, and creates
a whole new class of § 1983 suits derived from Article I. For example, the
Court's rationale creates a § 1983 cause of action when a State violates
the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunities, interferes
with the federal power over foreign relations, applies a duty upon imports
.. , invades the federal power over regulations of the entrance and residence
of aliens.. ., or attempts to tax income upon a federal obligation ....
Id. (citations omitted).
60 See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)).
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In 1874, however, in the course of codifying the federal statutes, Congress
separated the cause of action in § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 from the
jurisdictional counterpart in the same section and added the phrase "and laws"
to the cause of action.61 The significance of this change remained unclear for
more than a century, but in Maine v. Thiboutot,62 the Supreme Court construed
the phrase "and laws" to reach all federal statutes.63
Despite the broad holding of Thiboutot, the Court has restricted the use of
§ 1983 to enforce federal statutes by defining narrowly when federal statutes
contain judicially enforceable rights64 and by implying limitations on the scope
of § 1983 from the existence of private remedies.65 Moreover, in Suter v. Artist
M.,66 the Court may have signaled a retreat from its prior practice of effectively
treating § 1983 as being presumptively available for the enforcement of federal
statutes by adopting a test much closer to the implied right of action test to
govem the availability of § 1983 to enforce federal statutes.67
The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that § 1983 is available to enforce
federal statutes. In Ohio Academy of Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Barry,68 the court held
61See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1979).
62448 U.S. 1 (1980).
63 The issue in Thiboutot was whether § 1983 was limited to federal statutes
"providing for equal rights." The "equal rights" language, which is now codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1343(a) (3) (1988) (conferring original jurisdiction in federal court), had its origin
in one of the civil rights jurisdictional provisions that were created as part of the 1874
codification. See Chapman, 441 U.S. at 609. The ThiboutotCourt, however, refused to limit
the unmodified phrase "and laws" in § 1983 to 'laws providing for equal rights." See 448
U.S. at 6-8.
64 See generally Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (§ 1983
not available to enforce the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act
because it does not create enforceable rights and obligations).
65 See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1, 20 (1981) ("When the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently
comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the
remedy of suits under § 1983.'). But see Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498
(1990) (§ 1983 available to enforce the state obligation to provide reasonable and
adequate Medicaid reimbursement rates); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los
Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989) (§ 1983 available to enforce preemption claims under the
National Labor Relations Act); Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous.
Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987) (§ 1983 available to enforce Brooke Amendment claims under
the Housing Act).
66112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992) (§ 1983 not available to enforce the "reasonable efforts"
requirement of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act).
6 7Under the Court's implied private right of action test, legislative intent is the most
important factor in determining the availability of private enforcement. See ERwiN
CHAEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.3 (1989 & 1992 Supp.).
6856 Ohio St. 3d 120, 564 N.E.2d 686 (1990).
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that the Boren Amendment,69 which requires states participating in the
Medicaid Program to provide reasonable and adequate nursing home
reimbursement rates, conferred rights that were enforceable under § 1983.70
D. State of Mind Requirement
In Monroe v. Pape,71 the Supreme Court rejected the existence of a "specific
intent" requirement in § 198372 and construed § 1983 against principles of tort
law.7 3 This use of tort principles raised the question of whether § 1983 was
available in cases involving only negligent conduct, but in Parratt v. Taylor,74
the Court held that § 1983 does not contain a state of mind requirement.75
Nonetheless, the federal rights that are actionable under § 1983 often contain
state of mind requirements.76 Thus, the defendant's state of mind is often a
relevant issue in § 1983 litigation.T/
IV. STATE COURT JURISDICTION
A. Jurisdictional Principles
Unlike § 1983, which is only a cause of action, § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 contained both a cause of action and ajurisdictional provision.78 The latter
6942 U.S.C. § 1396a(13) (A) (1988).
7OThe Barry court, relying on Wilder, held that Medicaid providers could use § 1983
to challenge the state's reduction of reimbursement rates for nursing home care on the
ground that the rates violated the controlling federal statute. 56 Ohio St. 3d at 123, 564
N.E.2d at 690.
71365 U.S. 167 (1961).
721d. at 187. The Monroe Court recognized that § 1983, unlike its criminal counterpart,
see supra note 26, does not contain an explicit state of mind requirement. Id. (discussing
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945)).
73365 U.S. at 187 (observing that the statute "should be read against the background
of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his
actions").
74451 U.S. 527 (1981).
75Accord 2 OHIO JURY INSTRUcrIoNs § 247.01, comment (1992).
76 See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (negligent conduct not sufficient
to state a due process claim); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (negligent denial of
medical care by prison officials not actionable under § 1983, but the eighth amendment
is available for claims involving deliberate indifference to inmates' serious medical
needs).
77The defendant's state of mind is not directly relevant to the availability of either
qualified or absolute immunities, see infra notes 244-55 and 259-65 and accompanying
text, but it is relevant to claims for punitive damages. See infra notes 443-44 and
accompanying text.
78 The jurisdictional language was as follows: "such proceedings to be prosecuted in
the several district or circuit courts of the United States, with and subject to the same
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was necessary because in 1871 there was no general federal question
jurisdictional provision for the federal courts.79 In the 1874 codification of the
United States Statutes, however, the jurisdictional provision was separated
from the cause of action,80 and this pattern continues today. Thus, it is necessary
to look someplace other than § 1983 to determine whether state or federal
courts have jurisdiction over § 1983 actions. 81
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Therefore, it is necessary to
find an affirmative grant of subject matter jurisdiction before a federal court
may entertain a civil action.82 State courts, however, are courts of general
jurisdiction,83 and the Supreme Court has relied on the presumption of
concurrency that characterizes our system of judicial federalism 84 to hold that
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 actions.85
rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such
courts .... Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
79 The predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988), the general federal question jurisdiction
statute, was not adopted until the Act of March 3,1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (1875).
80 See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600,608-09 (1979).
81The jurisdictional counterpart to § 1983 is 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) (3) (1988). However,
Chapman and Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), make clear that this jurisdictional
provision is narrower than § 1983. The repeal of the jurisdictional amount requirement
in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988), see Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2, 94 Stat. 2369 (1980), effectively closed this jurisdictional gap by
making § 1331 the appropriate (and the broadest) jurisdictional provision for federal
court § 1983 actions.
82 See CHEMERNSKY, supra note 67, § 5.1. Rule 8(a) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure recognizes that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and requires
the party seeking to invoke federal court jurisdiction to include in his or her pleading
"a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction
depends." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (1).
83 Although some state courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, all states have courts
of general jurisdiction. In Ohio, the courts of general jurisdiction are the Courts of
Common Pleas. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.01 (Anderson Supp. 1992). The Ohio
pleading rule reflects the different status of state courts, and, unlike its federal
counterpart, see supra note 82, OHIO R. Civ. P. 8(A) does not require pleading the
existence of subject matter jurisdiction.
84 Under this presumption, state courts may exercise jurisdiction over federal causes
of action as long as Congress has not explicitly or implicitly made federal court
jurisdiction exclusive. An implied exclusivity can result from an "unmistakable
implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court
jurisdiction and federal interests." Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobile Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473,
478 (1981) (citations omitted). The classic statement of the presumption of concurrent
jurisdiction is contained in Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876) ("[W]here
jurisdiction may be conferred on the United States courts, it may be made exclusive
where not so by the Constitution itself; but, if exclusive jurisdiction be neither express
nor implied, the State courts have concurrent jurisdiction whenever, by their own
constitution, they are competent to take it."). See generally Martin H. Redish & John E.
Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Courts, 75 MICH. L. REV. 311
(1976); STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 9.2.
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The Supreme Court has not decided whether federal law requires states to
create forums that can entertain § 1983 claims. 8 6 Furthermore, the Court has
permitted state courts to refuse to entertain federal causes of action when they
have a "valid excuse."8 7 In Howlett v. Rose,88 however, the Court defined "valid
excuse" narrowly.89 Moreover, the Court has made clear that the
nondiscrimination principle prevents state courts from excluding § 1983 claims
on a discriminatory basis. 90 Under these federal principles, state courts are
The Supreme Court has reiterated its support for the presumption of concurrency.
See Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990) (permitting state courts
to exercise jurisdiction over Title VII employment discrimination actions); Tafflin v.
Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990) (permitting state courts to exercisejurisdiction over civil RICO
actions). The Court's only criticism of the presumption comes from Justices who would
strengthen it. See Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 469 (Scalia, J., concurring) (questioning whether
concurrent state court jurisdiction can ever be rebutted by implication from legislative
history or by findings of incompatibility).
85See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.1 (1980); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277,
283 n.7 (1980); see also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 147 (1988) (reaffirming concurrent
state court jurisdiction over § 1983 actions).
86See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 378 (1990) ('This case does not present the
questions whether Congress can require the States to create a forum with the capacity
to enforce federal statutory rights or to authorize service of process on parties who
would not otherwise be subject to the court's jurisdiction."); see also id. at 378 n.20 ("We
have no occasion to address in this case the contention[] ... that the States need not
establish courts competent to entertain § 1983 claims.").
8 7See Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 279 U.S. 377,387-88 (1929)
(approving evenhanded exclusion of FELA actions by nonresidents on out-of-state
accidents);seealso Missouriex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950) (permitting
the nondiscriminatory use of forum non conveniens to exclude FELA actions by
nonresidents on out-of-state accidents).
88496 U.S. 356 (1990). The Howlett Court applied the jurisdictional principles
developed in FELA cases to § 1983 cases, noting that "the existence of the jurisdiction
creates an implication of duty to exercise it." Id. at 373 (citing Mondou v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 58 (1912)). The Howlett Court also noted that it "is quite
inadmissible" for states to decline jurisdiction over federally created causes of action
because of disagreements with federal policy. 496 U.S. at 371.
89 d. at 381 ('The fact that a rule is denominated jurisdictional does not provide a
court an excuse to avoid the obligation to enforce federal law if the rule does not reflect
the concerns of power over the person and competence over the subject matter thatjurisdictional rules are designed to protect."); see also id. at 369 ("A state court may not
deny a federal right, when the parties and controversies are properly before it, in the
absence of 'valid excuse."'). Finally, the Howlett Court also noted that on the occasions
that it had found valid excuses for state court refusals to entertain federal causes of
action, the cases involved neutral rules of judicial administration, including such
matters as the state doctrine of forum non conveniens, the jurisdiction of state courts of
limited jurisdiction, and access to state courts by nonresidents. Id. at 374-75.
90 In Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), the Supreme Court reserved the
question of whether state courts are obligated to entertain § 1983 actions, but it relied
on the nondiscrimination principle in observing that under certain circumstances state
courts must hear federal claims. Id. at 283 n.7 ("We note that where the same type of
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effectively required to entertain § 1983 cases, 91 but the willingness of state
courts to open their doors voluntarily to § 1983 claims 92 makes it unlikely that
the Court will have to address the ultimate question of whether a state may
refuse to hear § 1983 actions.
B. Section 1983 Cases in the Ohio Courts
In Ohio, a number of state courts of general jurisdiction were initially
reluctant to entertain § 1983 suits and even questioned whether they could hear
such cases.93 The Ohio Supreme Court, however, has explicitly held that Ohio
claim, arising under state law, would be enforced in state courts, the state courts are
generally not free to refuse enforcement of the federal claim.").
In Howlett, the Court applied the nondiscrimination principle to § 1983 actions and
rejected an argument that sovereign immunity represented a jurisdictional limitation
on the power of the Florida courts. 496 U.S. at 379-80. Comparing § 1983 actions to the
tort claims against state entities that Florida entertains in its courts of general
jurisdiction, and looking at the exercise of jurisdiction by Florida courts over § 1983
actions against individuals, the Court held that federal law required the Florida courts
to entertain § 1983 actions against local school boards. See id. In taking this position, the
Court defined broadly the comparison to be made under the nondiscrimination
principle and made clear that states that opened their courts to § 1983 actions may not
pick and choose among the § 1983 actions they wished to entertainby classifying state
policies as jurisdictional. See id. at 381; see also Bloomingdale's By Mail, Ltd. v.
Huddleston, 848 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992) (relying on Howlett to hold that Tennessee
courts were required to entertain § 1983 cases challenging state tax statutes), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 3002 (1993); Willbourn v. City of Tulsa, 721 P.2d 803,805 (Okla. 1986) (relying
on the nondiscrimination principle to hold that state courts must entertain § 1983
actions).
The leading pre-Howlett Supreme Court cases applying the nondiscrimination
principle are: Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco
Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934); Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1912). For a
discussion of these cases, see Steinglass, Emerging State Court § 1983 Action, supra note
9, at 443-50. See also STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 9.3.
91To exclude § 1983 cases, a state would have to close its courts to similar actions
authorized by state and federal law against state and local governmental bodies and
their employees. Although such wholesale exclusions of legal challenges to
governmental action are theoretically possible, they are sufficiently implausible to have
led one commentator to conclude that the nondiscrimination principle imposes a "de
facto obligatory jurisdiction" on state courts. See Neubome, supra note 16, at 759.
92 See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 378 n.20 ("Virtually every state has expressly or by
implication opened its courts to § 1983 actions and there are no state court systems that
refuse to hear § 1983 cases.").
93 See STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 15.2(d) (2) n. 59; see also
Solimine, supra note 17, at 42-43. Other Ohio courts exercised jurisdiction over § 1983
cases without addressing the jurisdictional issue, see id. at 50n. 60, while some expressly
held that Ohio courts had concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 cases. See, e.g., Williams
v. Union-Scioto Bd. of Educ., No. 1204, 1985 WL 8356 (Ohio Ct. App. Ross Co. Oct. 8,
1985); Johnson v. Linder, 14 Ohio App. 3d 412,471 N.E.2d 815 (Allen Co. 1984); Jackson
v. Kurtz, 65 Ohio App. 2d 152,416 N.E.2d 1064 (Hamilton Co. 1979); Lakewood Homes,
Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 23 Ohio Misc. 211,258 N.E.2d 470 (Ct. C. P. Allen Co. 1970),
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courts have jurisdiction over § 1983 actions. 94 Even before the Ohio Supreme
Court expressly held that Ohio courts had concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983
actions, Ohio courts were entertaining such federal claims. Although no
statistics are collected on the precise number of § 1983 cases filed in the Ohio
courts,95 a review of appellate court opinions over the past two decades
suggests a significant trend. Essentially no § 1983 cases were being heard in the
Ohio courts in the 1970s, but-as Table I demonstrates, the § 1983 caseload began
to take off in the early 1980s. For example, during the four-year period between
1981 and 1984, there were 11 opinions issued per year by the Ohio appellate
courts, but between 1990 and 1993, the most recent four-year period, the
number of opinions issued per year by the Ohio appellate courts had jumped
more than threefold to 35.25.96 Appellate court opinions, of course, represent
only the tip of the iceberg, but they are a useful surrogate for trends taking place
in trial courts. Thus, it is fair to say that there has been a sharp increase in the
volume of § 1983 cases being filed in the Ohio trial courts.97
There also appears to be changes in the nature of the § 1983 caseload in Ohio.
This conclusion is necessarily impressionistic, but Table II is suggestive. In the
early 1980s, § 1983 cases filed in the Ohio courts were most likely to involve
public employment disputes and only rarely involved the criminal justice
process. In more recent years, however, the state court § 1983 caseload in Ohio
has come to more closely resemble the federal court § 1983 caseload, and there
rev'd, modified and affd, in part, on other grounds, 25 Ohio App. 2d 125, 267 N.E.2d 595
(Allen Co. 1971).
94 See Cooperman v. University Surgical Assocs., 32 Ohio St. 3d 191, 513 N.E.2d 288
(1987) (holding that Court of Common Pleas has jurisdiction over § 1983 individual
capacity damage actions against state employees); Schwarz v. Board of Trustees of Ohio
State Univ., 31 Ohio St. 3d 267,510 N.E.2d 808 (1987) (holding that Court of Common
Pleas has jurisdiction over § 1983 claims for prospective injunctive relief against state
officials); see also Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St. 3d 284, 292-93, 595 N.E.2d 862, 869-70
(1992) (reaffirming Schwarz).
95Telephone Interview with Douglas R. Stephens, Statistics Officer, Ohio Supreme
Court (Apr. 22, 1993). Nor does it appear that statistics on the volume of § 1983 cases
are gathered in other states. Telephone Interview with BrianJ. Ostrom, Director of Court
Statistics, National Center for State Courts July 26, 1993) (indicating his lack of
awareness of any state that systematically collects statistics on the volume of § 1983
cases).
96 Most of the appellate court opinions reflected in Table I are Court of Appeals
decisions, and only 21 of the 292 listed opinions are Ohio Supreme Court cases.
97 Until recently, less than 5% of the opinions of the Ohio Courts of Appeals were
being reported annually. See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, The Supreme
Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions: A Critique, 46 OHIO ST. LJ. 313,316 N. 24 (1985).
Effective March 1,1983, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted a new rule for the reporting
of opinions, see SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE REPORTING OF OPINIONS, and there has
been an increase in the reporting of Court of Appeals opinions. It should be noted,
however, that the increase in Court of Appeals opinions reflected in Table I is not a
function of any changes in publication policies, as the statistics include both reported
and unreported opinions.
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appears to be an increasing percentage of § 1983 suits involving police practices
and other aspects of the criminal justice system, including disputes arising out
of jails and prisons.98
TABLE I
§ 1983 LITIGATION IN THE OHIO CqVRTS
APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS
d&9 CUMg sct tal
1979 1 0 1
1980 0 0 0
1981 12 1 13
1982 7 2 9
1983 11 2 13
1984 7 2 9
1985 28 1 29
1986 12 1 13
1987 16 2 18
1988 22 1 23
1989 23 0 23
1990 35 3 38
1991 33 3 36
1992 37 3 40
1993 27 0 27
TABLE II
§ 1983 LITIGATION IN THE OHIO COU TS
BREAKDOWN BY SUBJECT MATTER
Key to Table II
1. public employment
2. police abuse/excessive force
3. criminal justice/prosecutorial abuse
4. prisoners' rights
5. land use
6. education/juvenile rights
7. taxation/business regulation/interference
8. welfare/governmental benefits
9. miscellaneous
98 This appears to be consistent with the changing nature of the § 1983 caseload in
other states. See STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 2.7.
99 These cases represent reported and unreported appellate court opinions in which
the opinion makes clear that a claim was made under § 1983. These cases were found
by using the following WESTLAW search to locate Ohio cases that cited § 1983:"42 w/5
1983." In cases in which both the Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court wrote
opinions, both are included.
10 0This is the subject matter breakdown of the cases in Table I.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 total
1979 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1981 5 1 0 2 2 1 0 1 1 13
1982 4 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 9
1983 4 1 4 0 1 0 0 1 2 13
1984 3 0 0 2 1 0 1 1 1 9
1985 12 1 5 2 1 3 2 1 2 29
1986 4 1 4 1 0 0 2 0 1 13
1987 8 0 3 1 2 0 0 0 4 18
1988 4 0 4 5 5 1 1 1 2 23
1989 7 0 1 3 2 1 2 1 6 23
1990 6 3 7 4 5 2 4 2 5 38
1991 12 3 5 7 1 1 2 1 4 36
1992 3 3 9 17 2 3 1 0 2 40
1993 8 2 3 6 2 1 2 2 1 27
C. Selective Refusals to Exercise Jurisdiction
Although no state court system categorically excludes § 1983 cases from its
courts, some states exclude subclasses of § 1983 cases.1 01 Such selective
exclusions, however, are improper where they are not based on valid excuses
and neutral rules of judicial administration.102 The Ohio Court of Appeals
recognized these principles in Weinfurtner v. Nelsonville-York School District
Board of Education.10 3 Relying on Howlett, the court held that the state policy of
providing the State Employment Relations Board with exclusive jurisdiction
over disputes involving unfair labor practice charges was not a neutral
jurisdictional rule and thus was not a valid excuse for divesting Ohio courts of
subject matter jurisdiction over § 1983 claims arising out of such disputes.104
10 1See, e.g., Faulkner-King v. Wicks, 590 N.E.2d 511 (111. Ct. App.) (holding that Illinois
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over § 1983 employment discrimination claims),
appeal denied, 602 N.E.2d 450 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1384 (1993); Cepeda v.
Coughlin, 513 N.Y.S.2d 528 (N.Y. App. Div.) (holding that New York courts lack subject
matter jurisdiction over § 1983 suits against correctional officers), appeal denied, 512
N.E.2d 560 (N.Y. 1987); seealso State v. Quill, 500 N.W.2d 196 (N.D. 1993) (holding that
North Dakota courts are not required to entertain § 1983 suits challenging state tax
policies).
102 See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
10377 Ohio App. 3d 348,602 N.E.2d 318 (Athens Co. 1991).
1041d. at 321-22; accord Thomas v. Allen, 837 S.W.2d 631, 632-33 (Tex. 1992) (relying
on Howlett and the absence of a neutral rule of judicial administration to reverse a trial
court's discretionary refusal to assume jurisdiction over an inmate's § 1983 claim against
correctional officers).
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D. Courts of Limited Jurisdiction
1. Court of Claims
States have some leeway in determining which courts they will open to
federal causes of action,105 but states may not adopt jurisdictional policies that
burden the litigation of § 1983 or other federal claims.106 This principle raises
two distinct questions. First, may courts of limited jurisdiction entertain § 1983
actions? Second, if they may, does this preclude courts of general jurisdiction
from also entertaining such actions?
In Manning v. Ohio State Library Board,10 7 the Ohio Supreme Court indirectly
addressed an aspect of these questions in the context of a Title VII employment
discrimination suit against a state agency. The court had previously held that
Ohio courts could not entertain Title VII actions. 108 But in Manning, the court
responded to an intervening Supreme Court decision,109 reversed itself, and
opened the Ohio courts to such federal claims.1 1 0 Because the suit was against
the state, however, the court held that the Ohio Court of Claims had exclusive
jurisdiction.111
105See Herb v. Pitcaim, 324 U.S. 117 (city court of limited jurisdiction may decline to
exercise jurisdiction over FELA actions on the ground that the action arose outside its
territorial jurisdiction), supplemental opinion, 325 U.S. 77 (1945).
106See generally STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATON, supra note 16, § 11.2(b).
10762 Ohio St. 3d 24, 577 N.E.2d 650 (1991).
10 8See Fox v. Eaton Corp., 48 Ohio St. 2d 236,358 N.E.2d 536 (1976) (treating Title VII
actions as exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federal courts).
10 9See Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990) (holding that state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII actions).
110In describing its decision in Fox, the Manning court observed that in Title VII
"Congress afforded room for disagreement on the issue ofjurisdiction" by" not expressly
grant[ing] exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts."Manning, 62 Ohio St. 3d at 28,577
N.E.2d at 653. This apparent attempt to justify Fox, however, completely ignores, as did
the decision by the Fox court, the well-established presumption of concurrency. See supra
note 84.
11162 Ohio St. 3d at 29-30, 577 N.E.2d at 654-55. The Ohio Courts of Common Pleas
have jurisdiction over actions against the state that they could have heard prior to the
creation of the Court of Claims in 1975. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A) (1)
(Anderson 1992) ("To the extent that the state has previously consented to be sued, this
chapter has no applicability."); see also Friedman v. Johnson, 18 Ohio St. 3d 85, 86, 480
N.E.2d 82, 83 (1985) ("[T]he Court of Claims was not to have exclusive, original
jurisdiction over claims from which the state was not immune prior to the effective date
of the Act.").
Despite Fox, the state was not immune from suit under Title VII in state or federal
courts as a result of the 1972 amendments to Title VII, which made Title VII applicable
to state and local governments. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (holding that
the 1972 amendments making Title VII applicable to the states overrode the states'
eleventh amendment immunity from suit in federal courts). As the Manning dissenters
noted, correctly, "[elven had the [Court of Claims] Act not been passed, the state of Ohio
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In the course of holding that Ohio courts may entertain § 1983 suits, the Ohio
Supreme Court has held that the Ohio Courts of Common Pleas have subject
matter jurisdiction over § 1983 suits against state officials for both damages and
injunctive relief.112 Since § 1983 damage suits may only be brought against state
officials in their individual capacities, 113 there is no question that the proper
Ohio court for such suits is the Court of Common Pleas and not the Court of
Claims.
States are not "persons" within the meaning of § 1983. Thus, they cannot be
sued under § 1983 in any forum. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that
official capacity suits seeking prospective injunctive relief against state officials
are within the scope of § 1983.114 This bifurcated definition of "person" under
§ 1983 raises a difficult state law question. Specifically, that issue is whether the
Court of Claims115 may exercise jurisdiction over some § 1983 injunctive claims
against state officials. The Ohio Supreme Court has approved jurisdiction in
the Court of Claims over injunctive suits against the state in limited circum-
.. would still be amenable to suit for a violation of Title VII." Manning, 62 Ohio St. 3d
at 32, 577 N.E.2d at 656 (Douglas, J., dissenting, in part).
Because states that entertain federal causes of action are required to apply all the
attributes of the federal remedy, see infra notes 189-93 and accompanying text, Manning
raises the unusual possibility that in order to entertain Title VII actions the Ohio Court
of Claims may be required to ignore features of state law identified by the Manning
dissenters as otherwise applicable in the Court of Claims, including the waiver
provision, the application of a special collateral source rule, and the bar on joinder of
individual state employees as defendants. Id. In addition, it will be curious to see how
the Court of Claims deals with the provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 creating a
right to trial by jury on intentional employment discrimination claims. See Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102,105 Stat. 1071,1072-73 (1991) (providing that the
right to trial by jury on intentional employment discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981A extends to any party in a case in which "a complaining party seeks
compensatory... damages"). But cf. Kermetz v. Cook-Johnson Realty Corp., 54 Ohio
App. 2d 220, 376 N.E.2d 1357 (Franklin Co. 1977) (treating the bringing of a just
compensation claim in the Court of Claims as a waiver of the right to trial by jury
guaranteed by the Ohio Constitution, but permitting the suit to be brought in the Court
of Common Pleas).
112 See supra note 94.
113Official capacity § 1983 damage suits against state officials are really suits against
the state and not within the definition of "person" in § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58,71 (1989). Thus, the § 1983 cause of action does not reach such
claims, regardless of forum. Moreover, the eleventh amendment denies federal courts
jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting states. Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
ll 4 See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10.
115 The jurisdiction of the court of claims is defined as follows: 'The state hereby
waives its immunity from liability and consents to be sued, and have its liability
determined, in the court of claims.., in accordance with the same rules of law applicable
to suits between private parties ... " OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A) (1) (Anderson
1992).
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stances.116 Furthermore, there is nothing in Manning that suggests that the
court will (or should) reexamine its earlier decisions and deny the Courts of
Common Pleas jurisdiction over § 1983 suits against state officials for injunctive
relief, 117 especially in light of the fact that such suits could be brought prior to
the adoption of the Court of Claims Act.11 8 Nonetheless, when plaintiffs join
§ 1983 claims for prospective injunctive relief with non-§ 1983 damage claims
against the state (permitted in the Court of Claims), there is no reason why the
Court of Claims cannot exercise jurisdiction over the § 1983 claims.
2. Municipal Courts
Analogous issues concerning courts of limited jurisdiction and § 1983
litigation can arise with respect to the Ohio Municipal Courts. Under state law,
Municipal Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with Courts of Common Pleas
over civil actions in which the amount claimed does not exceed $10,000,119 and
it is likely that, as a matter of state law, Municipal Courts are required to
entertain § 1983 suits within the jurisdictional amount requirement. 12 0
116 Cf. Friedman, 18 Ohio St. 3d at 87, 480 N.E.2d at 84 (holding that the presence of a
claim for declaratory relief joined with claims for damages and injunctive relief against
the state did not divest the Court of Claims of jurisdiction). But cf. Brownfield v. State,
63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 407 N.E.2d 1365 (1980) (holding that absent a statute authorizing an
injunctive action directly against the state in the Court of Common Pleas that court
lacked jurisdiction over such a suit).
117Accord Clark v. Russell, No. 1-92-28, 1993 WL 19649 (Ohio Ct. App. Allen Co. Jan
29,1993) (rejecting the argument that Manning deprives the Court of Common Pleas of
subject matter jurisdiction over § 1983 suits against state officials).
118 Although there is no evidence of official capacity § 1983 cases being brought in the
Ohio Courts of Common Pleas against state employees for prospective injunctive relief
prior to 1975, there was no state or federal impediment to such state court litigation.
Moreover, despite the absence of express consent to such suits, consent may be implicit
in the state's obligation under the Supremacy Clause to follow federal law. Cf. Howlett
v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) (rejecting the use of state sovereign immunity as a bar to the
exercise of state court jurisdiction over § 1983 claims). But cf. Manning, 62 Ohio St. 3d at
29, 577 N.E.2d at 654 ("Prior to the enactment of the Court of Claims Act, it was a
fundamental principle of the common law in Ohio that sovereign immunity applied
whenever the state was sued without its express consent."). For a discussion of the
obligation of state courts to entertain federal claims against the state, see infra note 406.
119 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1901.17 (Anderson 1983) ("A municipal court shall have
original jurisdiction only in those cases where the amount claimed by any party, or the
appraised value of the personal property sought to be recovered, does not exceed ten
thousand dollars."); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1901.18(A) (2) (Anderson Supp.
1992) ("[S]ubject to the monetary jurisdiction of municipal courts, ... a municipal court
has original jurisdiction within its territory... [i]n any action or proceeding at law for
the recovery of money.., of which the court of common pleas has jurisdiction.").
120Cf. Terry v. Kolski, 254 N.W.2d 704 (Wis. 1977) (relying on state law to hold that
the small claims courts in Wisconsin may entertain § 1983 claims). But see City of
Cleveland v. A.A. Rose Mfg. Co., 89 Ohio App.3d 267, 273, 624 N.E.2d 245, 249
(Cuyahoga Co. 1993) ('"There is no authority for maintaining a § 1983 action ... in the
municipal courts because they are not courts of general jurisdiction.").
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Moreover, even if state law permitted the exclusion of § 1983 suits from
Municipal Courts, treating federal causes of action differently from state causes
of action raises serious questions under the nondiscrimination principle. 12 1
Thus, it is likely that federal law requires Ohio to open its Municipal Courts to
§ 1983 claims.122
V. CHOICE OF FORUM CONSIDERATIONS
Most choice of forum discussions focus on plaintiffs because they are
responsible for choosing the court in which a suit is filed. Defendants, however,
have an equal interest in which court will hear a case. Accordingly, the factors
that convince some § 1983 plaintiffs to select state courts often lead defendants
to seek ways to avoid remaining in state courts. Given the liberal federal
question removal statute,123 state court defendants who prefer to defend § 1983
claims in federal court can almost always remove such cases,124 and they are
increasingly doing So.125
12 1 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
122 The converse issue of whether Ohio may make the Municipal Courts the exclusive
forums for entertaining § 1983 claims that meet their territorial and other jurisdictional
requirements is principally of academic interest given the fact that the Courts of
Common Pleas have concurrent jurisdiction with Municipal Courts over small damage
claims. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.01 (Anderson Supp. 1992) ("The court of
common pleas has original jurisdiction in all civil cases in which the sum or matter in
dispute exceeds the exclusive original jurisdiction of county courts .... "). Under the
nondiscrimination principle, a state may not single out § 1983 or other federal claims
for less favorable treatment than that afforded state law claims. See STEINGLASS, SECTION
1983 LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 10.4. A state that evenhandedly placed all "small
claims" (without regard to their state or federal character) in a special court, however,
could probably do so under federal law unless this burdened the litigation of the federal
claims. See STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 11.2(a) (2).
12328 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988) (permitting state court defendants to remove cases to
federal court if the action could have originally been filed in federal court). See generally
Dorsey v. City of Detroit, 858 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying § 1441 to permit removal
of a state court § 1983 case).
12 4Removal of state court § 1983 cases is not available when the state court defendant
fails to meet the timeliness and other procedural requirements of removal, see 28 U.S.C.§ 1446(b) (1988), when less than all state court defendants join the removal petition, see
Hewitt v. City of Stanton 798 F.2d 1230, 1232 (9th Cir. 1986), when the defendant's
conduct in the litigation constitutes a waiver of the right to remove, see infra note 127,
or when the federal court "lacks subject matter jurisdiction" over the case. See 28 U.S.C.§ 1447(c) (1988).
State courts are not required to follow the justiciability requirements of Article mT
of the United States Constitution, and defendants may not remove § 1983 cases that meet
state, but not federal, justiciability requirements. See International Primate Protection
League v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 111 S. Ct. 1700,1710 (1991) (noting that
"plaintiff's lack of Article m standing would not necessarily defeat its standing in state
court"). Likewise, federal courts do not have removal jurisdiction over cases that are
barred from federal court by the eleventh amendment. See McKay v. Boyd Constr. Co.,
769 F.2d 1084,1086-87 (5th Cir. 1985); David Nursing Home v. Michigan Dep't of Social
Servs., 579 F. Supp. 285, 288 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (removal to federal court not a waiver of
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A full review of choice of forum considerations relevant to § 1983 litigation
in Ohio is beyond the scope of this article,126 but some of the more important
factors deserve mention. At first, however, a caveat: at best, any choice of
forum discussion only identifies factors that those responsible for such
decisions should consider. What direction these factors point will vary based
on the nature of the case, the identity and attitudes of the parties and attorneys,
the relief sought, the identity of the judge, and the respective roles of the judge
and the jury. In addition, the body of relevant precedents as well as a myriad
of tactical considerations influence choice of forum decisions.
A. The Decisionmakers
1. The Judges
The identity of the judge who will hear a case is one of the more important
choice of forum factors. It is difficult, however, to generalize as to how
differences between state and federal judges influence choice of forum
decisions in specific cases. Moreover, because it is not possible to know which
judge in a multijudge district or division will be assigned to a particular case,
judgments about the attractiveness of the state or federal benches are
necessarily collective judgments. 127
eleventh amendment). When cases are removed to federal courts that lack subject matterjurisdiction, federal courts are required to remand the cases to state courts. See 28 U.S.C.§ 1447(c); seealso Henry v. Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1991) (treating
a § 1983 official capacity claim as a suit against the state that is barred by the eleventh
amendment and ordering a remand but retaining jurisdiction over the § 1983 individual
capacity claim). For a further discussion of jurisdictional issues in removed § 1983 cases,
see STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 24.4.
12 5This conclusion about the increase in the removal of state court § 1983 actions is
based on the author's analysis of raw statistical data from the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, from discussions with practicing attorneys throughout the
country, including Ohio, and from the increasingly frequent references to removal in
federal court § 1983 opinions. Cf. Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in
Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 369,389
n.86 (1992) (documenting the increase in federal question removal).
126For a general review without an Ohio focus, see STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983
LITIGATION, supra note 16, Chs. 5-9.
127Plaintiffs' attorneys rarely know which judge will be assigned to their case, but
state court defendants know the identity of the state trial judge to whom a case has been
assigned. Thus, removal permits defendants to divest a particular state court judge ofjurisdiction by removing the case to a different judicial system. But cf. Rothner v. City
of Chicago, 879 F.2d 1402,1404 (7th Cir. 1989) ("The thought that Congress could have
intended litigants to use § 1441 to 'test the waters' in state court before deciding whether
to exercise their right to remove is simply absurd."). Defendants, however, must not
only remove within the thirty-day period of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1988), but they must
also take care to avoid extensive participation in state court within the thirty-day period
or risk waiving their right to remove. See Rothner, 879 F.2d at 1412-16 (discussing the
waiver doctrine but expressing doubts about its status).
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Federal court judges clearly have better jobs than their state counterparts.
They have higher wages, better working conditions, and greater job security,
including a guarantee of life tenure that enables them to remain not only above
partisan politics but also independent of the bar, the public, and the media.128
But this guarantee of independence may also account for what some view as a
federal judiciary that has lost touch. State court judges lack the independence
that characterizes the federal bench.129 This is especially true in Ohio which,
despite a nonpartisan general election ballot,13 0 has a tradition of a politicized
and partisan state judiciary.131 Perhaps even more importantly, federal judges
have the institutional support to give their cases adequate attention.132 On the
other hand, state court trial judges in Ohio have significantly higher caseloads
than their federal counterparts and far fewer resources to perform their
duties.133
The most analogous procedural device available to plaintiffs who wish to change
forums after "testing the waters" are the rules on voluntary dismissals. Cf. Woods v.
Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, No. 80 CA 30, 1981 WL 6063 (Ohio Ct. App. Pickaway
Co. Nov. 9, 1981) (refusing to apply res judicata to a federal court suit that was
voluntarily dismissed after the decision was announced but before entry of judgment).
But cf. Feldman v. Village of Lombard, No. 86 C 3295, 1987 WL 9000 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26,
1987) (requiring any new filing after a voluntary dismissal to be treated as a "related
case" and reassigned to the original judge).
128 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 30-48
(1985).
12 9This is not to suggest that all federal judges leave their political or partisan concerns
behind after their confirmation. Nor does it suggest that all state court judges lack
independence. Rather, it suggests that it is easier for federal judges to remain
independent.
13 0See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.04 (Anderson 1988) (nonpartisan general election
ballot for election to judicial office).
13 11n addition to the partisan primary, political parties in Ohio play an active role in
funding and managing "nonpartisan" general election campaigns for the bench. See
generally Kathleen L. Barber, Ohio Judicial Elections-Nonpartisan Premises With Partisan
Results, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 762 (1971); see also G. ALAN TARR & MARY C. A. PORTER, STATE
SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 124-83 (1988).
13 2This is true despite the funding crisis that recently led to a temproary suspension
of civil jury trials in the federal courts. See Stephen Labaton, U.S. Judges Refuse To Add
Civil Cases Citing Gap in Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1993, at Al. But see Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-50, 107 Stat. 241, 246 (1993) (appropriating
interim funding for juror fees for civil cases).
1331n 1992, 154,890 new cases were filed in the General Division of the Ohio Courts
of Common Pleas. See OHIOCOURTS SUMMARY 1E (1992). In the 12 of the 19 Ohio counties
in which the General Division of the Court of Common Pleas does not have jurisdiction
over domestic relations, probate, and juvenile cases, which are almost exclusively the
most populous Ohio counties, an average of more than 800 new civil and criminal cases
were filed in 1992 for each year judge. Id. at 2E. In six counties in this group, there were
more than 1,000 new filings (including transfers and reactivations) per judge in 1992. In
order of caseload, these counties were: Erie (1,321), Franklin (1,259), Cuyahoga (1,207),
Summit (1,088), Hamilton (1,015), and Lorain (1,008). Id.
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These generalizations do not do justice to the subtle forces that influence
individual judges. Many state court judges, despite their lack of resources,
efficiently manage their caseloads. Likewise, many federal court judges,
despite their institutional advantages, do not.134 Thus, like collective
judgments about the competence or attitudes of the state or federal judiciary,
Federal court caseloads in Ohio, on the other hand, are far lighter. For example, in
1993, there were 4,012 new cases (divided into 3550 civil cases and 462 criminal cases)
filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. ANNUAL
AssEsSMENT OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1993 PURSUANT TO
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 (United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio)[hereinafter "NORTHERN DISTRIcy']. The comparable figures for the
Southern District of Ohio for 1993 were 3040 new cases (divided into 2632 civil cases
and 408 criminal cases). 10th ANNUAL REPORT 1993 (Office of the Clerk - United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio). The number of case filings per full-time
equivalent federal judge in the Northern District of Ohio for 1993 was 486.3, which
consisted of 430.3 new civil cases per judge and 56 new criminal cases per judge.
NORTHERN DISTRICT, supra. These figures allocate the time of federal judges who have
taken senior status and elect not to take a full draw of cases. They also reflect the fact
that five of the twelve authorized federal judgeships in the Northern District of Ohio
were vacant during 1993. If this court had been fully staffed during all of 1993, the per
judge new filings would have been 302.8, which would have consisted of 267.9 new civil
cases and 34.9 new criminal cases. Ignoring the contribution of the senior judges in the
Northern District of Ohio, the case filings per federal judge in the district for 1993
(assuming that all twelve of the judgeships had been filled) would have been 334.3 cases,
which would have consisted of 295.8 new civil cases per judge and 38.5 new criminal
cases per judge. The Southern District of Ohio does not generate any statistics based on
the number of case filings per full-time equivalent federal judge. All eight of the federal
judgeships in the Southern District of Ohio were filled during 1993. Ignoring the
contribution of senior judges, the numberof case filings per federal judge in the Southern
District of Ohio for 1993 was 380, which consisted of 329 new civil cases per judge and
51 new criminal cases per judge.
Unlike the federal court statistics, which sometimes take into consideration the
contribution of senior district court judges, the state court statistics ignore the role of
reserve judges. The statistics also ignore the greater complexity of many federal cases.
Nonetheless, the statistics provide some indication of the higher caseloads in the state
courts in many Ohio counties.
The above assessments of the caseloads of the federal courts in Ohio do not
breakdown the caseload, but in fiscal year 1992, which is the year ending September 30,
1992, there were 648 new civil rights cases filed in the Northern District of Ohio
(including 492 voting, employment, housing and accommodations, welfare, and other
civil rights cases and 156 "prisoner civil rights" cases) and 628 new civil rights cases filed
in the Southern District of Ohio (including 373 voting, employment, housing and
accommodations, welfare, and other civil rights cases and 255 "prisoner civil rights"
cases). ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 30 (1992) (Table C-3). This greater number of
prisoner cases in the Southern District is undoubtedly explained by the greater number
of prisons in the southern part of Ohio. As noted earlier, there are no comparable figures
available as to the § 1983 caseload of Ohio courts, see supra note 95, but it is clear that
most § 1983 cases in Ohio are filed in federal court.
13 4The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 attempts to improve the efficiency of the
federal bench by requiring all federal districts to adopt "a civil justice expense and delay
reduction plan." Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103(a), 104 Stat. 5098 (1990) (creating 28 U.S.C.
§ 471 (Supp. 1I 1991)).
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generalizations about efficiency or capacity have little relevance to how
individual judges act in specific cases.
2. The Juries
There are significant differences in the composition of juries in the state and
federal courts in Ohio as well as in their mode of selection and methods of
operation. State court juries in Ohio are selected from a venire representing a
single county, unlike multicounty federal juries. 135 Thus, state court juries more
closely resemble the county in which a suit is filed. Attorneys in the Ohio courts
conduct the voir dire and thus play a greater role in selecting juries than do
attorneys in the federal courts. The methods of deciding cases also differ. State
court juries in Ohio decide civil cases by a three-fourths vote136 rather than by
the unanimous vote required in federal court under both the Seventh
Amendment and the federal rules.137
B. Doctrinal Limitations
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and federal practice is
characterized by restrictive policies on such justiciability requirements as
standing, mootness, and ripeness. Likewise, the various abstention doctrines
limit the equitable power of federal courts. In addition, the Eleventh
Amendment limits the ability of federal courts to enter decrees having an
impact on the state treasury.138
State courts in Ohio operate independently of these federal constraints.
Although there may be Ohio counterparts to many of these federal limitations,
Ohio courts may reach the merits of claims that federal courts cannot reach.
For example, unlike the federal courts, Ohio courts make broad use of taxpayer
standing.139 Also, unlike the federal courts, Ohio courts are not subject to the
narrow federal mootness doctrine. 140
135For example, juries in the Western Division of the Northern District of Ohio, which
sits in Toledo, come from a 21-county area. The Eastern Division is divided into three
regions for jury selection purposes, and juries in Akron are selected from 11 counties;
in Cleveland from 4 counties, and in Youngstown from 4 counties. See JUROR SELECTION
PLAN, UNITED STATES DIsTRIcT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 2 (Sept. 1,
1992).
13 6 0HIO CONST. art. I, § 5.
13 7See American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 467-68 (1897); see also FED. R.
Civ. P. 48.
13 8See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 67, § 7.4.
13 9Compare State ex rel. Meshel v. Keip, 66 Ohio St. 2d 379, 423 N.E.2d 60 (1981)
(upholding the use of taxpayer standing to permit a challenge to the constitutionality
of the General Assembly's delegation of authority to the Controlling Board to transfer
funds from one fiscal year to another) and State ex rel. Nimon v. Springdale, 6 Ohio St.
2d 1,215 N.E.2d 592 (1966) (permitting a municipal taxpayer to enforce the right of the
public to the performance of a public duty) with United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166 (1974) (denying taxpayer and citizen standing to plaintiffs challenging secrecy
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C. Tactical Differences
State courts are often seen by plaintiffs as more attractive forums in which
to litigate § 1983 damage claims. Among the reasons for this attraction is the
fact that in the age of "civil justice reform,"14 1 federal courts have become less
friendly places for litigating cases. 142 Furthermore, state court judges are less
likely to block the path to the jury.
Despite Ohio's adoption of civil rules of procedure that are patterned after
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there are differences not only in specific
rules but also in the practices followed by state and federal courts. Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the willingness of federal judges to
use (or to threaten to use) Rule 11 and other sanctions may deter some plaintiffs
from filing § 1983 cases in federal courts. 143 In Ohio, however, the analogous
rules have far fewer teeth.144 Even more importantly, state trial court judges
are often reluctant to use sanctions aggressively against attorneys whose
support they may need to retain their jobs.
Federal case management procedures are also more demanding than
analogous state procedures. Because moving cases to trial quickly is one of
concerning expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency as inconsistent with U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7, requiring a regular statement and account of public funds).
140Compare Franchise Developers, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 30 Ohio St. 3d 28, 29, 505
N.E.2d 966,967 (1987) (syllabus) ("Although a case may be moot with respect to one of
the litigants, this court may hear the appeal where there remains a debatable
constitutional question to resolve, or where the matter appealed is one of great public
or general interest.") with Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975) (limiting capable
of repetition yet evading review mootness exception to cases in which the named party
may again be affected).
1 41Under the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio was designated a "demonstration" district and was
required to "experiment with systems of differentiated case management." Publ. L. No.
101-650, § 104(b) (1), 104 Stat. 5098 (1990). In addition, the district opted to be an early
implementation district and to adopt its expense and delay reduction plan by December
31, 1991. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 105, 104 Stat.
5098 (1990). The district's differentiated case management plan, which became effective
on January 1, 1992, permits early intervention and encourages the use of alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms. See UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF OHIO, LOCAL RULES 7 & 8 (dealing with alternative dispute resolution and
differentiated case management respectively).
14 2See Miller, supra note 125, at 396-423 (summarizing the results of a survey of
attorneys' choice of forum decisions).
14 3The revision of Rule 11, which became effective on December 1, 1993, is intended
to place "greater constraints on the imposition of sanctions." Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules, comment (on proposed Rule 11).
144Compare OHIO R. Civ. P. 11 (limiting sanctions to willful violations) with FED. R.
CIv. P. 11 (authorizing sanctions without any showing of willful violations). The recent
change in FED. R. CIv. P. 11, see supra note 143, places greater constraints on the
imposition of sanctions but still leaves the federal rule far more powerful than the Ohio
counterpart.
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plaintiffs' goals, one might think that plaintiffs would prefer judges who have
both the tools and the inclination to accomplish this. Nonetheless, some
plaintiffs resist what they believe to be overly demanding case management
requirements, and they often have concerns about the interventionist approach
of many federal judges.
Discovery rules in the state and federal courts in Ohio have long been
virtually identical, but this may be changing. The federal courts have made
major changes in discovery,145 but it is unclear whether they will apply to§ 1983 cases in the Ohio federal courts.146 Nor is it clear whether such changes
will remain in effect,147 and, if they do, whether Ohio will follow the federal
lead.1 48
There are also different procedural tools available in state and federal courts.
Ohio expressly permits the use of Doe Defendants to allow the joinder of
unknown defendants after the expiration of the statute of limitations. 149 In
contrast, the availability of this practice in federal court is unclear.150 The
federal offer of judgment rule151 also evinces a difference between federal and
Ohio civil procedure. Though used only occasionally, this rule is a powerful
14 5 0n April 22, 1993, the Supreme Court recommended the adoption of rules that
would significantly change the current system of discovery and replace it with a system
thatrelies heavily on voluntary disclosure. See Order, 146 F.R.D. 404 (1993) (transmitting
proposed amendments to Congress). Because Congress failed to block these changes,
they became effective December 1, 1993.
146 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1), as amended, federal district courts may adopt local
rules that make inapplicable or modify disclosure procedures.
14 7See Randall Samborn, Rules for Discovery Uncertain Opposition Lingers to Mandatory
Disclosure, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 20, 1993, at 1 (describing the unsuccessful effort to get
Congress to block the mandatory disclosure rules before their December 1,1993 effective
date, and the uncertainty as to whether Congress will intervene now that the rules have
become effective).
148 The Ohio Supreme Court has relied on federal principles in defining the scope of
discovery in § 1983 litigation. See Henneman v. City of Toledo, 35 Ohio St. 3d 241, 520
N.E.2d 207 (1988) (noting that "[wihere a particular claim is based on the United States
Constitution or federal statutes, federal law controls on the question of evidentiary
privilege" and permitting discovery of information and records compiled by a police
department pursuant to its internal investigation of alleged police misconduct subject
to an in camera inspection by the trial court).
149 See OHIO R. Civ. P. 3(A) & 15(D).
150See Lewellen v. Morley, 875 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1989) (acknowledging that state law
supplied the applicable tolling policies for § 1983 actions, but refusing to apply this
borrowed state policy to federal court § 1983 when there is a provision of federal law
on point); see also Worthington v. Wilson, 790 F. Supp. 829 (C.D. Ill. 1992) (refusing to
permit relation back of amendment adding Doe Defendants under FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c),
as amended in 1991). But see Cabrales v. Los Angeles County, 864 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir.
1988) (permitting such relations back), vacated on other grounds, 490 U.S. 1087 (1989). For
a further discussion of this issue, see STEINGLAss, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note
16, at § 8.2(c).
151FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
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weapon for federal court defendants. It provides leverage to force settlements
by limiting their exposure to fee awards in § 1983 suits. 152 There is no analogous
provision under Ohio law.153 Finally, the clear availability of interlocutory
appeals of § 1983 qualified immunity issues in the federal system, as contrasted
to the uncertainty of such interlocutory review in the Ohio courts, 154 is another
reason § 1983 plaintiffs may prefer state courts and § 1983 defendants may
remove cases to federal courts. 155
Differences between state and federal practice, however, are more than
simply a question of the formal rules. One of the most significant areas of
difference involves the availability of summary judgment. Despite the virtually
identical rules,156 federal judges are far more likely than Ohio judges to dispose
of cases on summary judgment. In part, this is a result of recent Supreme Court
decisions that encourage greater use of summary judgment, 157 especially in§ 1983 cases, 158 but it also may be a function of the greater resources that federal
courts can bring to the task of addressing complex, document-intensive
motions for summary judgment.
Ohio has embraced the federal approach to summary judgment,159 but the
Ohio Supreme Court appears more reluctant than federal courts to approve the
•
152 See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) (construing FED R. CIV. P. 68 to permit the
use of rejected offers of judgment to limit awards of attorney fees to plaintiffs under 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
153 See OHIO R. Civ. P. 68 (barring the use of rejected offers of judgment to determine
costs).
154 See infra notes 327-48 and accompanying text.
155Some additional differences involve voluntary dismissals. Compare OHIO R. Civ. P.
41(A) (1) (permitting plaintiffs to dismiss cases voluntarily up until the commencement
of trial) with FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a) (1) (only permitting plaintiffs to dismiss cases
voluntarily before service of an answer or a motion for summary judgment). Differences
also exist with regard to the rules on verdicts. Compare OHIO R. Civ. P. 49(C) (barring
the use of special verdicts) with FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a) (permitting the use of special
verdicts).
156 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56; OHIo R. CIv. P. 56.
157 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322 (1986) ("[T]he plain language of Rule
56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and
upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial."); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Unlike federal
courts, the Ohio courts do not permit sua sponte grants of summary judgment. See Besser
v. Griffey, 88 Ohio App. 3d 379,382 n.4, 623 N.E.2d 1326, 1328 n.4 (Ross Co. 1993).
158See infra notes 260-63 and accompanying text (discussing the adoption of an almost
exclusively objective qualified immunity standard).
159 5ee Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas, 59 Ohio St. 3d 108, 108,570 N.E.2d 1095,
1096-97 (1991) (syllabus no. 3) (relying on Celotex and holding that "[a] motion for
summary judgment forces the nonmoving party to produce evidence on any issue for
which that party bears the burden of production at trial").
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use of summary judgment and has required trial courts to strictly adhere to the
summary judgment rule.
Summary judgment is a procedural device to terminate litigation and
to avoid a formal trial where there is nothing to try. It must be awarded
with caution, resolving doubts and construing evidence against the
moving party, and granted only when it appears from the evidentiary
material that reasonable minds can reach only an adverse conclusion
as to the party opposing the motion. Recently, this court reiterated that,
because summary judgment is a procedural device to terminate
litigation, it must be awarded with caution. Doubts must be resolved
in favor of the non-moving party.
160
Independent of doctrine, it is often easier for state court judges to deny
summary judgment and to set a case for trial rather than to produce a written
opinion granting summary judgment.161 Federal judges, on the other hand, are
more likely to refer the stack of depositions, affidavits, and briefs to a law clerk
(or law student intern), a luxury available to few state trial courts.
D. Federal Law and the Law of the Circuit
State courts often look to the Court of Appeals for the federal circuit in which
their state is located for guidance in construing § 1983. Even though the same
body of federal law governs § 1983 actions in state and federal courts, state
courts are not obligated to follow the law of their federal circuit.162 Although
somewhat surprising, this is consistent with the structure of the federal judicial
system in which the United States Supreme Court is responsible for resolving
conflicts between state and federal courts on the meaning of federal law.163
16OMurphy v. City of Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St. 3d 356,358,604 N.E.2d 138,140 (1992)
(citations and quotations omitted). The syllabus in Murphy was as follows: "Civ.R. 56(C)
places a mandatory duty on a trial court to thoroughly examine all appropriate materials
filed by the parties before ruling on a motion for summary judgment. The failure of a
trial court to comply with this requirement constitutes reversible error." 65 Ohio St. 3d
at 356, 604 N.E.2d at 138. The Murphy court also made clear that the independent
consideration by an appellate court cannot cure a trial court's failure to examine the
evidence. 65 Ohio St. 3d at 360, 604 N.E.2d at 141.
16165 Ohio St. 3d at359, 604 N.E.2d at 140 (requiring trial courts to thoroughly examine
all appropriate materials before ruling on a motion for summary judgment).
162 See United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072,1075-76 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971).
163 See generally STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 5.4; see also
Beason v. Harcleroad, 805 P.2d 700, 704 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that "in cases in
which federal law is applied, Oregon courts are not bound by Ninth Circuit decisions
...."); Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 179 (Cal. 1981) ("[Tihis court is in any
event under no obligation to follow federal lower court precedents interpreting acts of
Congress when we find those precedents unpersuasive."); Gayety Books v. City of
Baltimore, 369 A.2d 581, 585 (Md. 1977) ("The courts of this State ... are not bound by
the holdings of a federal district court or of a federal circuit court of appeals.").
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Because Ohio courts need not follow Sixth Circuit interpretations of federal
law,164 those responsible for choice of forum decisions should carefully review
the state of the relevant law in the Sixth Circuit 165 and the Ohio Supreme
Court.166
VI. THE METHODOLOGY OF STATE COURT § 1983 LITIGATION
As the volume of § 1983 state court litigation increases, state courts have had
to address a number of novel issues. State courts that entertain § 1983 actions
tend to apply familiar state policies, including state rules of practice and
procedure. This application of state policies raises a range of discrete state and
federal law issues, including whether the state policies apply to § 1983 claims
as a matter of state law, and, if so, whether such applications are consistent with
federal law.
The Supreme Court requires state courts to use federal standards to define
the elements of the § 1983 cause of action. 167 States may not go beneath this
federal floor to reject federal policies on such matters as the available
immunities, the absence of exhaustion requirements, and the availability of
attorney fees to prevailing parties. 168 Nor may states adopt policies that
discriminate against or burden § 1983 actions.169 On the other hand, when the
policies applicable to federal court § 1983 litigation are not derived from § 1983
itself, such as with the jury unanimity requirement of the Seventh Amendment
or the case or controversy requirement of Article III, state courts are generally
free to follow their own policies. 170
164For example, the Sixth Circuit has interpreted federal law as requiring the use of
a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 cases, but some Ohio Courts of Appeals have
selected a four-yearlimitationsperiod. Fora discussion of thestatuteof limitations issue,
see infra notes 491-506 and accompanying text.
165For a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's recent treatment of § 1983 issues, see Steven
H. Steinglass, Section 1983 and the Reaganization of the Sixth Circuit: Closing the Doors to
the Federal Courthouse, 20 U. TOL. L. REV. 497 (1989)[hereinafter Steinglass, Sixth Circuit].
166Only decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court are binding on trial courts throughout
the state. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 97, at 322. Thus, when the Ohio Supreme
Court has not spoken on an issue, it is important to look at the decisions of the state
Court of Appeals whose decisions are binding on state trial courts within a district. See
SUPREME COURT RULES FOR REPORTING OPINIONS 2(G) (2) ("Opinions [of the Court of
Appeals] reported in the Ohio Official Reports . . . shall be considered controlling
authority for all purposes in the judicial district in which they were rendered unless and
until each such opinion is reversed or modified by a court of competent jurisdiction.").
167See infra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
168See infra notes 239-42, 471-90 and 554-61 and accompanying text.
169See infra notes 194-207 and accompanying text.
170See generally STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 16, at § 10.3.
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A. The Meaning of State Law
State courts must initially determine whether state law applies to § 1983
actions. By addressing this issue first, state courts can avoid reaching federal
issues. For example, in Terry v. Kolski,171 the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied
on principles of state court jurisdiction to hold that state law required small
claims courts to entertain § 1983 actions otherwise within their jurisdiction.
Terry therefore had no reason to reach the ultimate question of whether federal
law required the same result.172
Ohio has similarly avoided reaching federal issues when state statutes, by
their terms, only apply to state causes of action. Under these circumstances, the
Ohio Supreme Court has not extended such requirements to § 1983 claims. For
example, in Conley v. Shearer,173 the court treated the immunity of state officials
under § 9.86 of the Ohio Revised Code 174 as not applicable to § 1983 actions
because the statute "expressly limits its coverage to 'any civil action that arises
under the law of this state."'175
In many cases, state statutes are not clear as to whether they apply to § 1983
actions, and this raises difficult issues of state statutory construction. In such
cases, state courts often assume that state policies apply to § 1983 claims as a
matter of state law.176 An alternative approach to this initial state law issue is
followed by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. In Mellinger v. Town
of West Springfield,177 the court adopted a "clear statement rule". Under that rule,
the court refused to apply the Massachusetts notice of claim requirement 178 to
§ 1983 claims "absent a clear legislative statement that § 1983 claimants must
comply" with the state policy.179 Because state legislators rarely have § 1983 or
other federal causes of action in mind when they adopt policies to govern state
court litigation, the Massachusetts rule of statutory construction seems more
171254 N.W.2d 704 (Wis. 1977).
172 See id. at 713.
17364 Ohio St. 3d 284, 595 N.E.2d 862 (1992).
174 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 9.86 (Anderson 1990).
17564 Ohio St. 3d at 291, 595 N.E.2d at 869 (first emphasis added) (quoting OHIO REV.
CODE § 9.86).
176 See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 408 N.W.2d 19 (Wis. 1987) (construing state statute
providing that "no action may be brought ... unless" a claimant complies with the state
notice of claim requirement as reaching § 1983 actions), rev'd on other grounds, 487 U.S.
131 (1988).
177515 N.E.2d 584 (Mass. 1987).
178 Under notice of claim requirements, a plaintiff is typically required to serve a notice
of an injury on a governmental body within 90 or 120 days of the accrual of an action
and then wait until the claim is denied (or a statutory period of time runs) before filing
a civil suit.
1791d. at 589.
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sound than a rule that presumptively applies state substantive policies (or state
procedural policies that have a substantive impact) to federal causes of action.
The importance of this threshold issue of state statutory construction is easy
to overlook, and the Ohio courts have not addressed it directly. For example,
it is unclear whether the waiver provision of the Ohio Court of Claims Act is
applicable to § 1983 claims. The statute, by its terms, treats the filing of a civil
action against the state in the Court of Claims as a waiver of "any cause of
action, based on the same act or omission, which the filing party has against
any state officer or employee."180 In Leaman v. Ohio Department of Mental
Retardation,181 the Sixth Circuit construed the statute literally and applied it to
§ 1983 claims, 182 but in Conley v. Shearer,183 the Ohio Supreme Court treated the
related immunity provision as not applying to § 1983 claims. 184 This
conclusion, however, may have been based on federal law rather than state
law,185 and a number of Ohio courts have cited Leaman favorably without
addressing the state law issue.186 In any case, at some point, the Ohio courts
will be required to authoritatively decide whether the waiver provision in the
Court of Claims Act applies to § 1983 claims as a matter of state law.187
Likewise, the Ohio courts will have to decide whether § 1983 actions are "tort
180OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A) (Anderson 1992).
181825 F.2d 946 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1204 (1988).
1821d. at 952 ("[TIhe Ohio legislature clearly provided for waiver of federal causes of
action .... ). In so construing state law, the Sixth Circuit relied on two federal district
court cases and its own interpretation of state law. See id. There are no Ohio appellate
court decisions addressing this issue.
18364 Ohio St. 3d 284, 595 N.E.2d 862 (1992).
184 See supra notes 173-75.
185 See Conley, 64 Ohio St. 3d at 282, 595 N.E.2d at 869 (referring to § 9.86 and
§ 2743.02(F) of the OHIO REV. CODE and stating that "[tihose sections, however, do not
apply to claims brought under federal law."). It is unclear, however, whether this
conclusion was based exclusively on the language in OHIO REV. CODE § 9.86.
186 See, e.g., Weinfurtner v. Nelsonville-York Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 77 Ohio App. 3d
348,602 N.E.2d 318 (Athens Co. 1991); White v. Morris, 69 Ohio App. 3d 90, 590 N.E.2d
57 (Scioto Co.),juris. motion overruled, 56 Ohio St. 3d 704, 564 N.E.2d 707 (1990).
187 The leading commentators on the relationship between the Court of Claims Act
and § 1983 view it as "anomalous that such an important state law should receive its
authoritative interpretation by the federal courts." Saphire & Brenner, supra note 17, at
246. This is particularly true in the case of the Court of Claims Act since "neither the
language nor the structure of the Act establishes, explicitly or by necessary implication,
that the Ohio General Assembly either sought purposefully-or, indeed, that it even
considered-whether, or the extent to which, it would affect or perhaps even foreclose
the ability of an individual to obtain an adjudication of rights secured by federal law."
Id. at 245.
The Ohio courts are free to disagree with the Sixth Circuit's conclusion in Leaman
that federal law permits the state to apply this waiver provision to § 1983 claims. For a
discussion of this issue, see Steinglass, Sixth Circuit, supra note 165, at 571-78.
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actions" for purposes of the provision of the 1987 legislation that imposed a
heavier burden of proof on those seeking punitive damages and removed
responsibility for determining the amount of punitive damages from juries.188
B. A Federal Definition of§ 1983
When states voluntarily open their courts to federal causes of action, they
must give plaintiffs "the benefit of the full scope of these [federally created]
rights."189 This principle requires state courts to apply the federal definition of
the § 1983 cause of action.190 In Howlett v. Rose,191 the Court extended this
principle and rejected the availability of state sovereign immunity as a defense
to a § 1983 suit against a local school board. In so holding, the Court stated that
"[tihe elements of, and the defenses to, a federal cause of action are defined by
federal law."192 Thus, the Court made clear that federal principles define both
the § 1983 cause of action and the available defenses.193
C. The Nondiscrimination Principle
The Supreme Court has relied on the nondiscrimination principle to limit
the ability of state courts to exclude § 1983 actions from their courts.194 This
jurisdictional principle, however, also prevents states from singling out federal
causes of action and applying policies not followed in analogous state-created
actions.195 Moreover, in Felder v. Casey,196 the Court broadened the
nondiscrimination principle by treating state policies as discriminatory when
188 See infra notes 447-70 and accompanying text.
189 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988) (quoting Garrett v. Moore-McCormack
Co., 317 U.S. 239, 245 (1942)).
190 Seegenerally STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 16, §§ 10.3,15.2(c) (1).
See also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 n.8 (1980) (holding that states may not
narrow § 1983 cause of action by immunizing conduct wrongful under § 1983).
191496 U.S. 356 (1990).
192 d. at 375.
1931n asserting the primacy of federal rules in defining § 1983, the Howlett Court stated
that
as to persons Congress subjected to liability, individual States may
not exempt such persons from federal liability by relying on their
own common law heritage. If we were to uphold the immunity
claim in this case, every State would have the same opportunity
to extend the mantle of sovereign immunity to "persons" who would
otherwise be subject to § 1983 liability. States would then be free to
nullify for their own people the legislative decisions that Congress
has made on behalf of all the People.
Id. at 383.
194 See supra note 90.
195 See generally STEINGLAss, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 10.4.
196487 U.S. 131 (1988).
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they were imposed "only upon those who seek redress for injuries resulting
from the use or misuse of governmental authority."197
D. State Policies and Burdens on § 1983 Litigation
The purposes of § 1983 are compensation and deterrence. 198 State policies
that are inconsistent with those purposes, or that burden the litigation of § 1983
claims, should be rejected in § 1983 litigation in both state and federal courts.
Thus, federal law bars the use of state policies in state court § 1983 litigation
even when state courts apply those policies evenhandedly to both state and
federal causes of action.
In Felder, the Court gave content to the compensation purpose of § 1983 by
holding that state policies that limited the right of recovery in order to minimize
governmental liability were inconsistent with federal law.199 In addition, the
Court held that state policies applicable only to state court § 1983 actions must
be rejected not only when they are inconsistent with federal policies concerning
immunities, exhaustion and statutes of limitations but also when they burden
state court § 1983 litigation.2°°
Although state court judgments based on state procedural doctrines are
insulated from Supreme Court review under the adequate state ground
doctrine,201 the adequacy of the state ground is itself a federal question. For
example, in FELA litigation, the Supreme Court observed that "the forms of
local practice" cannot defeat the federal right,202 and further stated that "[s]trict
local rules of pleading cannot be used to impose unnecessary burdens upon
rights of recovery authorized by federal laws."203 States may not use procedural
19 71d. at 141. The Felder Court rejected the application to § 1983 of a notice of claim
requirement that the state applied only on a specific class of plaintiffs-those who sue
governmental defendants, the archetypical § 1983 defendant.
1 98 See generally Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1978) ("The policies
underlying § 1983 include compensation of persons injured by deprivation of federal
rights and prevention of abuses of power by those acting under color of state law.").
1 99Felder, 487 U.S. at 153.
2 00 Id. at 150. ('Federal law takes state courts as it finds them only insofar as those
courts employ rules that do not 'impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery
authorized by federal laws."') (quoting Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294,298-99
(1949)).
2 01Under the adequate state ground doctrine, the Supreme Court cannot review a
decision resting on an adequate and independent state ground because the Court's
review of the federal issue will not affect the state court judgment and, thus, will only
be an advisory opinion. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983). For a
discussion of the adequacy of state procedural doctrines grounds as a bar to Supreme
Court review of state court § 1983 decisions, see STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION,
supra note 16, § 10.6.
202 Brown, 338 U.S. at 296.
203 Id. at 298.
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doctrines that discriminate against federal causes of action to refuse to reach
the merits of federal claims; nor may they give their courts unlimited discretion
to determine when to overlook procedural defaults and reach federal issues.204
In Howlett v. Rose,205 the Court explored the adequate state ground doctrine
in the course of rejecting the use of the state-created doctrine of sovereign
immunity to protect local school boards that would have been subject to suit
under § 1983 in federal court. Noting "the concern that the state court may be
evading federal law and discriminating against federal causes of action," the
Howlett Court stated that "[tihe adequacy of the state law ground to support a
judgment precluding litigation of the federal claim is itself a federal question
which we review de novo."206 The Court then stated that it "is within our
province to inquire not only whether the [federal] right was denied in express
terms, but also whether it was denied in substance and effect, as by putting
forward non-federal grounds of decision that were without any fair or
substantial support."207
E. Intra-State Uniformity and the "Reverse-Erie" Approach
In Felder, the Court also rejected the use of "outcome determinative" state
policies in state court § 1983 litigation.208 In doing so, the Court relied heavily
on the federal interest in "intra-state uniformity" and the principles developed
in diversity cases under the Erie doctrine. "Just as federal courts are
constitutionally obligated to apply state law to state claims, ... so too the
Supremacy Clause imposes on state courts a constitutional duty 'to proceed in
such manner that all the substantial rights of the parties under controlling
federal law [are] protected.' 209 Because the notice of claim requirement did not
apply to § 1983 claims filed in the federal courts,210 the application of the
requirement to § 1983 state court actions would permit the choice of forum to
dictate the outcome and thus would encourage the type of forum shopping
that the Erie doctrine was intended to limit.
204 See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (state rule concerning
notice for reviewing a transcript on appeal deemed discretionary and not an adequate
state ground to prevent Supreme Court review of federal issues in a § 1982 case).
205496 U.S. 356 (1990).
206Id. at 366.
2071d.
208 Felder, 487 U.S. at 151-52.
209 Id. at 151 (quoting Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 245 (1942)).
21OPrior to Felder, the Supreme Court had not rejected theapplication of notice of claim
requirements to federal court § 1983 actions, but virtually all federal courts had done
so. See STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 17.5.
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Nonetheless, Felder made clear that states may adopt policies that differ from
federal policies and are more congenial to § 1983 claims. 211 Thus, federal
policies that are not derived from § 1983 itself, such as policies involving jury
unanimity or the standing and other justiciability requirements applicable in
federal courts, need not be followed by state courts in § 1983 actions.212 On the
other hand, state courts may not apply restrictive state policies that burden
§ 1983 claims. For example, a state court that maintained a case or controversy
requirement that was narrower than the federal counterpart could not apply
the requirement to § 1983 claims. Such an interpretation of what controversies
are justiciable under state law is not an adequate state ground on which to base
a judgment and deny Supreme Court review of the federal issues in such a
case.
2 13
VII. SECTION 1983 REMEDIAL ISSUES
A. Pleading
Plaintiffs in § 1983 cases need only plead that some person, acting under
color of state law, deprived them of federal rights secured by § 1983.214 It is not
necessary to allege that defendants acted in bad faith or abused their qualified
immunities, and defendants must raise such "confession and avoidance"
defenses affirmatively.215 Despite this liberal apporach to pleading, most
federal courts, until recently, had applied a strict or heightened pleading
requirement to § 1983 complaints. 2 16 This had been most common on
immunity issues,2 17 but some federal courts had extended the heightened
pleading requirement to non-immunity issues such as the facts necessary to
establish municipal liability.218 The Supreme Court, however, in Leatherman v.
21 1See Felder, 487 U.S. at 151 ("States may make the litigation of federal claims as
congenial as they see fit... because such congeniality does not stand as an obstacle to
the accomplishment of Congress' goals.").
212 The ability of state courts to avoid some of the justiciability doctrines that
characterize federal court practice is an important choice of forum factor. See supra notes
139-40 and accompanying text.
213 5ee generally STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 16, §§ 10.6, 13.2. Cf.
Liner v. Jaco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301 (1964) (treating a decision based on state mootness
grounds as not resting on an adequate state ground).
214 For a discussion of the elements of a § 1983 claim, see supra notes 30-77 and
accompanying text.
215 See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1980).
216 See Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 30 n.87 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084
(1985), and cases cited.
217 See infra note 286.
218 See, e.g., Sivard v. Pulaski County 959 F.2d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 1992) ("This Court
demands that plaintiffs suing a municipal body under § 1983 plead with greater
specificity than might ordinarily be required."); accord Palmer v. City of San Antonio,
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Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit,219 rejected the
application of strict pleading requirements to § 1983 claims.
In Leatherman, the plaintiff alleged that a municipality engaged in a policy
or custom of inadequate police training for which the municipality could be
held liable.2 20 The Fifth Circuit dismissed the § 1983 complaint because it failed
to allege with particularity all material facts establishing the plaintiff's right to
recovery, including facts that supported the allegation of inadequate
training.22 1 In rejecting this heightened pleading standard, the Supreme Court
relied on the normal pleading requirements of the federal rules and the failure
of the drafters to extend the special pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to § 1983 or other civil rights complaints. 222
Prior to Leatherman, the Ohio Court of Appeals, in Roe v. Hamilton County
Department of Human Services,223 applied the notice pleading standards of the
Ohio rules to § 1983 claims.224 This was consistent with the approach followed
by some state courts,225 but a number of state courts had relied on
810 F.2d 514,516-17 (5th Cir. 1987); Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir.
1985).
219113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993), rev'g 954 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir 1992).
220 See 954 F.2d at 1058.
22 1Id.
222 See 113 S. Ct. at 1163 (noting that FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) imposes a particularized
pleading requirement for averments of fraud and mistake). Nonetheless, the Leatherman
Court expressly declined to consider the application of a heightened pleading
requirement to § 1983 immunity issues. Id. at 1162. For a discussion of this issue, see
infra notes 284-93 and accompanying text.
22353 Ohio App. 3d 120,124,560 N.E.2d 238,242 (Hamilton Co. 1988), cause dismissed,
49 Ohio St. 3d 714, 552 N.E.2d 953 (1990).
224 1n taking this position, the Roe court expressly rejected reliance on the Sixth
Circuit's approach.
[The defendants] wish us to follow the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Jones v. Sherrill (C.A.6, 1987), 827 F.2d 1102, which holds that the
factual allegations of the complaint must be examined to determine
if the conduct alleged in the complaint rises to the level of "gross"
negligence rather than merely stating "simple" negligence. We
decline to follow this rule because we think it is in conflict with
the concept of "notice" pleading adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court.
53 Ohio App. 3d at 124, 560 N.E.2d at 242; see also O'Brien v. University Community
Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St. 2d 242,327 N.E.2d 753 (1975) (syllabus) ("In order for a
court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
it must appear beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts entitling him to recovery.") (citation omitted).
225 See Cunha v. City of Algona, 334 N.W.2d 591, 596 (Iowa 1983) (rejecting strict
pleading standard for § 1983 cases); Casteel v. Vaade, 481 N.W.2d 476 (Wis. 1992)
(applying liberal pleading standards to pro se § 1983 complaints). But see Black v. Rouse,
587 So. 2d 1359, 1361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (applying Florida strict pleading rules
requiring the pleading of a "short and plain statement of the ultimate facts showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief" to a § 1983 complaint), review denied, 598 So. 2d 75 (Fla.
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pre-Leatherman federal cases as authority for the use of strict pleading
requirements. 226 Leatherman undercuts federal support for an across-the-board
strict pleading requirement for § 1983 cases, but it does not answer whether
states may independently, as a matter of state law, impose strict pleading
requirements on § 1983 or other federal civil rights claims.
Under the nondiscrimination principle, a state may not impose heightened
pleading requirements on federal claims, if it does not impose the same
standards on state claims, 227 but a difficult question arises when a state
demands the evenhanded application of strict state pleading rules to state and
federal claims. The Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue. In
Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama,2 28 however, the Court stated that "strict
local rules of pleading cannot be used to impose unnecessary burdens upon
rights of recovery authorized by federal laws."229 The Brown Court further
made clear that it would not "fail to protect federally created rights from
dismissal because of over-exacting local requirements for meticulous pleadings
.... "230 State courts have relied on these federal principles to reject the
application of state pleading requirements to § 1983 complaints.231
A frequent pleading issue that arises in state court § 1983 litigation is whether
plaintiffs must specifically plead that they are relying upon § 1983.232 Federal
1992); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. City of Evanston, 411 N.E.2d
1030 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (applying Illinois strict pleading rules to § 1983 complaints),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981).
226 See, e.g., Kyle v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 588 So. 2d 1154, 1160 (La. Ct. App. 1991)
(expressing concern about permitting plaintiffs to state § 1983 claims with "vague,
broadly worded complaints," and, relying on Fifth Circuit decisions, imposing a
stringent pleading requirement under which "to commence a lawsuit against a public
official for acts for which he is potentially immune, the complaint must allege with
particularity all material facts on which [the claimant] contends... that the plea of
immunity cannot be sustained") (internal quotations omitted), writ denied, 595 So. 2d 654
(La. 1992); Henschke v. Borough of Clayton, 598 A.2d 526, 530 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991) (relying on Third Circuit cases and stating that "a plaintiff is required to set forth
specific conduct by the state or its officials which violated the constitutional rights of
the plaintiff ... [and] is required to establish with specificity that defendant deprived
him of a right secured by the Constitution and that such a deprivation was caused by a
person acting under color of state law").
22 7See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
228338 U.S. 294 (1949).
2291d. at 298.
23 0Id. at 299.
23 1See Bach v. County of Butte, 195 Cal. Rptr. 268,272-74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (relying
on Brown and federal standards to determine the sufficiency of a § 1983 complaint); Kay
v. David Douglas Sch. Dist., 719 P.2d 875 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (holding state rule requiring
specific pleading of attorney fees inapplicable to § 1983), rev'd as moot, 738 P.2d 1389 (Or.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1032 (1988).
23 2This often comes up at the end of litigation when the issue is whether a prevailing
plaintiff may recover attorney fees. See, e.g., Bloomingdale's By Mail,Ltd. v. Huddleston,
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courts have not imposed such a pleading requirement,233 and state courts have
generally followed suit.234 Rather, courts look to the course of the litigation to
determine whether the suit included a § 1983 claim. Nonetheless, a number of
courts have observed that the "better practice is to specifically plead" reliance
on § 1983."235
Unlike the refusal of federal and state courts to require specific pleading of
§ 1983, some courts have strictly required plaintiffs to plead whether § 1983
claims are being brought against defendants in their individual or official
capacities. The use of such a pleading standard, however, even if occasionally
appropriate in federal courts of limited jurisdiction, seems inappropriate in
state courts of general jurisdiction.236
B. Official Immunities
Section 1983, by its terms, is silent about the availability of any immunities
for officials who violate federal law.237 Despite this silence, the Court has
established an elaborate system of absolute and qualified immunities to protect
government officials and employees from personal liability under § 1983. It has
done this by reading § 1983 against the background of the common law that
existed in 1871. When an immunity was well established at that time, the Court
has been unwilling to assume that Congress would have overridden the
immunity without expressly providing so. 238
848 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3002 (1993). The importance of this
pleading issue is underscored by the fact that plaintiffs who prevail only on state law
claims may sometimes recover fees if the suit also included a § 1983 claim. See infra note
561 and accompanying text.
233 See, e.g., Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. School Dist. of
Grand Rapids, 835 F.2d 627, 635 (6th Cir. 1987).
2 34 See, e.g., Gumbhir v. Kansas State Bd. of Pharmacy, 646 P.2d 1078 (Kan. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983); Rzeznik v. Chief of Police of Southampton, 373 N.E.2d 1128,
1134 n.8.(Mass. 1978); L.K. v. Gregg, 425 N.W.2d 813 (Minn. 1988); Marx v. Truck
Renting and Leasing Ass'n, 520 So. 2d 1333 (Miss. 1987); Tarkanian v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 741 P.2d 1345 (Nev. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 488 U.S. 179(1988); Packard v. Gordon, 537 A.2d 140 (Vt. 1987); Boldt v. State, 305 N.W.2d 133 (Wis.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 973 (1981).
23 5Gumbhir, 646 P.2d at 1085; accord Rzeznik, 373 N.E.2d at 1134 n.8; L.K., 425 N.W.2d
at 820.
23 6This issue comes up most often in § 1983 suits against state officials. See infra notes
416-31 and accompanying text.
23 7See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2612-13 (1993).
238 See generally Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367,376 (1951).
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The immunities applicable to federal court § 1983 claims also apply in state
courts, and the Supreme Court, in Martinez v. California,239 made clear that
federal, not state, law governed their availability.
Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... cannot be immunized by state law. A
construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity
defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee
into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution
insures that the proper construction may be enforced. . . . The
immunity claim raises a question of federal law.
240
The Ohio Supreme Court has accepted the Martinez principle. In Cooperman
v. University Surgical Associates,241 the court noted that "[i] mmunity, for purpose
of a federal claim, is clearly a question of federal law."242 Yet, neither the United
States Supreme Court nor the Ohio courts have addressed the extent to which,
or even whether, states may develop their own policies for the administration
of federal immunities. Thus, it is unclear whether state courts entertaining
§ 1983 claims are required to follow the lead of federal courts and limit
discovery, make expanded use of summary judgment, restrict the role of the
jury, or expand the availability of interlocutory appeals. 243
1. Absolute Immunities
The Court maintains a presumption against absolute immunity and has been
"quite sparing in approving it."244 Most governmental officials, including
governors and executive branch officials, have only a qualified immunity from
239444 U.S. 277 (1980).
24 01d. at 284 n.8 (citation omitted) (quoting Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602,
607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1973)); see also Felder, 487 U.S. at 139 ("[A] state
law that immunizes government conduct otherwise subject to suit under § 1983 is
preempted, even where the federal civil rights litigation takes place in state court,
because the application of the state immunity law would thwart the congressional
remedy,. . . which of course already provides certain immunities for state officials.").
24132 Ohio St. 3d 191, 513 N.E.2d 288 (1987).
24232 Ohio St. 3d at 198, 513 N.E.2d at 296; accord, Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St. 3d
284,292, 595 N.E.2d 862,869 (1992).
243 See infra notes 301-02, 324-26 and 332-41 and accompanying text.
244 Bums v. Reed, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 1939 (1991); accord Antoine v. Byers & Anderson,
113 S. Ct. 2167,2169 (1993) (stating that "[tihe proponent of a claim to absolute immunity
bears the burden of establishing the justification for such immunity" in the course of
rejecting absolute immunity for court reporters for the ministerial act of preparing
verbatim transcripts of criminal trials).
19931
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§ 1983 damage suits.245 Nonetheless, some § 1983 defendants are entitled to
claim an absolute immunity from suit. For example, state legislators have
absolute immunity from § 1983 damage suits for their legislative acts246 as do
regional24 7 and local legislators.248 Likewise, state court judges and
prosecutors have absolute immunity from § 1983 damage claims involving
their judicial or prosecutorial functions.
Such absolute immunity, however, is limited. Judges only have an absolute
immunity for judicial acts taken within their jurisdiction,249 and they may be
liable under § 1983 for their administrative decisions.250 They may also be sued
2 45See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 807 (1982) (observing that qualified immunity represents the norm for executive
officials).
2 46 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); see also Supreme Court of Virginia
v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719,732 (1980) ("Although Tenney involved an action for
damages under § 1983, its holding is equally applicable to § 1983 actions seeking
declaratory or injunctive relief.").
247 See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391
(1979).
248 The Supreme Court has not decided whether local legislators have absolute
immunity from § 1983 damage claims, but cf. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265,
278-80 (1990) (relying on considerations developed in state legislative immunity cases
to reverse contempt sanctions against city council members), but the federal circuits
have consistently extended absolute immunity to local legislators for legislative acts.
See, e.g., Acevedo-Cordero v. Cordero-Santiago, 958 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1992); Haskell v
Washington Township, 864 F.2d 1266, 1277 (6th Cir. 1988); Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708
F.2d 96, 98-100 (3d Cir. 1983). Legislators, however, may lose their absolute immunity
when performing administrative and other non-legislative acts. SeeAcevedo-Cordero, 958
F.2d at 23 (exploring the distinction between legislative and administrative acts and
looking to the nature of the underlying facts and the particularity of the impact of the
action to determine the availability of absolute immunity); see also Gross v. Winter, 876
F.2d 165,169-73 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (city council member not entitled to absolute immunity
for the administrative act of terminating a legislative researcher); cf. Haskell, 864 F.2d at
1278 (suggesting that local legislators performing "even traditionally legislative actions"
lose their absolute immunity when they act in "bad faith, because of corruption, or
primarily in furtherance of personal instead of public interests").
24 9See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (absolute judicial immunity for
ordering sterilization of a "somewhat retarded" 15-year old girl); Piersonv. Ray, 386 U.S.
547 (1967) (absolute judicial immunity for unconstitutionally convicting persons
challenging segregated interstate bus terminal facilities);seealso Mireles v. Waco, 112 S.
Ct. 286 (1991) (per curiam) (absolute judicial immunity for allegedly ordering a police
officer to use excessive force to bring a public defender to the judge's courtroom); cf.
Butz v..Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (hearing examiner and administrative law judge
performing independent adjudicatory activities entitled to absolute immunity); Sparks
v. Character and Fitness Comm. of Ky., 818 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1987) (absolute judicial
immunity to the members of a character and fitness committee of the state bar for
assisting the court in screening candidates for admission to the bar), vacated, 484 U.S.
1022, adhered to on remand, 859 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1011 (1989).
2 50 See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) (no absolute judicial immunity for the
nonjudicial administrative act of demoting and dismissing a court-attached probation
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under § 1983 for injunctive relief (on claims for which they have an absolute
immunity from damage suits). They may also be subject to liability for attorney
fees.251
Similarly, prosecutors have absolute quasi-judicial immunity when
performing prosecutorial functions intimately associated with the judicial
phase of the criminal process, 252 but they are not entitled to absolute immunity
for either their investigative or other non-prosecutorial activities. Thus, in
Burns v. Reed, 253 the Court denied absolute immunity to a prosecutor for
providing legal advice to police officers concerning the hypnotizing and
questioning of a suspect. Likewise, in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,254 the Court held
that prosecutors who were engaged in entirely investigative activities before
there was probable cause to make an arrest were not entitled to absolute
immunity either for fabricating evidence during the preliminary investigation
of a crime or for making false statements at a press conference announcing the
return of an indictment.255
In addressing the availability of § 1983 immunity, Ohio courts have followed
federal standards and provided absolute immunity to judges and clerks of
officer); Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979) (denying absolute judicial
immunity to a judge who used his political influence tohavea police officer disciplined),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 938 (1980); Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978) (denying
absolute judicial immunity to a judge who ordered a coffee vendor brought before him
in handcuffs because of the poor quality of the coffee); cf. Antoine, 113 S. Ct. at 2171
(observing that even if judges, not court reporters, were responsible for preparing
verbatim transcripts of criminal trials, they might not be entitled to absolute judicial
immunity).
2 51 See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
2 52 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); see also Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478 (1978) (applying a functional test to extend absolute immunity to federal
administrative officials responsible for initiating administrative proceedings). The
Supreme Court has also extended absolute immunity to police witnesses sued as a result
of their testimony. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983). But see White v. Frank, 855
F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that complaining witnesses are not entitled to absolute
immunity for testifying before a grand jury, although witnesses who merely testify
before grand juries are protected by absolute immunity).
253111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991).
254113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993).
25 5The Court has not decided whether social workers are entitled to absolute
immunity, but lower courts have applied a functional approach and provided social
workers with absolute prosecutorial immunity for initiating dependency and related
court proceedings. See, e.g., Vosburg v. Department of Social Servs., 884 F.2d 133 (4th
Cir. 1989); Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 829 (1987). But cf. Achterhof v. Selvaggio, 886 F.2d 826 (6th Cir.
1989) (denying absolute immunity to social worker for opening a child abuse case and
placing a father's name on a central registry because such acts were either investigatory
or administrative).
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courts for issuing a capias, 256 and to prosecutors for obtaining a
release-dismissal agreement.257 On the other hand, they have denied absolute
immunity to officials performing executive or other administrative
functions. 258
2. Qualified Immunities
a. public officials
The Supreme Court has held that public officials who are not entitled to
absolute immunity may still be immune from § 1983 damage suits when their
performance of discretionary functions violates federal law.259 In 1975, in Wood
v. Strickland,260 the Supreme Court defined the § 1983 qualified immunity in
both objective and subjective terms. Seven years later, however, in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald,261 a Bivens action,262 the Court eliminated the subjective leg and
defined qualified immunity in objective terms by asking whether the
defendants violated clearly established federal law.
[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally
are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.... On summary
judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, not only the
currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly established
at the time the action occurred. If the law at that time was not clearly
established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate
subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to "know"
25 6See Kelly v. Whiting, 17 Ohio St. 3d 91,477 N.E.2d 1123 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1008 (1985).
257See Hunter v. City of Middleton, 31 Ohio App. 3d 109, 509 N.E.2d 93 (Butler Co.
1986).
2 58 See, e.g., Dalhover v. Dugan, 54 Ohio App. 3d 55, 560 N.E.2d 824 (Hamilton Co.
1989) (official in charge of administration of juvenile detention center not entitled to
quasi-judicial absolute immunity for failing to prevent juvenile's suicide); cf. Jaeger v.
Wracker, 21 Ohio App. 3d 150, 486 N.E.2d 1240 (Lorain Co. 1985) (township trustees
have qualified immunity for summary removal of volunteer fireman because law not
clearly established).
259 See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,246-49 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,564
(1967).
260420 U.S. 308 (1975).
261457 U.S. 800 (1982).
262 Bivens actions are suits brought against federal officials directly under the federal
constitution. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Many of
the Court's most important qualified immunity decisions arose in Bivens, not § 1983,
actions, but the Court has applied the same immunity policies to both actions. See
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n. 30; Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,504 (1978).
[Vol. 41:407
HeinOnline  -- 41 Clev. St. L. Rev. 452 1993
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN THE OHIO COURTS
that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful. If
the law was clearly established, the immunity defense should fail,
since a reasonably competent public official should know the law
governing his conduct.
263
In Anderson v. Creighton,264 the Court held that the determination of whether
the law was clearly established required a particularized definition of the issue
of federal law that must be clearly established.
[Tihe right the official is alleged to have violated must have been
"clearly established" in a more particularized, and hence more relevant,
sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by
qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously
been held unlawful,.. . but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing
law the unlawfulness must be apparent.
265
Anderson requires courts addressing qualified immunity issues to define the
underlying right with a high degree of particularity, thus expanding the utility
of qualified immunity for § 1983 defendants.266 The Court, however, has not
provided guidance as to where courts should look to determine whether
federal law is clearly established.267 The Sixth Circuit has provided a number
of different formulations of where courts should look in order to make this
determination,268 but the Ohio courts have not focused on this issue.269
263Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19; see also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984) (holding
that federal, not state, law must be dearly established to deny defendants a qualified
immunity). The Harlow definition of qualified immunity also contained a small
subjective component under which an official who violates clearly established federal
law is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity if the official "claims extraordinary
circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the
relevant legal standard." 457 U.S. at 819.
264483 U.S. 635 (1987).
2651d. at 640.
266 Cf. Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 341 (7th Cir. 1991) ("By sleight of hand you can
turn any defense on the merits into a defense of qualified immunity."), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1242 (1992).
267 See Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered
Questions, 22 GA. L. REV. 597, 605 n.41 (1989). For a discussion of the role of state law in
determining whether federal law is clearly established, see Richard B. Saphire, Qualified
Immunity in Section 1983 Cases and the Role of State Decisional Law, 35 ARIz. L. REV. 621
(1993).
2 68See Steinglass, Sixth Circuit, supra note 165, at 543-46; see also Saphire, supra note
267, at 631 n.52. In Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331 (6th Cir. 1993), the Sixth
Circuit described the sources of clearly established law as follows:
In inquiring whether a constitutional right is clearly established,
we must look first to decisions of the Supreme Court, then to
decisions of this court and other courts within our circuit, and finally
1993]
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b. private defendants
The rationale for providing government officials with an objectively defined
qualified immunity flows from the Court's characterization of the immunity
as an immunity from suit, and from its concern that individuals will not take
governmental jobs if they can be forced to trial on the basis of allegations of
bad faith conduct.270 Private individuals, who may also be sued under § 1983
when they act under color of state law,271 however, are not entitled to the same
immunity available to governmental officials. Thus, in Wyatt v. Cole,272 the
Court held that private defendants who relied on a state replevin statute
subsequently declared unconstitutional were not entitled to an objectively
defined qualified immunity.273
to decisions of other circuits. [In the ordinary instance, to find a
clearly established constitutional right, a district court must find
binding precedent by the Supreme Court, its court of appeals or
itself. In an extraordinary case, it may be possible for the decisions
of other courts to clearly establish a principle of law. For the
decisions of other courts to provide such "clearly established law,"
these decisions must both point unmistakably to the unconstitutionality
of the conduct complained of and be so clearly foreshadowed by
applicable direct authority as to leave no doubt in the mind of a
reasonable officer that his conduct, if challenged on constitutional
grounds, would be found wanting. Thus, it is only in extraordinary
cases that we can look beyond Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit
precedent to find "clearly established law."
Id. at 1336. (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Marsh v. Am, 937 F.2d
1056, 1069 (6th Cir. 1991) (observing that "when there is no controlling precedent in the
Sixth Circuit our court places little or no value on the opinions of other circuits in
determining whether a right is clearly established").
The Sixth Circuit's search for controlling precedent in Walton and Marsh can be
contrasted not only with other pronouncements of the court, see, e.g., Robinson v. Bibb,
840 F.2d 349,351 (6th Cir. 1988) ("In order to be clearly established, a question must be
decided either by the highest state court in the state where the case arose, by a United
States Court of Appeals, or by the Supreme Court."), but with the more flexible reliance
of other circuits on all decisional law. See Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: A User's
Manual, 26 IND. L. REV. 187, 203-05 (1993).
269But see Moore v. Hayman, 67 Ohio App. 3d 184, 586 N.E.2d 233 (Allen Co. 1988)
(noting that the "Supreme Court has not defined the phrase 'clearly established"' and
relying on Robinson v. Bibb for the applicable definition). For a critique of this
formulation, see Steinglass, Sixth Circuit, supra note 165, at 543-45.
270 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816.
271 See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
272112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992).
273The Wyatt Court did not reach, however, whether such defendants are entitled to
a good faith or probable cause defense to § 1983 suits on the merits. Id. The Sixth Circuit,
however, anticipating the Supreme Court's decision in Wyatt, rejected the availability
of qualified immunity for private defendants and held that private defendants sued for
using an unconstitutional execution statute are entitled to a good faith defense. Duncan
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3. Administering § 1983 Qualified Immunities
In addition to the threshold question of whether a defendant is entitled to
absolute or qualified immunity, difficult administrative issues arise in the area
of immunities, especially qualified immunities. 274 These issues have taken on
even greater importance in § 1983 litigation because the Court has relied on the
breadth of qualified immunity to restrict the availability of absolute
immunity.275
a. pleading
In Gomez v. Toledo,2 76 the Supreme Court held that qualified immunity was
an affirmative defense that § 1983 plaintiffs were not obligated to anticipate
and rebut in their complaints. Until recently, however, the Court has provided
little guidance on either the pleading standards applicable to § 1983 qualified
immunity issues or on the proper approach to deciding such issues. In 1991,
however, the Court addressed this aspect of § 1983 litigation.
In Siegert v. Gilley,277 an action involving an alleged deprivation of a liberty
interest without due process,278 the Court made clear that the plaintiff must
plead the violation of a clearly established constitutional right.279 Prior to
Siegert, many federal courts would assume the existence of a violation of the
underlying federal right but dispose of cases on qualified immunity grounds
because the federal right was not clearly established. 280 Siegert rejected this
approach. It held that the initial inquiry was not whether the defendant alleged
a violation of clearly established federal law, but whether the defendant alleged
any violation of federal law.281
v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261,1267-68 (6th Cir. 1985);accord Wyatt v. Cole, 994 F.2d 1113,1118-21(5th Cir.) (on remand), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 470 (1993).
274The discussions that follow deal principally with administering qualified
immunities, but many of the same issues apply to absolute immunities.
2 75 See Bums v. Reed, 111 S. Ct. 1934,1944 n.8 (1991).
276446 U.S. 635 (1980)
277111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991).
2 78Siegert was a Bivens suit by a former federal employee who alleged that his
supervisor wrote a defamatory letter thus depriving the plaintiff of a liberty interest
without procedural due process.
2 791d. at 1793.
28 0See, e.g., Danese v. Asman, 875 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1989) (not reaching the merits of
a § 1983 jail suicide claim because the underlying law was not clearly established), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990).
281Seigert, 111 S. Ct. at 1793; accord Silver v. Franklin Township, 966 F.2d 1031, 1036
(6th Cir. 1992) ("[W]e need not reach the issue of qualified immunity because we hold
... [that the plaintiff] has failed to establish the violation of any substantive due process
right."). But see Walton, 995 F.2d at 1339 (holding that there was no clearly established
right to personal security forbidding the police from abandoning passengers in 1988,
19931
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In addition, Siegert provided guidance for the analysis of qualified immunity
issues. Initially, the Court noted that "[q]ualified immunity is a defense that
must be pleaded by a defendant official.' 2 8 2 The Court then described the
qualified immunity inquiry in terms of both current law and the law at the time
the action occurred. "Once a defendant pleads a defense of qualified immunity,
'[o]n summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, not only the
currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly established at the
time an action occurred .... Until this threshold immunity question is resolved,
discovery should not be allowed. '"283
Although Siegert makes an important clarification of the analytical approach
to deciding qualified immunity issues, the Court did not reach the issue on
which it had granted certiorari, namely, the application of strict or heightened
pleading requirements to civil rights actions.2 84 Most federal circuits had
imposed such heightened pleading requirements,285 and this had been most
common on qualified immunity issues.286 Nonetheless, some federal judges
had suggested that a heightened pleading standard was inconsistent with the
notice pleading requirements of the federal rules, 2 87 and the Supreme Court in
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit28 8
rejected the use of such a standard. The Court, however, expressly left open
whether the use of a heightened pleading standard could be justified for § 1983
suits against individuals who could raise immunity defenses.289
Most federal courts have construed Leatherman as precluding the use of strict
pleading requirements on qualified immunity issues,290 but Justice Kennedy,
and reversing the denial of qualified immunity to police officers who left minor children
unattended after arresting their mother without addressing whether the plaintiffs
established a substantive due process violation).
282Seigert, 111 S. Ct. at 1793 (relying on Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980)).
283Id. (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818).
2841d. at 1791.
28 5See supra note 216.
286See Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 345 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1242
(1992), and cases cited; see also Siegert v. Gilley, 895 F.2d 797,802 (D.C. Cir. 1990), affd
on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991); Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472,1477-78 (5th Cir.
1985). But see Bergquistv. County of Cochise, 806 F.2d 1364,1367(9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting
the use of a strict pleading standard for § 1983 claims).
2 87See Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d at 1482-83 (Higginbotham, J., concurring); see also Elliott
v. Thomas, 937 F.2d at 345.
288113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993).
28 91d. at 1162 ("We thus have no occasion to consider whether our qualified immunity
jurisprudence would require a heightened pleading in cases involving individual
government officials.").
2 90See Callaghan v. Congemi, No. CIV.A.91-1496, 1993 WL 114523, at *5-6 (E.D. La.
Apr. 8,1993) (treating Leatherman as "sound[ing] the death knell for... [the] requirement
of heightened pleading in suits involving individual government officials" and noting
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in his concurring opinion in Siegert, concluded that it was appropriate to
impose a heightened pleading requirement on § 1983 qualified immunity
issues.
There is tension between the rationale of Harlow and the requirement
of malice, and it seems to me that the heightened pleading requirement
is the most workable means to resolve it. The heightened pleading
standard is a departure from the usual pleading requirements of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9(b), and departs also from the
normal standard for summary judgment under Rule 56. But avoidance
of disruptive discovery is one of the very purposes for the official
immunit doctrine... [and] [tihe substantive defense of immunity
controls. 
91
Given the decision in Leatherman, federal courts would have difficulty
imposing a heightened pleading requirement on § 1983 qualified immunity
issues without taking the bold step of construing the immunity from suit as an
element of substantive law that overrides the broad delegation of rule-making
that Congress gave the Supreme Court in the Rules Enabling Act.292
"that Leatherman cannot be limited to its holding"); see also Dodson v. City of Kenner,
No. CIV.A.92-3530, 1993 WL 149111 (E.D. La. May 4, 1993) (on reconsideration); Kelly
v. Blake, No. CIV.A.93-CV-0365, 1993 WL 131518 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1993); cf. Jordan v.
Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 339 (4th Cir. 1993) (relying on the rationale of Leatherman to reject
a heightened pleading standard that would require a § 1983 plaintiff to plead multiple
incidentsof similar constitutional violations to support an allega tion of municipal policy
or custom); Garus v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 563,568 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (relying
on Leatherman to reject the application of a heightened pleading requirement to Title VII
complaints). But see Moore v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 994 F.2d 874, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(noting that Leatherman had not rejected the use of a heightened pleading requirement
for individual defendants, and relying on circuit precedent to apply a heightened
pleading standard); but cf. Richardson v. Oldham, 12 F.3d 1373 (5th Cir. 1994) (declining
to reach the pleading question expressly reserved in Leatherman, namely whether a
heightened pleading standard is permissible for § 1983 cases against individual
government officials).
291111 S. Ct. at 1795. Kennedy also stated in his concurrence that "[tihe heightened
pleading standard is a necessary and appropriate accommodation between the state of
mind component of malice [in some substantive constitutional claims] and the objective
test that prevails in qualified immunity as a general matter". Id.
29228 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988). Under § 2072(b), the Court may not adopt rules that
"abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right," but the delegation of rule-making
to the Court is quite broad. See generally Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). The
Court has never rejected a federal rule because of a conflict with the substantive law.
See GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 40[C][2] 159 (1989); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 6 (1987) ("[T]he
study and approval given each proposed Rule by the Advisory Committee, the Judicial
Conference, and this Court, and the statutory requirement that the Rule be reported to
Congress for a period of review before taking effect,.., give the Rules presumptive
validity under both the constitutional and statutory constraints.'). The Court, however,
has often construed a federal rule narrowly to avoid such a conflict. See Hanna, 380 U.S.
at 472. Given the relatively recent characterization of the qualified immunity as an
immunity from suit, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), it is difficult to argue
1993]
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If the Supreme Court held that federal immunity law was substantive and
overrode the liberal pleading requirements of the federal rules (and required
the application of a heightened pleading requirement to § 1983 complaints
against individuals), plaintiffs would not be able to resist the argument that
federal law also overrode liberal state pleading requirements. On the other
hand, if the Supreme Court rejected the application of a heightened pleading
requirement to § 1983 suits against individuals, state courts that desired to
continue to apply strict state pleading requirements could do so only if the state
pleading rules did not burden § 1983.293
b. discovery
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,294 the Court treated the existence of qualified
immunity as a threshold legal issue based on whether the federal right in
question was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.295 This
analysis also led the Harlow Court to require courts to stay discovery until the
threshold issue is resolved.296
Despite this preference for resolving qualified immunity issues early in the
litigation, the Court, in Anderson v. Creighton,297 opened the door to limited
discovery, at least when the immunity issue is fact-specific. In Anderson, the
Court recognized that "the determination whether it was objectively legally
reasonable to conclude that [the alleged conduct was legal] ... will often
require an examination of the information possessed by" the defendants.298
"The relevant question... is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether
a reasonable officer could have believed [the defendant's conduct] ... to be
lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [defendant]
... possessed. [The defendant's] ... subjective beliefs ... are irrelevant."299 The
Anderson Court also acknowledged that when the factual allegations of the
parties differ, "discovery may be necessary before [the plaintiff's] ... motion
for summary judgment... can be resolved."300
that the drafters of the federal rules did not intend the liberal pleading requirements to
apply to suits againstpublic officials. But see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,744 (1982)
("This Court consistently has recognized that government officials are entitled to some
form of immunity from suit.").
293See supra notes 198-207 and accompanying text.
294457 U.S. 800 (1982).
295Id. at 817-19.
2 961d. at 818 ("Until this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should
not be allowed.").
297483 U.S. 635 (1987).
2 981d. at 641.
299Id.
300Id. at 646 n.6.
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It is unclear whether these limitations on discovery apply with equal force
to state court § 1983 litigation. Even given the characterization of the § 1983
immunity as an immunity from suit, it is difficult to accept the proposition that
federal law requires states to organize their judicial systems to mirror the
federal model. Some state court systems might rely heavily on summary
judgment and limit discovery, while others might downplay summary
judgment, expand discovery, and rely more heavily on trials. 301 While a state
that imposed cumulative burdens on the qualified immunity available to
individual § 1983 defendants might violate federal law, the interest of states in
the administration of their judicial systems may well outweigh the relevant
federal interest and give state courts some leeway in approaching the timing
of discovery in § 1983 cases.302
c. summary judgment
In redefining qualified immunity, the Harlow Court expressly relied on its
concern about the difficulty of resolving qualified immunity issues on
summary judgment. 303 Although the Supreme Court has defined the qualified
immunity in objective terms, the underlying constitutional rights enforceable
through § 1983 often contain state of mind requirements.304 Some federal
courts, however, relying on the Court's desire to expand the use of summary
judgment,305 have refused to permit state of mind discovery even when motive
or bad faith relates to the underlying substantive federal standard unless the
plaintiff comes forward with direct nonconclusory allegations of evidence of
30 1States are involved in a number of experiments to make civil litigation more
efficient. See, e.g., Robert D. Myers, MAD Track: An Experiment in Terror, 25 ARIz. ST. L.J.
11 (1993) (discussing Arizona's Mandatory Alternative Discovery Track program for
reducing discovery costs and minimizing the time involved in getting civil cases
through the system).
302 But cf. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 145 (1988) (rejecting the argument that sound
notions of public administration justified the application of a state notice of claim
requirement to state court § 1983 litigation). In New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
2408 (1992), the Court relied on the tenth amendment and principles of state sovereignty
to strike down provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act
of 1985 that required states, under some limited circumstances, either to take title to
radioactive waste (and become liable for damages suffered by the failure to do so
promptly) or to regulate according to federal instructions. In treating this "take title"
provision as an unconstitutional commandeering of the state's legislative process into
federal service, the Court contrasted the "well established power of Congress to pass
laws enforceable in state courts," which it treated as a personal obligation imposed on
judges by the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 2429. Nonetheless, New York suggests there may
be limits on the extent to which federal law may commandeer state institutions.
303 Harlow, U.S. at 815-18.
304 See supra note 76.
305 Moreover, the use of summary judgment in federal court has been made more
popular by the Supreme Court's trilogy of decisions in 1986 placing greater burdens on
plaintiffs who are resisting summary judgment. See supra note 157.
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unconstitutional motive.306 Justice Kennedy, who appears to be the Court's
strongest proponent of a heightened pleading requirement,3 07 has rejected the
use of a direct evidence requirement and has taken the position that plaintiffs
can meet their burden in cases involving unconstitutional motives by
presenting circumstantial evidence.308
As with other issues involving the administration of § 1983 qualified
immunities, it is unclear whether states must follow the federal model or
whether they may apply summary judgment standards that place a greater
burden on defendants' seeking to assert an immunity from suit. Although the
Ohio Supreme Court has embraced some aspects of the federal summary
judgment model,309 it is difficult to imagine federal law requiring Ohio trial
courts to make greater use of summary judgment on § 1983 qualified immunity
issues than Ohio law otherwise permits.
d. role of the jury
There remains a great deal of confusion over the precise role of the judge and
the jury on qualified immunity issues. In Hunter v. Bryant,310 the Supreme
Court summarily reversed a Ninth Circuit decision because the circuit court
framed the qualified immunity issue for the jury in terms of whether a
reasonable officer could have believed he had probable cause to make a
warrantless arrest. The Court concluded that this routinely placed the question
306 See Siegert v. Gilley, 895 F.2d 797,803-04 (D.C. Cir. 1990), affd on other grounds, 111
S. Ct. 1789 (1991); Whitacre v. Davey, 890 F.2d 1168, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
497 U.S. 1038 (1990); accord Moore v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 994 F.2d 874,877 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (adhering to Circuit's heightened pleading standard and requiring the plaintiff to
"produce some direct evidence that the officials' actions were improperly motivated...
if the case is to proceed to trial").
307 See supra notes 290-91 and accompanying text. Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh
Circuit has suggested that the debate over the use of a heightened pleading requirement
on § 1983 qualified immunity issues does not really involve the pleadings but rather the
timing of motions for summary judgment and the showing that a plaintiff must make
to be permitted to conduct discovery when state of mind is an element of the underlying
claim. See Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338,345 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1242
(1992).
308 See Siegert, 111 S. Ct. at 1795 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Upon the assertion of a
qualified immunity defense the plaintiff must put forward specific, nonconclusory
factual allegations which establish malice, or face dismissal. I would reject, however,
the... statement that a plaintiff must present direct, as opposed to circumstantial,
evidence.... Circumstantial evidence may be as probative as testimonial evidence.");
see also id. at 1795 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (rejecting the refusal of the court of appeals
to permit limited discovery of unconstitutional motive absent direct evidence, and
noting that "[bjecause evidence of such intent is peculiarly within the control of the
defendant, the 'heightened pleading' rule... effectively precludes any Bivens action in
which the defendant's state of mind is an element of the underlying claim"); accord Elliott
.v. Thomas, 937 F.2d at 345; Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1991).
309 See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
310112 S. Ct. 534 (1991) (per curiam).
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of qualified immunity in the hands of the jury whereas "[fimmunity ordinarily
should be decided by the court long before trial" by the court "ask[ing] whether
the [defendants] acted reasonably under settled law in the
circumstances .... "311
Prior to Hunter, federal courts had taken different positions on the role of the
jury on qualified immunity issues,3 12 and Hunter's significance is unclear.
There is no disagreement that federal court judges are responsible for
determining what is clearly established federal law for qualified immunity
purposes. Most federal judges, however, view qualified immunity as involving
a two-step analysis that requires the court to determine not only whether the
law was clearly established but also the "objective legal reasonableness of the
defendants' conduct."3 13
The most difficult qualified immunity issues arise when the legal standard
itself contains a reasonableness requirement. In cases involving such standards,
most federal courts have viewed the second step of the analysis as raising an
issue for the judge. For example, in Scott v. Henrich,3 14 in an opinion that is
presently being reconsidered, the Ninth Circuit treated the standard for
analyzing excessive force claims as the same as the qualified immunity
standard, but it noted that "even though reasonableness traditionally is a
question of fact for the jury,.. . defendants can still win on summary judgment
if the district court concludes, after resolving all factual disputes in favor of the
plaintiff, that the officer's use of force was objectively reasonable under the
3 11Id. at 537.
312Compare Finnegan v. Fountain, 915 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1990) (treating availability of
qualified immunity as a legal question for the court); and Warren v. Dwyer, 906 F.2d 70,
76 (2d Cir.) (treating qualified immunity asa legal question for the court but encouraging
the use of special interrogatories to the jury on the underlying factual issues), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 967 (1990); and Coffman v. Trickey, 884 F.2d 1057,1063 (8th Cir. 1989) (reversible
error to submit question of the availability of qualified immunity to the jury), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1056 (1990) with Melear v. Spears, 862 F.2d 1177, 1184 (5th Cir. 1989) (requiring
the "trier of fact ... [to] determine the objective legal reasonableness of an officer's
conduct by construing the facts in dispute"); and Thorsted v. Kelly, 858 F.2d 571,575 (9th
Cir. 1988) (treating as a triable issue of fact "whether a reasonable [police] officer placed
in the circumstances faced by . . . [the defendant] could reasonably believe that his
conduct was legal...").
3 13See, e.g., Biddle v. Martin, 992 F.2d 673,675 (7th Cir. 1993). The Harlow Court treated
the qualified immunity inquiry as a single question and assumed that if the law was
clearly established a reasonable public official would be aware of this and act
accordingly. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-9. ("If the law was clearly established, the
immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official
should know the law governing his conduct."). Anderson required a more particularized
definition of the clearly established federal right. See supra notes 264-65 and
accompanying text. The Court in Hunter, for the first time, albeit in a per curiam opinion,
expressly treated the inquiry as involving two discrete steps. 112 S. Ct. at 536-37.
3141993 WL 168332, 994 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. May, 21, 1993) (amended opinion),
withdrawnfrom bound volume, 994 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1993).
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circumstances. 315 Moreover, in ActUp!/Portland v. Bagley,316 the Ninth Circuit
made explicit its broad reading of Hunter.
We interpret Hunter to hold that the question of whether a reasonable
officer could have believed probable cause (or reasonable suspicion)
existed to justify a search or an arrest is "an essentially legal question,"
that should be determined by the district court at the earliest possible
point in the litigation. Where the underlying facts are undisputed, a
district court must determine the issue on motion for summary
judgment.
The threshold determination of whether the law governing the
conduct at issue is clearly established is a question of law for the court.
The determination of whether the facts alleged could support a
reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause or reasonable
suspicion is also a question of law to be determined by the court.3
17
On the other hand, in Mahoney v. Kesery,318 Judge Richard A. Posner of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit described the problem
when the qualified immunity issue merges with the merits as follows:
[C]ases in this and other circuits keep saying that the question of
immunity is for the judge because it is a question of law. But that
proposition requires qualification to be precise. What is true is thatoften
the question of immunity is one of law-specifically, it is the question:
what was the clearly established rule of law when the officers
committed the acts for which they are being sued? But where as in this
case the only contested issue bearing on immunity is whether a
reasonable officer would have thought the defendant had committed
a crime, there is no question of law-at least in the sense of a question
reserved for judges, for the jury is going to decide the same question.
As there can be no doubt therefore that the jury is legally competent to
decide the question, and as the jury must decide it anyway when the
case goes to trial, there is an argument that the jury might as well be
allowed to decide it with preclusive effect on the judge's determination
of immunity.
If the issue of the adequacy of the grounds for the arrest is the same in
the immunity inquiry and on the merits of the false-arrest charge, then
unless some legal rule or standard bearing on probable cause has
changed since the arrest, the jury's determination that there was or was
315 Id. at *2.
316988 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1993) (modified opinion).
3171d. at 873.
318976 F.2d 1054 (7th Cir. 1992).
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not probable cause will automatically resolve both immunity and the
merits. That way of resolving the matter implies, it is true, that the issue
of immunity drops right out of the case if there are genuine issues of
material fact and the law has not changed since the officers acted. But
maybe that is correct.
319
Even read broadly, however, Hunter does not eliminate the role for juries in
performing the fact-finding that is relevant to qualified immunity issues. For
example, in Washington v. Newsom, 320 a case involving the use of deadly force,
the Sixth Circuit recognized the factual nature of the qualified immunity
question by pointing out that the question of whether an objectively reasonable
police officer would have known that the decedent was not armed depended
upon the factual question of the precise information possessed by the officers.
Under the practices generally followed in state and federal courts, juries
apply the law to the facts.321 In the area of determining entitlement to qualified
immunity, the Court has made clear that the judge, not the jury, is responsible
for identifying the clearly established federal law, but the Court has not
explained why it has deviated from the prevailing policies that govern whether
the judge or the jury will be responsible for applying the law to the facts.322
Nor has the Court explained how either the Seventh Amendment or sound
principles of judicial administration support giving federal trial judges
responsibility for determining whether § 1983 defendants acted reasonably in
violating clearly established federal law.323
Even assuming that federal court judges, not juries, are responsible for
determining whether § 1983 defendants acted unreasonably in failing to follow
federal law, states are not precluded by federal law from following their
traditional practices in allocating decision-making authority between judges
3191d. at 1058-59.
320977 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1848 (1993).
3 2 1 See generally W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 37, at 235-38 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the functions of the court and the jury in
negligence cases); see also FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.18, at 353-56
(4th ed. 1992) (discussing the role of the jury in assessing the legal consequences of the
facts).
3 221n his dissent from the refusal to grant an en banc rehearing in Bagley, Judge Norris
described the panel opinion as "deflying] our common law tradition, which since time
immemorial has considered the reasonableness of human conduct to be a quintessential
jury question." See Bagley, 988 F.2d at 874 (Norris, J., dissenting).
32 3Judge Norris has also suggested some of the administrative problems that will
result from leaving the jury with the responsibility for fact-finding but denying it the
right to decide the ultimate question of the reasonableness of the official conduct. See id.
at 875-78 (Norris, J., dissenting) (describing the "procedural nightmares" that would
result from asking the jury to answer extremely detailed interrogatories or from using
special verdict forms).
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and the juries.3 24 For example, in Ohio, the jury is responsible for deciding
whether the defendant acted reasonably in light of the applicable legal
principles.32 5 Therefore, Ohio courts should be permitted to assign juries a
similar task in determining whether § 1983 defendants are entitled to a
qualified immunity.326
e. interlocutory appeals
Under the final judgment rule327 federal appellate courts, with limited
statutory exceptions not relevant here,328 only have jurisdiction over appeals
from final decisions of district courts. There is, however, a judicially developed
collateral order exception to the final judgment rule, and in Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp.,329 the Supreme Court permitted the immediate appeal of
district court decisions that fall within "that small class which finally determine
claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action,
too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to
require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is
adjudicated."330 The Supreme Court has applied this collateral order exception
to the immunity from suit provided by absolute and qualified immunity,331 and
324 But cf. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952) (treating the
allocation of responsibility between judge and jury as a matter of federal law in a state
court FELA action). Dice, however, involved the federal statutory right to trial by jury
in FELA cases, which the Supreme Court has applied to the states. See infra note 467 and
accompanying text.
325 See Gibbs v. Village of Girard, 88 Ohio St. 34, 44, 102 N.E. 299, 301 (1913)
("Ordinarily, the question of negligence, if not one of fact, is of mixed law and fact, and
is a proper issue for the determination of the jury."), overruled on other grounds, Hamden
Lodge No. 517 v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 127 Ohio St. 469, 189 N.E. 246 (1934).
326 See Banks v. Village of Oakwood, No. 57225,58020,1990 WL 151662 (Ohio Ct. App.
Cuyahoga Co. Oct. 11, 1990) (treating the issue of whether a reasonable person would
have known that probable cause is necessary for an arrest as raising a qualified
immunity issue for the jury), dismissed, 57 Ohio St.3d 718, 568 N.E.2d 690 (1991).
32728 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988) ("The courts of appeals... shall have jurisdiction of appeals
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States .... ").
328 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) (1988) (permitting interlocutory appeals from orders
granting or denying preliminary injunctions); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988) (permitting
interlocutory appeals from orders certifying controlling questions of law).
329337 U.S. 541 (1949).
3 301d. at 546.
3 31See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to
permit immediate appeals of the "denial of a claim for qualified immunity, to the extent
that it turns on an issue of law"); see also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,742-43 (1982)
(permitting immediate appeal of denials of absolute immunity).
[Vol. 41:407
HeinOnline  -- 41 Clev. St. L. Rev. 464 1993
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN THE OHIO COURTS
individual § 1983 defendants may immediately appeal trial court decisions
denying them either type of immunity.332
It is unclear, however, whether states are required by federal law to follow
the federal model, and state courts throughout the country have taken different
positions on the availability of immediate appeals of trial court decisions
denying qualified or absolute immunity.333 The Ohio Supreme Court has not
addressed this issue, but in Ohio Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. Moritz,334 the
Ohio Court of Appeals refused to permit such immediate appeals, noting that
while a state court hearing a Section 1983 case is bound by the terms
of such statute as construed by the United States Supreme Court as it
relates to substantive law, it may proceed in matters of practice and
procedure in accordance with local rules and the civil procedural
practice of the state.
335
The availability of a federally-required right to an immediate appeal of state
trial court denials of qualified or absolute immunity is a close question. Section
1983 defendants in the Ohio courts can rely on Felder v. Casey3 36 and argue that
the immunity from suit (as contrasted to a defense on the merits that can be
asserted at trial) is a federal substantive right that states may not burden.337
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, can characterize the federal "right" as procedural
and rely on the observation of Judge Frank Easterbrook of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that "it is hard to depict a 'right not to
be tried' as substantive; it sounds distinctly procedural."338
The availability of such immediate appeals in state courts may ultimately
depend on the source of the putative federal right. The Ohio Supreme Court
has provided some guidance, albeit in another context, as to its approach to
such issues. In Celebrezze v. Netzley, 33 9 a libel case with a First Amendment
defense, the court treated the collateral order doctrine as a construction of the
federal jurisdictional statutes and noted that Ohio neither had a similar rule
332 Municipalities, on the other hand, are not entitled to an immediateappeal of federal
trial court decisions forcing them to go to trial. See McKee v. City of Rockwall, Tex., 877
F.2d 409,412 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023 (1990); Kraus v. County of Pierce,
793 F.2d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 1986). But see Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v.
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 684 (1993) (applying the collateral order exception to
permit immediate appeals by defendants claiming an eleventh amendment immunity
from suit in federal court).
333 See STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 8.11(b) (1).
33439 Ohio App. 3d 132, 529 N.E.2d 1290 (Franklin Co. 1987).
33539 Ohio App. 3d at 134, 529 N.E.2d at 1292.
336487 U.S. 131 (1988).
33 7See supra notes 198-207 and accompanying text.
33 8Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 345 (7th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1242 (1992).
33951 Ohio St. 3d 89, 554 N.E.2d 1292 (1990).
19931
HeinOnline  -- 41 Clev. St. L. Rev. 465 1993
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
nor was required to adopt the federal policy.340 Thus, the court refused to
permit defamation defendants to file an immediate appeal of a trial court
decision denying a motion for summary judgment and forcing them to trial.341
Following this approach, the Ohio courts could view the federal right to bring
an immediate appeal of the denial of a qualified immunity as an interpretation
of federal statutes governing the jurisdiction of the appellate courts and not
applicable in a state that has a different policy on what is a final appealable
judgment.
Until recently, § 1983 defendants seeking immediate appellate review of
Ohio trial court decisions denying them qualified or absolute immunity could
attempt to fit their appeals into the state court appellate framework. To do this,
they could have relied on the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Amato v. General
Motors Corp.342 Amato interpreted the state definition of a final appealable
orderM4 3 and permitted interlocutory appeals when the need for immediate
appellate review outweighed the "harm to the 'prompt and orderly disposition
of litigation,' and the consequent waste of judicial resources, resulting from the
allowance of an appeal."344 This option, however, is no longer open to
defendants as the Ohio Supreme Court has overruled Amato345 and embraced
a strict final judgment rule.
Ohio's rule goes so far as to reject the federal practice and deny state court
criminal defendants the right to take immediate appeals of motions to dismiss
prosecutions on double jeopardy grounds.346 Given the refusal of the Ohio
34051 Ohio St. 3d at9,554 N.E.2d at 1295 ("This doctrine involves judicial construction
of the federal final order statute and is thus not applicable to the states, although a state
may of course adopt a similar rule under its own statutes .... This court has not adopted
a similar collateral order rule....").
3411d. The court also noted that even if Ohio had such a rule the case would not have
been immediately appealable because the first amendment provided a defense to
liability not an immunity from suit. Id. Nonetheless, there is nothing in Celebrezze that
suggests that the court would adopt a collateral order exception to the final judgment
rule in cases involving an immunity from suit.
34267 Ohio St. 2d 253, 423 N.E.2d 452 (1981).
343 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02 (Anderson 1991) (defining "final order" as "an
order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding"). For a discussion of
the Ohio Supreme Court's treatment of interlocutory appeals under this statute, see
Donald Gitlin, Note, Special Proceedings in Ohio: What is the Ohio Supreme Court Doing
with the Final Judgment Rule?, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 537 (1993).
34467 Ohio St. 2d at 258, 423 N.E.2d at 456.
345 Polikoff v. Adam, 67 Ohio St. 3d 100, 616 N.E.2d 213 (1993).
346 1n federal courts, criminal defendants may take immediate appeals of denials of
double jeopardy claims. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977). The Ohio
Supreme Court had followed such a policy, see State v. Thomas, 61 Ohio St. 3d 254,400
N.E.2d 897 (1980), but, prior to overruling of Amato, the court overruled Thomas and
refused to permit immediate double jeopardy appeals in the Ohio courts. State v. Crago,
53 Ohio St. 3d 243, 559 N.E.2d 1353 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 941 (1991). Finally, in
Wenzel v. Enright, 68 Ohio St. 3d 63, 623 N.E.2d 69 (1993), a post-Polikoffdecision, the
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Supreme Court to follow the federal model and to permit immediate appeals
by criminal defendants raising double jeopardy claims, the court is unlikely to
extend the right to immediate appeal to § 1983 defendants asserting an
immunity from suit. Thus, any relief for § 1983 defendants will most likely
come from a review of this issue by the United States Supreme Court 347 or from
a major change in the rules governing interlocutory appeals in Ohio.348
C. Municipal Liability
In Monroe v. Pape,349 the Supreme Court held that cities were not "persons"
within the meaning of § 1983 and thus were not amenable to suit. In Monell v.
Department of Social Services,350 however, the Court reversed this aspect of
Monroe and held that cities could be sued under § 1983, but the Court rejected
court reaffirmed its rejection of immediate appeals of denials of double jeopardy claims.
See 68 Ohio St. 3d at 64, 623 N.E.2d at 70 (syllabus no. 2) ("In Ohio, the proper remedy
for seeking judicial review of the denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground of double
jeopardy is a direct appeal to the court of appeals at the conclusion of the trial court
proceeding."); see also 68 Ohio St.3d at 67 n.1, 623 N.E.2d at 72 n. 1 (stating that "Abney
does not mandate, as a matter of federal constitutional law, that a state provide a
mechanism for an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss on
grounds of double of jeopardy").
3 47 The Supreme Court, however, has been reluctant to address this issue and has
consistently denied certiorari in cases raising this issue. See STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983
LmGATION, supra note 16, § 8.11(b) (1).
3 48Alternative approaches to obtaining immediate appellate review of denials of
qualified immunity could involve the extraordinary writ practice used in Oklahoma,
see McLin v. Trimble, 795 P.2d 1035,1036-40 (Okla. 1990), the writ of error used in New
Mexico, see Carrillo v. Rostro, 845 P.2d 130, 139-42 (N.M. 1992) (adopting the collateral
order doctrine "as a matter of sound judicial administration" and holding that the writ
of error is the proper procedural device for bringing qualified immunity appeals), or
the certification procedure used in Wisconsin. Cf. Baxter v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural
Resources, 477 N.W.2d 648, 650 n.3 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (permitting review by
certification of a denial of qualified immunity in a Rehabilitation Act suit, and noting
that such a denial will usually satisfy the criteria for leave to appeal under the state
certification procedure), review denied, 485 N.W.2d 412 (Wis. 1992). The American Bar
Association has recommended a certification procedure to ameliorate the harshness of
the final judgment rule. See AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.12 (1977).
These alternatives, however, may be not consistent with the Ohio Constitution. See
OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 3(B) (2) ("Courts of Appeals shall have such jurisdiction as may
be provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders
of the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals .. "); cf. In re Hawke, 107 Ohio
St. 341,140 N.E. 583 (1923) (holding that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals cannot
be extended beyond the limits in the state constitution).
349365 U.S. 167 (1961).
350436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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respondeat superior as a basis for liability.351 Nonetheless, municipalities and
other units of local government may be liable under § 1983 for violations of
federal rights when the challenged actions 1) are based on official policies made
by the municipality's lawmakers;352 2) are taken by other official
policymakers; 353 3) are the result of inadequate training or other policies that
reflect a deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons with
whom municipal employees come into contact,354 or 4) are part of the custom
or practice of the municipality.355 In all cases, however, there must be a causal
connection between the action or inaction of the municipality and the resulting
injury.356
35 1Id. at 691 ("[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a
tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a
respondeat superior theory.").
3521d. at 694.
353 See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737-38 (1989); see also City of St.
Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469
(1986). The Supreme Court treats "the identification of those officials whose decisions
represent the official policy of the local governmental unit ... [as] a legal question to be
resolved by the trial judge before the case is submitted to the jury." Jett, 491 U.S. at 737.
The determination of who is an official policymaker may involve not only an analysis
of "state and local positive law" but also "custom or usage having the force of law." Id.
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 124 n.1). Although the
Supreme Court apparently expects federal judges to do whatever fact-finding is
necessary to identify the official policymakers, state courts may have more authority to
assign such fact-finding to the jury. For a recent discussion of municipal liability based
on the actions of a putative policymaker, see Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 988 F.2d 649
(6th Cir. 1993) (police chief did not have authority to make final city policy regarding
drug testing of police cadets).
354 See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). A single unconstitutional act by
a municipal employee, standing alone, may not be the basis for inferring an improper
training policy. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985); accord Lytle v.
City of Columbus, 37 Ohio App. 3d 99, 590 N.E.2d 421 (Franklin Co. 1990) (rejecting
proof of municipal liability under § 1983 from the alleged misconduct of a single police
officer). However, when combined with sufficient evidence of inadequate policies of
training or supervision, a single act may be the basis for imposing § 1983 liability on a
municipality. See City of Oklahoma City, 471 U.S. at 821-22; accord Pembaur, 485 U.S at 480
("[Ilt is plain that [§ 1983] municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by
municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances."). For a recent discussion of
municipal liability based on a training policy, see Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d
1036 (6th Cir. 1992) (refusing to permit entry of summary judgment on a claim involving
an alleged city failure to properly train police officers on the use of deadly force).
35 5See Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989);
Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246-48 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495
U.S. 932 (1990).
35 6See Jett, 491 U.S at 737 ("Once those officials who have the power to make official
policy on a particular issue have been identified, it is for the jury to determine whether
their decisions have caused the deprivation of rights at issue ... ").
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In Murphy v. City of Reynoldsburg,357 the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that
§ 1983 municipal liability may be based on customs or practices that are not
authorized by policymakers.
Even though a particular practice is not explicitly authorized by city
officials, where the practice is sufficiently persistent and widespread
it may constitute a custom that represents municipal policy.
Sufficiently numerous prior incidents of police misconduct... may
tend to prove a custom and accession to that custom by the
municipality's policymakers.
358
Unlike individual governmental employees, municipalities and other
political subdivisions cannot claim a qualified immunity under § 1983.359 As a
result, § 1983 plaintiffs often join municipalities or other governmental entities
to assure the presence of a defendant that lacks an immunity and is capable of
satisfying a judgment. The joinder of political subdivisions in § 1983 suits,
however, can complicate the litigation, especially when entity liability is based
either on inadequate training or supervision or on the existence of a custom.360
Plaintiffs may sometimes avoid these difficulties in states like Ohio that not
only permit some suits to be brought directly against political subdivisions36 1
but also have liberal indemnification policies under which judgments against
employees are paid by the governmental entity.362 There are, however,
limitations on the extent to which state law provides an alternative to § 1983.
35765 Ohio St. 3d 356, 604 N.E.2d 138 (1992).
35865 Ohio St. 3d at359, 604 N.E.2d at 140 (quotations and citations omitted) (quoting
McConney v. City of Houston, 863 F.2d 1180, 1184 (5th Cir. 1989)). The Ohio appellate
courts have followed Supreme Court cases defining municipal liability under § 1983.
See, e.g., Steplight v. Belpulsi, 76 Ohio App. 3d 384, 601 N.E.2d 656 (Lake Co. 1991)
(affirming a the directed verdict in favor of defendant in a § 1983 claim against a
municipality for the actions of a police detective because of the plaintiff's failure to
establish a municipal custom or policy); Lytle, 70 Ohio App. 3d at 110, 590 N.E.2d at 429
(rejecting the inference of a city policy for purposes of § 1983 municipal liability from a
single incident of misconduct); Kazel v. City of Eastlake, No. 10-089, 1985 WL 7780, at
*4 (Ohio Ct. App. Lake Co. Feb. 1, 1985) (city not liable under § 1983 for an arrest absent
an official policy); Amurri v. City of Columbus, Nos. 84AP-597, 84AP-598, 84AP-618,
84AP-619,84AP-681,84AP-682,1985 WL 9634 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin Co. Feb. 28,1985)
(respondeat superior not a basis for § 1983 municipal liability).
359 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
360Section 1983 claims against governmental entities represent a case within a case
and can significantly lengthen and complicate a trial. Thus, a number of federal judges
bifurcate § 1983 claims and hear the claims against the individual defendants first. See
Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police
Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499 (1993) (criticizing the practice of bifurcating § 1983
claims).
361 See infra notes 363-66 and accompanying text.
362See infra notes 369-82 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, Ohio law in this area, like § 1983, has its own ambiguities and
complexities.
In the early 1980s the Ohio Supreme Court abrogated the doctrine of
governmental immunity and made municipalities and other units of local
government liable for the acts of their employees on a theory of respondeat
superior.363 This abrogation of governmental immunity made municipalities
directly liable under state law for some conduct for which the municipality
could also be found liable under § 1983.364 In addition, it permitted suits
directly against municipalities under state law for conduct that was actionable
under § 1983 (against individual employees) but for which § 1983 municipal
liability did not extend. 365
This abrogation of governmental immunity did not remain the law of Ohio
for very long. Effective November 20, 1985, Chapter 2744 of the Ohio Revised
Code, the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, largely restored
governmental immunity by making municipalities and other political
subdivisions immune from suit under state law for "governmental functions"
subject to a narrow group of statutory exceptions.366 As a result, in many of
those circumstances in which § 1983 claims are likely to be brought, there is no
basis for joining analogous state law claims against municipalities. 367
3 63 See Enghauser Mfg. Co. v. Eriksson Eng'g Ltd., 6 Ohio St. 3d 31, 451 N.E.2d 228
(1983) (holding that municipalities will be held liable, the same as private corporations
and persons, for the negligence of their employees and agents in the performance of the
activities once the decision has been made to engage in activities characterized by the
exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion); Haverlack v. Portage
Homes, Inc., 2 Ohio St. 3d 26, 30,442 N.E.2d 749, 752 (1982) (abolishing the doctrine of
sovereign immunity for municipal corporations, and stating that "[a] municipal
corporation, unless immune by statute, is liable for its negligence in the performance or
nonperformance of its acts").
3 64 See, e.g., Longfellow v. City of Newark, 18 Ohio St. 3d 144, 480 N.E.2d 432 (1985)
(city lacks sovereign immunity for actions of a police officer in making an arrest without
a valid warrant).
3 65 See Molton v. City of Cleveland, 839 F.2d 240, 243-48 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding city
liable under state law but not § 1983 for the suicide of a pretrial detainee, cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1068 (1989).
3 66OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.02(A) (1) (Anderson 1992). Under § 2744.02(A) (1)
municipalities and other political subdivisions have immunity for governmental and
proprietary functions subject to certain express exceptions for which the immunity of
political subdivisions is waived in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744,02(B) (Anderson 1992).
See generally Sawicki v. Ottawa Hills, 37 Ohio St. 3d 222, 226-7, 525 N.E.2d 468, 472-73
(1988) (noting that the cases judicially abrogating sovereign immunity are no longer the
law of Ohio).
3 67Some state courts address this problem by implying suits directly under the state
constitution. See, e.g., Corum v. University of North Carolina, 413 N.E.2d 276, 289-92
(N.C.) (finding an implied right of action under the North Carolina Constitution and
holding the doctrine of sovereign immunity not applicable to such actions), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 493 (1992). See generally JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES Ch. 7 (1992). The Ohio Supreme
Court, however, has rejected the availability of such implied claims when thereareother
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Ironically, however, the Act, while largely insulating political subdivisions
from liability under state law, did not provide similar protection to
governmental employees who have been left with a narrower immunity under
state law than that available under § 1983.368
reasonably satisfactory remedies. See Provens v. Stark County Bd. of Mental
Retardation, 64 Ohio St. 3d 252, 594 N.E.2d 959 (1992) (rejecting the availability of a
Bivens claim directly under the Ohio Constitution on behalf of a teacher alleging that
retaliatory actions were taken against her as a result of her having criticized the board
because of the availability of "other reasonably satisfactory remedies provided by
statutory enactment and administrative process"). The court has not addressed, and it
is unclear, whether Chapter 2744 meets the Provens standard in light of the apparent
immunity for police practices, see infra note 369, and the other significant gaps in its
coverage. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.02(B) (4) (Anderson 1992) (political
subdivisions are immune from liability for injuries caused within or on the grounds ofjails, places of juvenile detention, workhouses, or other detention facilities despite their
liability for injuries caused in other public buildings); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.03(A)(4) (Anderson 1992) (political subdivisions are immune from liability for "inj ury or death
to a person who had been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a criminal offense and who,
at the time of the injury or death, was serving any portion of his sentence by performing
community service work for or in the political subdivision").
The Ohio Courts of Appeals have upheld the constitutionality of § 2744.02(B) (4).
See, e.g., Phipps v. City of Dayton, 57 Ohio App. 3d 11, 566 N.E.2d 181 (Montgomery
Co. 1988) (upholding the constitutionality of the grant of immunity to political
subdivisions for injury or death that is caused by the negligence of their employees and
that occurs in their jails), cause dismissed, 41 Ohio St. 3d 708, 534 N.E.2d 1204 (1989);accord
Agee v. Butler County, 72 Ohio App. 3d 481, 594 N.E.2d 1050 (Butler Co. 1991), juris.
motion overruled, 60 Ohio St. 3d 712, 573 N.E.2d 672 (1991); cf. Menefee v. Queen City
Metro, 49 Ohio St. 3d 27,550 N.E.2d 181 (1990) (relying on the state's legitimate interest
in preserving the financial soundness of its political subdivisions, and upholding on
state and federal constitutional grounds the provision of OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2744.05(B) granting political subdivisions immunity against claims subrogated to an
insurance company).
36 81n addition to not having an immunity for "acts or omissions [that] were manifestly
outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities," OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2744.03(A) (6) (a) (Anderson 1992), employees of political subdivisions do not have an
immunity from liability for "acts or omissions [that] were [taken] with malicious
purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner." OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2744.03(A) (6) (b) (Anderson 1992). Unlike the objective immunity available to
governmental employees under § 1983, see supra notes 261-66 and accompanying text,
the immunity under state law is framed in subjective terms that, at least in part, are
dependent on the subjective state of mind of the individual employees. Thus, an
employee of a political subdivision who acted in subjective bad faith might have an
objective § 1983 qualified immunity (because federal law was not clearly established)
but, at the same time, could be found liable under state law and denied an immunity
because of the relevance of the employee's subjective beliefs. Cf. Brodie v. Summit
County Children Servs. Bd., 51 Ohio St. 3d 112, 117, 554 N.E.2d 1301, 1307 (1990)
(pre-Chapter 2744 case, relying on the statutory immunity of OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.86 (Anderson 1990) to "hold that officers or agents of a county children services
bureau are immune from civil liability for the exercise of discretionary functions unless
a plaintiff challenging the public officer's good faith can show that the official acted in
willful, reckless or wanton disregard of rights established underlaw"). In addition, OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.03(A) (7) (Anderson 1992), recognizes a common law immunity
for political subdivisions and for certain prosecutorial, legal, and judicial officers.
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Despite the restoration of governmental immunity for most state law claims
involving the type of governmental conduct that is most often the subject of
§ 1983 suits,369 the duty of municipalities and other political subdivisions 370 to
indemnify § 1983 judgments provides an indirect way for § 1983 plaintiffs to
have their judgments satisfied. Under § 2744.07(A) of the Ohio Revised
Code,371 this duty extends to claims brought under § 1983.372 Thus, there is a
state law alternative to suing municipalities directly under § 1983.
The duty to defend and the duty to indemnify employees, however, are not
couched in the same language. The duty to defend only exists "if the act or
omission occurred or is alleged to have occurred while the employee was acting
in good faith and not manifestly outside the scope of his employment or official
responsibilities."373 On the other hand, the duty to indemnify is narrower and
The Revised Code provides in part:
The political subdivision, and an employee who is a county prosecuting
attorney, city director of law, village solicitor, or similar chief legal
officer of a political subdivision, an assistant of any such person,
or a judge of a court of this state, is entitled to any defense or immunity
available at common law or established by the Revised Code.
Id.
36 9For example, many § 1983 suits involve police practices, but "[tihe provision or
nonprovision of police.., services or protection" is a "governmental function" under
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.01(C) (2) (a) (Anderson Supp. 1992), for which the
immunity of political subdivisions is not waived under OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2744.02(B) (Anderson 1992); accord Sawicki, 37 Ohio St. 3d at 224-25, 525 N.E.2d at
472-73 (observing that "[t]he current law . . . appears to immunize municipal
corporations from liability deriving from the actions of their police officers").
3 70 Political subdivisions are defined in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.01(F) (Anderson
Supp. 1992) to include a broad range of local governmental entities, including "a
municipal corporation, township, county, school district, or other body corporate and
politic responsible for governmental activities in a geographic area smaller than that of
the state."
371OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2744.07(A) (1), (2) (Anderson 1992) (defining the duty of
political subdivisions to defend and indemnify employees sued under both state and
federal law); see also OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 9.87 (Anderson 1990) (comparable
indemnification provision for state employees).
3 72Generally, Chapter 2744, the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, does not apply
to § 1983 or other federal claims, but this exclusion is not applicable to OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2744.07 (Anderson 1992), which deals with the duty to defend and indemnify
employees. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.09(E) (Anderson 1992) ('This chapter does
not apply to, and shall not be construed to apply to ... (E) Civil claims based upon
alleged violations of the constitution or statutes of the United States, except that the
provisions of section 2744.07... shall apply to such claims or related civil actions.').
373OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.07(A) (1) provides as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this division, a political subdivision
shall provide for the defense of an employee, in any state or federal
court, in any civil action or proceeding to recover damages for injury,
death, or loss to persons or property allegedly caused by an act or
omission of the employee in connection with a governmental or pro-
prietary function if the act or omission occurred or is alleged to have
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only exists "if at the time of the act or omission the employee was acting in good
faith and within the scope of his employment or official responsibilities."374
In Rogers v. City of Youngstown,375 the Ohio Supreme Court held that the duty
to defend a federal court § 1983 action was triggered by an allegation that a
police officer "while acting within the scope of his employment.., assaulted
and battered the Plaintiff."376 The fact that the complaint did not allege that the
defendant acted in good faith but rather claimed that he acted "unlawfully" did
not absolve the city of its obligation to defend the suit, which also included
state law claims. 377 Thus, the city was obligated to pay the cost of defending
the § 1983 action.378
Unlike the duty to defend, which is determined from the pleadings at the
outset of the litigation, the duty to indemnify "any judgment, other than a
occurred while the employee was acting in good faith and not manifestly
outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities.
3 74 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.07(A) (2) provides as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this division, a political subdivision
shall indemnify and hold harmless an employee in the amount of any
judgment, other than a judgment for punitive or exemplary damages,
that is obtained against the employee in a state or federal court or as
a result of a law of a foreign jurisdiction and that is for damages
for injury, death, or loss to persons or property caused by an act or
omission of the employee in connection with a governmental or proprie-
tary function, if at the time of the act or omission the employee
was acting in good faith and within the scope of his employment or
official responsibilities.
37561 Ohio St. 3d 205, 574 N.E.2d 451 (1991).
37661 Ohio St. 3d at 209, 574 N.E.2d at 454.
377 1n refusing to limit the duty to defend to cases in which the complaint in the
underlying suit contained an allegation that the employee acted in good faith, the court
observed that such a requirement "would be incongruous with suing the employee in
his or her individual capacity." Id. Neither the absence of good faith nor the presence of
bad faith, however, is a prerequisite to a § 1983 claim, and there is nothing incongruous
about an allegation of good faith in an individual capacity § 1983 complaint. For
example, a prison official could be found liable under § 1983 for the deliberate
indifference to the serious medical needs of an inmate without a finding of bad faith.
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Likewise, a police officer may be found liable
for an improper use of deadly force without a finding of bad faith. See Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). Nonetheless, plaintiffs rarely include allegations about the
defendants' good faith in § 1983 complaints, and any policy that conditioned the
defendants' ability to receive a defense on the allegations of the complaint would be odd
indeed. Thus, the decision in Rogers to look to the complaint to determine the nature of
the suitbut to not require any formalistic allegations avoids giving the statute an absurd
construction that would virtually eliminate the duty to defend.
3 78Rogers, 61 Ohio St. 3d at 209, 574 N.E.2d at 454. The city was also required to pay
the costs of the declaratory judgment action for indemnification brought under OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.07(C) (Anderson 1992). Id.
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judgment for punitive or exemplary damages" 79 is determined after the case
has gone to judgment.380 Moreover, the duty to indemnify, although tied to a
scope of employment inquiry,3 81 is based on whether the employee was
actually acting within the scope of his or her employment.382
The governmental immunity that was restored by Chapter 2744 is not
applicable to "[c]ivil claims based upon alleged violations of the Constitution
or statutes of the United States."383 This provision clearly makes the state
immunity inapplicable to § 1983 claims as a matter of state law.384 It is unclear,
however, whether this broad statutory exclusion3 85 is limited to federal claims
3 79 OHIo REV. CODE. ANN. § 2744.07(A) (2).
380 The duty of Ohio political subdivisions to indemnify employees is applicable to
§ 1983 claims, see supra note 372, but the duty is contingent upon a judgment having
been entered against the employee. Even though municipalities cannot claim a qualified
immunity under § 1983, see supra note 359, the duty to indemnify is only available when
the employee is not entitled to qualified immunity and a judgment may be entered
against the employee. Thus, state law, as a practical matter, permits the political
subdivision to share the employee's qualified immunity. Nonetheless, in cases in which
the employee but not the political subdivision is liable under § 1983, the state
indemnification statute effectively imposes liability on the entity based on respondeat
superior.
381Scope of employment is a factual issue to be decided by the jury. Osborne v. Lyles,
63 Ohio St. 3d 326, 330, 587 N.E.2d 825,829 (1992) (plurality opinion) (stating that "it is
commonly recognized that whether an employee is acting within the scope of his
employment is a question of fact to be decided by the jury" and treating whether an
off-duty police officer was acting within the scope of his employment when heallegedly
exceeded his lawful authority and committed tortious acts as raising factual issues on
which summary judgment was not available). But cf. Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St. 3d
284,595 N.E.2d 862 (1992) (treating the scope of employment determination in the Court
of Claims Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(F) (Anderson 1992), as procedural in
nature and not subject to the right to trial by jury).
3 82 By tying the duty to represent to whether the employee's acts or omissions were
"not manifestly outside he scope of his employment or official responsibilities," OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.07(A) (1) (emphasis added), Ohio gives employees the benefit
of the doubt and permits representation when it appears from the allegations that the
employee was acting somewhat (but not manifestly) beyond the scope of his or her
employment.
3 83 0HIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.09(E) (Anderson 1992).
3 84 Conley, 64 Ohio St. 3d at 292, 595 N.E.2d at 869 (treating state immunities as
inapplicable to § 1983 under both state and federal law).
3 85Unlike OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.09(E), which makes Chapter 2744 inapplicable
to "Ic]ivil claims based upon alleged violations of the constitution or statutesof theUnited
States," the other four subsections of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.09(Anderson 1992)
(emphasis added) make the chapter inapplicable to specific types of "[clivil actions." See
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.09(A)-(D). Read literally, the broad language of
§ 2744.09(E) appears to make the state stutory immunities inapplicable to hybrid actions
in which state-created remedies are used to enforce duties imposed by federal law. For
a discussion of hybrid actions in which state-created causes of action are used to enforce
duties imposed by federal law, see Paul Sherman, Use of Federal Statutes in State
Negligence Per Se Actions, 13 WHITHER L. REV. 831 (1992); Pauline E. Calande, State
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in which the cause of action is authorized by § 1983 and other provisions of
federal law or whether it also makes the statute inapplicable to state-created
actions to enforce federal law. 386
D. Suits Against States
Cities and other units of local government are "persons" for purposes of suit
under § 1983, but in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,387 the Supreme
Court held that states are not. Thus, the Court immunized states from § 1983
suits in state courts.388
Prior to Will, unconsenting states could not be sued in federal court under
§ 1983 because of the Eleventh Amendment.3 89 State officials, however, have
long been subject to § 1983 official capacity suits in federal court for prospective
injunctive relief even though such relief really runs against the state.390 Will
made clear that § 1983 was equally available in state courts for suits against
state officials for prospective injunctive relief,391 and the Ohio Supreme Court
has held that the Court of Common Pleas has jurisdiction over official capacity
§ 1983 suits for injunctive relief against state officials. 392
The Ohio courts also anticipated Will and refused to permit § 1983 suits
against the state in either the Court of Common Pleas3 93 or the Court of
Incorporation of Federal Law: A Response to the Demise of Implied Federal Rights of Action,
94 YALE L. J. 1144,1153 (1985); Ronald J. Greene, Hybrid State Law in the Federal Courts,
83 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1969).
3 86For a discussion of the use of state-created remedies to enforceprovisions of federal
law that are also actionable under § 1983, see STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra
note 16, § 5.3(b). See also Akhil Amar, Using State Law to Protect Federal Constitutional
Rights: Some Questions and Answers About Converse § 1983,64 U. COLO. L. REV. 159 (1993)
(discussing the use of state remedies to enforce federal rights against federal officers in
state courts).
387491 U.S. 58 (1989).
3 881n rejecting the availability of § 1983 as a basis for obtaining relief against the state
in state courts, the Supreme Court in Will imported the distinctions used in federal court
for purposes of the eleventh amendment into the definition of "person" under § 1983.
See Will, 491 U.S. at 66-67 ("[I]n deciphering congressional intent as to the scope of § 1983,
the scope of the eleventh amendment is a consideration, and we decline to adopt a
reading of § 1983 that disregards it.").
3 89See Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
3 90See generally Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); cf. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908) (creating a fiction under which state officers could be sued for injunctive relief
directly under the constitution despite the eleventh amendment).
391491 U.S. at 71 n.10 ("Of course a state official in his or her official capacity, when
sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because 'official-capacity
actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State."').
392 See supra note 94.
393 See Kinney v. Ohio Dep't of Admin. Servs., 30 Ohio App. 3d 121, 507 N.E.2d 399
(Franklin Co. 1986) (state agency not a "person" under § 1983).
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Claims.394 The Ohio courts, however, do not need § 1983 in order to entertain
claims against the state for violations of federal law.395 Ohio has consented to
suit in the Court of Claims,396 and this consent extends to federal claims in
which the state is a proper party.397
Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court has not followed the federal model in
determining the scope of relief available against the state in the Court of Claims
on injunctive claims. In Edelman v. Jordan,398 a federal court § 1983 case, the
United States Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred
retroactive injunctive relief where the relief-illegally withheld public
assistance benefits-would have to come from the state treasury. The Ohio
Supreme Court, however, in Ohio Hospital Ass'n v. Ohio Department of Human
Services,3 99 rejected the Edelman approach and held that Medicaid providers
suing for injunctive relief (as contrasted to damages) in the Court of Claims
may recover payments that had been improperly withheld in violation of
federal law even though the judgment would have to be satisfied from the state
treasury.4 00
394 See Burkey v. Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, 38 Ohio App. 3d 170,528 N.E.2d
607 (Franklin 1988).
395 See Ohio Hosp. Ass'n v. Ohio Dep't of Human Servs., 62 Ohio St. 3d 97, 579 N.E.2d
695 (1991) (permitting suit against the state directly under the federal Medicaid statute
despite the unavailability of § 1983 but not reaching the availability of suits directly
under the United States Constitution), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1483 (1992); Wilcox Indus.,
Inc. v. State, 79 Ohio App. 3d 403, 607 N.E.2d 514 (Hamilton Co. 1992) (permitting the
Ohio Court of Claims to entertain a taking claim directly under the fifth amendment to
the United States Constitution), juris. motion overruled, 65 Ohio St. 3d 1416, 598 N.E.2d
1168(1992).
396 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A) (1) (Anderson 1992) ('The state hereby waives
its immunity from liability and consents to be sued, and have its liability determined,
in the court of claims... in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits
between private parties .... "); see also Reynolds v. State of Ohio, Div. of Parole and
Community Servs., 14 Ohio St. 3d 68, 471 N.E.2d 776 (1984) (rejecting a narrow
construction of the private parties limitation in the Court of Claims Act and holding that
the state could be liable for failing to supervise an inmate on a work release furlough);
accord Bennett v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation and Correction, 60 Ohio St. 3d 107, 573
N.E.2d 633 (1991) (relying on Reynolds and holding that state is not immune for
unlawfully confining a prison inmate beyond the lawful term of his incarceration).
397 See Manning v. Ohio State Library Bd., 62 Ohio St. 3d 24, 577 N.E.2d 650 (1991)
(holding that Ohio courts may entertain Title VII employment discrimination actions
against the state in the Court of Claims).
398415 U.S. 651 (1974).
39962 Ohio St. 3d 97, 579 N.E.2d 695 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1483 (1992).
4001n taking this position, the court distinguished a suit for equitable relief in the form
of monies withheld under an invalid administrative rule from money damages and
permitted a suit for the former in the Court of Claims. See id. at 62 Ohio St. 3d 103-04,
579 N.E.2d at 699-700. It is unclear, however, why the waiver of sovereign immunity in
the Court of Claims Act would not also apply to damage suits against the state.
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Likewise, in Wilcox Industries, Inc. v. State of Ohio,401 the Ohio Court of
Appeals held that the Court of Claims had jurisdiction over a patent holder's
claim that the state prison was making, using, and selling products that were
protected by the patent. Cases arising under the federal patent laws are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts,402 but the patent holder framed
its case as a taking claim under the federal Constitution.403 After holding that
federal law did not prevent the plaintiff from framing its claim as a state court
taking claim, the court held that the Court of Claims was the proper forum for
such a suit.404
Neither the claim for retroactive payments in Ohio Hospital Ass'n nor the
claim for just compensation in Wilcox was brought under § 1983, but in both
cases the Ohio courts allowed full relief in the Court of Claims. These decisions
implicitly recognize that states may have remedies that are more favorable than
federal remedies for the enforcement of federal rights,40 5 and Ohio has taken
such an approach in permitting the Court of Claims to award relief not
available under federal statutory remedies.406
40179 Ohio App. 3d 403, 607 N.E.2d 514 (Hamilton Co.1992),juris. motion overruled, 65
Ohio St. 3d 1416,598 N.E.2d 1168 (1992).
402 See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988).
403 Wilcox, 79 Ohio App. 3d at 403-04, 607 N.E.2d at 514-15.
40479 Ohio App. 3d at 405-06, 607 N.E.2d at 515-16.
405Accord Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that an
award of retroactive benefits in the form of equitable relief is not barred by state
sovereign immunity and ordering retroactive general assistance benefits withheld
under a state durational residency requirement that violated both the state and federal
constitutions),affd on other grounds, 504 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
902 (1994).
4 06The United States Constitution, however, may require states to providefull relief
for state violations of the federal constitution. See General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211,
226 (1908) ("If a suit against state officers is precluded in the national courts by the 11th
Amendment to the Constitution and may be forbidden by a state to its courts ... an
easy way is open to prevent the enforcement of many provisions of the Constitution
...."). See generally Louis E. Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause:
Damages Against States in their Own Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69 CAL. L. REV.
189,314 (1981) (concluding that"[tihe idea that there are some wrongs without remedies,
whatever its force in the field of private law, has no place in regulating the rights of
individuals against government in a system with a written constitution like our own").
Cf. Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993) (strengthening the
presumption in favor of the retroactive application of new civil divisions and requiring
states to offer taxpayers adequate predeprivation procedural due process or provide
retrospective relief in the form of either tax refunds or the retroactive elimination of
discriminatory tax policies); McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and
Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 49n.34 (1990) (noting that Florida had waived sovereign immunity
through its authorization of a state court refund action and requiring the state to provide
refunds of taxes paid under an unconstitutional state tax statute). But see Mossman v.
Donahey, 46 Ohio St. 2d 1,346 N.E.2d 305 (1976) (pre-Court of Claims Act case holding
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E. Suits Against State Officials
In contrast to the availability of § 1983 suits seeking prospective injunctive
relief against state officials, § 1983 is not available in official capacity damage
actions against state officials. Nonetheless, in Hafer v. Melo,40 7 the Supreme
Court made clear that state officials were subject to personal liability in
individual capacity § 1983 damage claims for acts taken as part of their official
duties.4 08 Thus, the Court treats an official capacity claim against a
governmental official as a claim against the governmental entity on behalf of
which the official is acting. Under this approach, the question of whether a suit
is brought against a governmental official in that official's individual or official
capacity is important in suits against both state and local governmental
defendants.4 09 As a result, in any § 1983 suit that is even nominally against an
individual, it is necessary to determine the capacity in which the defendant is
being sued.
An issue that has arisen frequently in Ohio involves the provision of Ohio
law that conditions the availability of individual capacity suits against state
employees on a determination by the Court of Claims that they acted in bad
faith or beyond the scope of their employment.410 Until recently, lower courts
in Ohio had been split as to the applicability of this required scope of
employment determination to individual capacity § 1983 claims.411 In Conley
that the state cannot be sued for damages in the state courts on a federal claim without
its consent).
407112 S. Ct. 358 (1991); accord Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Wray, No. 92AP-627, 1992
WL 323917, *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin Co. Nov. 3,1992) (relying on Hafer to hold that
"state officials may be sued for damages in their individual capacity for acts performed
in their official capacity under color of state law if such acts are violative of constitutional
rights").
408 Prior to Hafer, the Sixth Circuit had misconstrued Will and held that state officials
could not be sued under § 1983 for acts taken in their official capacity. See Cowan v.
Louisville School of Medicine, 900 F.2d 936,942-43 (6th Cir. 1990); Rice v. Ohio Dep't of
Transp., 887 F.2d 716, 719 (6th Cir. 1989), vacated, 110 S. Ct. 3232 (1990). See generally
William Burnham & Michael C. Fayz, The State as a "Non-Person" Under Section 1983:
Some Comments on Will and Suggestions for the Future, 70 OR. L. REV. 1, 35-43 (1991).
4 091n an individual capacity suit against a local governmental official, the defendant
may assert a qualified or an absolute immunity. No such immunity is available to
governmental entities. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (holding
that a city may not share the qualified immunity of city employees). Because an official
capacity § 1983 suit against a local governmental official is really another way of naming
the entity, see Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464 (1985), the governmental entity may not
claim an immunity. On the other hand, to prevail in an official capacity § 1983 damage
suit against a local governmental official, a § 1983 plaintiff must meet Monell standards
and prove that an official policy of the governmental entity caused the deprivation of
federal law.
4 10 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(F) (Anderson 1992).
411Compare Besser v. Dexter, 68 Ohio App. 3d 510, 589 N.E.2d 77 (Hocking Co. 1990)
(rejecting applicability to § 1983); and White v. Morris, 69 Ohio App. 3d 90, 590 N.E.2d
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v. Shearer,4 12 however, the Ohio Supreme Court, relying on the Martinez
principle,4 13 held that it was plain error to apply this scope of employment
requirement to § 1983 claims against state employees.4 14 Therefore, a plaintiff
suing a state employee under § 1983 need not first file an action against the
state in the Court of Claims (to determine whether the employee was acting
within the scope of his or her employment), although this requirement is
applicable to state law claims. 415
Federal courts, however, are divided as to how to construe § 1983 complaints
that seek damages against state officials for their official acts but do not make
clear whether the suits are being brought against the officials in their individual
or official capacities. For example, the Sixth Circuit treats § 1983 complaints
that fail to expressly state that governmental officials are being sued in their
individual capacities as official capacity suits.4 16 Moreover, even though issues
of capacity are generally waivable, the Sixth Circuit treats this issue as
jurisdictional because it implicates the Eleventh Amendment.417
The Supreme Court did not reach the pleading issue in Ha/er4 18 and thus did
not decide whether the Third Circuit acted properly in looking to the
proceedings below to determine whether the § 1983 damage suit was brought
57 (Scioto Co. 1990),juris. motion overruled, 56 Ohio St. 3d 704, 564 N.E.2d 707 (1990) with
Mullins v. Rower, No. 1-90.6 1991 WL 44174 (Ohio Ct. App. Allen Co. Mar. 20, 1991)
(applying requirement to § 1983 claims); Bell v. Newnham, No. L-89-373, 1990 WL
131972 (Ohio Ct. App. Lucas Co. Sept. 14,1990).
41264 Ohio St. 3d 284, 595 N.E.2d 862 (1992).
4 13See infra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
4 14The Conley court relied on the supremacy of federal law in construing § 1983.
[Clonduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrong-
ful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... cannot be immunized by state law,
... even though the federal cause of action [was] being asserted in
the state courts.... [A] construction of... J§ 1983] which permit[s]
a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute
a basic guarantee into an illusory promise...
64 Ohio St.3d at 292-93, 595 N.E.2d at 869 (quotations ommitted). But see note 185 and
accompanying text (discussing a possible state law basis for Conley).
415Haynes v. Marshall, 887 F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1989).
416 See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592 (6th Cir. 1989). See also Yeksigian v. Nappi,
900 F.2d 101,104 (7th Cir. 1990) ("In the absence of any express statement that the parties
are being sued in their individual capacities, an allegation that the defendants were
acting under color of law generally is construed as a suit against the defendants in their
official capacities only."); cf. Lovelace v. O'Hara, 985 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1993) (refusing
to permit an amended complaint naming a deputy county sheriff in his individual
capacity to relate back for purposes of the statute of limitations).
417See Wells, 891 F.2d at 593.
418 See Hafer, 112 S.Ct. at 361 n.*.
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against the state official in her official or her personal capacity.419 Nonetheless,
the Hafer Court agreed with the Third Circuit's observation that "[ilt is
obviously preferable for the plaintiff to be specific in the first instance to avoid
any ambiguity."420
Despite the Supreme Court's failure to reach this issue and its obvious
preference for clarity in pleading, the Court has approached the issue of
determining the capacity in which a § 1983 suit has been brought by looking
to the course of the proceedings.42 1 Moreover, the Court's willingness to permit
the Hafer suit to go forward suggests that the pleading of individual capacity
is not jurisdictional.
In Cooperman v. University Surgical Associates., Inc.,422 the Ohio Supreme
Court addressed a related issue and recognized that some suits against
individual defendants were really suits against the state and thus subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.
An action against a state officer or employee will be treated as one
against the state for purposes of R.C. Chapter 2743 where the state,
though not a party to the suit, is the real party against which relief is
sought, and where a judgment for the plaintiff, though nominally
against the defendant as an individual, could operate to control the
action of the state or subject it to liability.4 23
Despite this statement, the determination of whether a § 1983 claim is brought
as an official or an individual capacity claim should be governed by federal
standards, and the Ohio courts should not rely on the above language from
Cooperman for this purpose. Nor should they require a specific pleading of
capacity,424 or confuse the allegation that a § 1983 defendant was acting in his
or her official capacity with the independent question of the capacity in which
the defendant is being sued.42 5
419See Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 635-36 (3d Cir. 1990), affd, 112 S. Ct. 360 (1990).
Other circuits following this approach and cited by the Court are: Conner v. Reinhard,
847 F.2d 384, 394 n.8 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988); Houston v. Reich, 932
F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1991); Lundgren v. McDaniel, 814 F.2d 600, 603-04 (11th Cir.
1987). The Courtcited the Sixth and Eighth Circuit decisions in Wells and Nix v. Norman,
879 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1989), as imposing more rigid pleading requirements.
42 0See Hafer, 112 S. Ct. at 361 n. * (quoting 912 F.2d at 636 n.7).
42 11n Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, (1985), the Court observed that "[iln many
cases, the complaint will not clearly specify whether officials are sued personally, in
their official capacity, or both. 'The course of proceedings' in such cases typically will
indicate thenature of the liability sought to be imposed."Id. at 167 n.14 (quoting Brandon
v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 469 (1985)).
42232 Ohio St. 3d 191, 513 N.E.2d 288 (1987).
42332 Ohio St. 3d at 195, 513 N.E.2d at 293.
424 See OHIO R. Civ. P. 9(A).
42 5Hafer, 112 S. Ct. at 363.
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Finally, the treatment of capacity as jurisdictional, even if proper for suits
against state officials in federal court, is inapplicable to state court § 1983
claims. Carrillo v. State426 is the leading state court case addressing the
construction of § 1983 complaints that are ambiguous as to the capacity in
which individuals are being sued. In that case, the Arizona Court of Appeals
recognized the "important repercussions" of treating a § 1983 suit as a personal
capacity as contrasted to an official capacity suit.427 Nonetheless, the court
rejected a requirement that plaintiffs plead that they are suing a defendant in
his or her personal or individual capacity.428
Viewing the strict pleading approach as derived, in part, from the
jurisdictional requirements of the Eleventh Amendment, the Arizona court
refused to impose such a requirement on state court § 1983 plaintiffs.
[A] plaintiff should allege specifically the capacity in which he is suing
the official. Such specificity both relieves courts from the difficulty
inherent in interpreting an ambiguous complaint and gives the
defendant clear notice of his possible personal liability for damages.
We decline to hold, however, that failure to allege specifically official
or personal capacity will be the death knell of a section § 1983 action
or that an allegation of capacity, standing alone, is determinative of this
issue. Such a conclusion would result in a harsh elevation of form over
substance.
429
Instead, the court applied an "interpretive" approach, which it found supported
by the Supreme Court's decision in Brandon v. Holt.430 Under this approach, the
court reviewed the pleadings and the course of the proceedings to determine
that the case before it was a § 1983 personal capacity suit.431
426817 P.2d 493 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
42 7The court defined the "repercussions" as follows:
The plaintiff in a section 1983 action can recover monetary damages,
including punitive damages, only against a defendant named in
his personal capacity. Balanced against that right of recovery, however,
is the right of a defendant named in his personal capacity to assert
a defense of qualified or absolute immunity, a defense not available
to one named in his official capacity.
Id. at 496 (citation omitted).
42 8 d. at 497.
42 91d. The court also relied on ARiZ. R. CIv. P. 9(a), which limits required allegations
of capacity to those going to jurisdiction. Id. at 497 n.3. OHIO R. Civ. P. 9(A), however,
does not even contain such a provision.
430469 U.S. 464, 469 (1985).
431817 P.2d at 497.
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F. Damages
1. Compensatory Damages
In Carey v. Piphus,432 the Supreme Court looked to the federal principle of
compensation as the source of a uniform § 1983 damage policy that would not
vary from state to state. The Carey Court also made clear that § 1983 damages
are not limited to those that were available in 1871, when the predecessor to
§ 1983 was enacted, but are based on evolving federal standards.433 Finally, the
Court rejected the availability of presumed damages for procedural due
process violations.4 4
Under federal principles, a broad range of damages may be awarded in
§ 1983 cases, including damages for mental and emotional distress.435 In
Memphis Community School District v. Stachura,436 however, the Court rejected
the availability of presumed damages to supplement § 1983 damage awards
but permitted such damages as a substitute when traditional damages are
difficult to prove.437 Thus, in the typical § 1983 case, a plaintiff may not recover
damages for the value of the constitutional right itself.
The damage policies in § 1983 actions are based on the common law but are
not dependent upon the law of the forum state.438 For example, the Sixth
Circuit has held that the federal doctrine of joint and several liability applies to
§ 1983 claims.439 Likewise, most federal courts apply a federal, not a state,
collateral source doctrine to determine whether reductions should be made to
432435 U.S. 247 (1978).
433Id. at 257-59.
4341d. at 260-64.
4351d. at 263-64 & n.20.
436477 U.S. 299 (1986).
43 71d. at 310-11.
43 8See Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 86 (3d Cir. 1965) ("We believe that the benefits of
the [Civil Rights] Acts were intended to be uniform throughout the United States, that
the protection to the individual to be afforded by them was not intended by Congress
to differ from state to state, and that the amount of damages to be recovered by the
injured individual was not to vary because of the law of the state in which the federal
court suit was brought."); see also Gordon v. Norman, 788 F.2d 1194,1199 (6th Cir. 1986)
("Federal standards govern the determination of damages under the civil rights
statutes."); accord Gordon v. Gerhardt, No. 6796, 1981 WL 2710, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App.
Montgomery Co. March 5,1981) ("Where an action for damages is based on... Sec. 1983,
whether that action is brought in a state court or in a federal court, federal law with
regard to the right to recover punitive damages applies.").
439Weeks v. Chaboudy, 984 F.2d 185, 188-89 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that there is a
federal rule of joint and several liability in § 1983 cases and reversing the apportionment
of liability for compensatory damages among the defendant and other prison personnel
who were not parties to the action).
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§ 1983 damage awards.440 State courts have generally followed federal policies
to determine the damage policies applicable to § 1983 claims,441 and the Ohio
courts should apply such federal policies in § 1983 actions.442
2. Punitive Damages
Under federal standards, punitive damages are available in § 1983 litigation
when defendants act intentionally or with reckless or callous disregard for
plaintiffs' rights.443 Furthermore, under federal common law principles,
punitive damages are available against individual defendants even absent
actual damages,444 and it is the responsibility of the jury to determine eligibility
for and amount of punitive damages under the traditional civil burden of proof:
the preponderance of the evidence standard. 445 Municipalities, however, are
not subject to § 1983 claims for punitive damages. 446
44 0See House, supra note 17, at 112-13.
441See, e.g., Sundholm v. City of Bettendorf, 389 N.W.2d 849 (Iowa 1986) (following
federal law to permit punitive damages under § 1983 despite the absence of actual
damages); Janda v. City of Detroit, 437 N.W.2d 326 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (applying
federal standards to affirm a § 1983 award of punitive damages despite the
unavailability of punitive damages for punishment under state law); Rogers v. Saylor,
760 P.2d 232 (Or. 1988) (rejecting the application of the $100,000 damage ceiling of the
Oregon Tort Claims Act and the immunity of governmental employees from awards of
punitive damages to § 1983 actions); Orr v. Crowder, 315 S.E.2d 593 (W. Va. 1983)
(following federal law to uphold a § 1983 damages award for mental anguish absent
physical injury), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 981 (1984); Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners,
340 N.W.2d 704 (Wis. 1983) (holding that the state $25,000 damage ceiling on municipal
liability does not apply to § 1983 actions under principles of federal law that require full
compensation for deprivations of federal rights). But see infra notes 458-59 and
accompanying text.
442 See House, supra note 17, at 116-24, 129-30 (arguing in favor of a federal common
law collateral source rule in both state and federal court § 1983 actions).
443 See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983) ("[Rleckless or callous disregard for the
plaintiff's rights, as well as intentional violations of federal law, should be sufficient to
trigger a jury's consideration of the appropriateness of punitive damages.").
444 See King v. Macri, 993 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1993); Erwin v. County of Manitowoc,
872 F.2d 1292,1299 (7th Cir. 1989); Wilson v. Taylor, 658 F.2d 1021,1023 (5th Cir. 1981);
Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1965); cf. Gordon v. Norman, 788 F.2d 1194,
1199 (6th Cir. 1986) ("[Plunitive damages may be awarded under § 1983 even where
they would not normally be recoverable under the local law in the state where the
violation occurred.").
445 See Bird v. Figel, 725 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. Ind. 1989).
44 6 See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981). The Court in Fact
Concerts left a small opening for the award of punitive damages against municipalities
under § 1983 in an "extreme situation where the taxpayers are directly responsible for
perpetuating an outrageous abuse of constitutional rights." Id. at 267 n.29. Courts have
generally rejected the availability of § 1983 punitive damage awards against
municipalities even in egregious circumstances. See STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983
LmCATION, supra note 16, § 16.3(c) n.51.
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Under the tort reform legislation that became effective on January 5, 1988,
Ohio has made a number of changes in the common law policies that
previously governed the availability of punitive damages in what the General
Assembly broadly defined as "tort actions."447 Punitive damages are now only
available in such actions under standards that are far more stringent than the
standards applicable to § 1983 claims in federal court. Under Section 2315.21(B)
of the Ohio Revised Code, punitive damages may not be recovered from a
defendant in a "tort action" unless "[tihe actions or omissions of that defendant
demonstrate malice, aggravated or egregious fraud, oppression, or insult
.. *.."448 In addition, for punitive damages to be awarded under Ohio law "[t]he
plaintiff... [must have] adduced proof of actual damages .... ,,449 but there is
no such requirement under federal law.450
Finally, Ohio has followed the lead of a number of other states by imposing
a more stringent burden of proof on punitive damages awards,451 and by
reducing the role of the jury in awarding punitive damages. Under this policy,
the plaintiff must satisfy the state's clear and convincing standard of proof in
order to permit a jdiry to conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to punitive
damages. The jury's function, with respect to such damages, is limited to
determining only whether the plaintiff is entitled to the award. Determining
the amount of the award is a decision made exclusively by the judge.452
There are substantial questions as to whether these new punitive damages
policies apply to § 1983 and other federal causes of action as a matter of state
4470HIo REV. CODE. ANN. § 2315.21(A) (1) (Anderson 1991) (defining "tort action" as
"a civil action for damages for injury or loss to person or property").
44 8 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(B) (Anderson 1991).
449§ 2315.21(B) ("[P]unitive or exemplary damages are not recoverable from a
defendant.., in a tort action unless... [t]he plaintiff.., has adduced proof of actual
damages ... .'). Curiously, the new statute may not require that actual damages be
awarded. Prior to its adoption, there was disagreement as to whether punitive damages
were available in Ohio absent proof of actual damages, but the committee responsible
for drafting jury instructions in Ohio took the position "that exemplary or punitive
damages may not be awarded in the absence of proof of actual damages." 1 OHIO JURY
INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 23.70, (1) comment; see also 1 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTION-CIVIL
§ 23.70(1) ("If you do not find actual damage, you cannot consider punitive damages.").
In the comment to the provisional jury instruction on punitive damages under the new
statute, the committee interprets OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(B) (2) as "explicitly
codif[ying] the requirement of proof (but not necessarily an award) of actual damages
for recovery of punitive damages." 1 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 23.71(1)
(provisional), (1) comment (interpreting this provision as codifying the requirement of
proof of actual damages that appeared in Shimola v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 25 Ohio St.
3d 84,495 N.E.2d 391 (1986)).
45OSee supra note 444.
4 51See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032,1046 n.11 (1991) (citing and
speaking favorably of state statutes that require a higher burden of proof for punitive
damages awards).
452 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(C) (Anderson 1991).
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law, but the Ohio courts have not addressed this issue.453 Assuming their
applicability under state law, there are also substantial questions as to whether
federal law permits states to apply such policies to § 1983 claims.
One relatively easy issue involves the standards for awarding punitive
damages under § 1983. Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed
the issue, the damages available in § 1983 actions are part of the federal
definition of the § 1983 cause of action.4 54 Consequently, state courts generally
rely upon uniform federal, not state, policies to determine the damages
available under § 1983, and the Ohio courts should apply federal punitive
damages standards rather than the state statutory standards to § 1983
claims.455 Thus, the decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals in Gordon v.
Gerhardt45 6 upholding a § 1983 award of punitive damages even though no
compensatory damages were allowed seems correct.
The more difficult federal issues involve the change in the burden of proof
and the reduction in the role of the jury. Federal courts entertaining diversity
actions treat the burden of proof as part of the definition of the element of
damages and apply state policies under the Erie doctrine.4 57 State courts,
however, have been reluctant to abandon state punitive damages policies. The
Louisiana courts do not allow punitive damages in § 1983 cases, 458 while the
Colorado Supreme Court has upheld the application of the state's unusual
453For a discussion of the importance of the threshold state law issue, see supra notes
171-88 and accompanying text. Plaintiffs can argue that § 1983, though literally within
the statutory definition of "tort action" and sometimes referred to as a "constitutional
tort," see Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontier Beyond,
60 Nw. U. L. REV. 277 (1965), was not intended by the General Assembly to be a "tort
action" within the meaning of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(C) (Anderson 1991).
Moreover, § 1983 is available in a wide variety of cases having nothing to do with
traditional tort actions. See Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of
Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive orFadeAway?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19-20
(1985) (describing the range of federal claims that have been litigated under § 1983).
4 45See supra note 189-93 and accompanying text.
4 55See infra note 443 (defining the federal standard).
4 56No. 6796, 1981 WL 2710 (Ohio Ct. App. Montgomery Co. March 5, 1981) (relying
on Basista and the applicable federal standards to uphold an award of punitive
damages).
45 7See, e.g., Nereson v. Zurich Ins. Co., No. A3-91-72, 1992 WL 212233 (D. N.D. Aug.
20, 1992) (diversity case applying the state punitive damages statute, including the
statute's clear and convincing burden of proof on punitive damages); seealso STEINGLASS,
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 16.3(c) n.70.17.
458 See Ricard v. State, 390 So. 2d 882 (La. 1980); see also Price v. Louisiana Dep't of
Transp. and Dev., 608 So. 2d 203 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (reading Wade as not having
effectively overruled Ricard, and holding that punitive damages are not available in§ 1983 actions in the Louisiana courts). For a recent federal court case rejecting Ricard
and holding that punitive damages are available in § 1983 actions in federal courts in
Louisiana regardless of state law, see Thomas v. Frederick, 766 F. Supp. 540 (W.D. La.
1991).
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"beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof to § 1983 claims.459 The better
view, however, is that the available damages are part of the § 1983 remedy and
that state courts entertaining § 1983 claims are required to provide the full
range of damages that are available under federal standards. Because the
burden of proof is bound up with the element of damages, the Ohio courts
entertaining § 1983 claims should apply the traditional preponderance of the
evidence burden of proof rather than the state clear and convincing standard
to punitive damage claims.460 Moreover, the use of "outcome determinative"
state policies to govern the availability of punitive damages in state court § 1983
litigation would violate the the federal interest in "intra-state uniformity" and
the "reverse Erie" principle that the Supreme Court applied to state court § 1983
cases in Felder v. Casey.461
The removal from the jury of the power to determine the amount of punitive
damages also raises difficult questions of both state and federal law. In federal
court, such a policy raises substantial Seventh Amendment issues,462 but the
Seventh Amendment is not applicable to state courts.463 Nonetheless, federal
statutory causes of action often have their own jury trial guarantees,464 and the
right to trial by jury in § 1983 cases may come from § 1983 itself.
Although there is no explicit trial by jury provision in § 1983, it is likely that
the members of the 42nd Congress, which enacted the predecessor to § 1983,
contemplated that juries would hear such cases. The language in § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 providing that defendants shall 'be liable to the party injured
in any action at law"465 suggests that Congress was thinking about legal actions
to which the jury trial guarantee attached. Moreover, in response to a question
about how to measure damages under a different section of the 1871 Act, a
459See Boulder Valley Sch. Dist. R-2 v. Price, 805 P.2d 1085 (Colo. 1991).
460 See STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 16.3(c).
461487 U.S. 131 (1988). See also infra notes 208-13 and accompanying text.
462 See McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1392 (7th Cir. 1984) (reversing a
district court's remittitur of punitive damages, without option of a new trial, in a § 1983
case, and noting that the "Seventh Amendment reserves the determination of damages,
in jury trials within its scope, to the jury"); cf. Defender Indus., Inc. v. Northwestern Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 938 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc) ("An assessment by a jury of the
amount of punitive damages is an inherent and fundamental element of the
common-law right to trial by jury."). But cf. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987)
(holding that the Seventh Amendment does not guarantee a jury trial to assess civil
penalties under a federal statute).
463 See Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 92-93 (1876).
464For example, under the new cause of action for intentional employment
discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. 1111991), created by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071,1072-73 (1991), the right to trial by jury extends
to any party in a case in which "a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive
damages." See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (Supp. 1m 1991).
4 65Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (emphasis added) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)).
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member of the House responded as follows: "Precisely the same as you do in
an action of tort. The question of damages is a question in the sound discretion
of the jury."466 Although this seems like slender support for finding a statutory
right to jury in § 1983 itself, the Supreme Court has not required an explicit
statutory provision to extend the jury right to state court litigation of other
federal causes of action.467 Finally, the removal from the jury of the right to
assess the amount of punitive damages raises substantial questions under the
Ohio Constitution.468
Even if a federal right to trial by jury extended to state court § 1983 litigation,
courts would have to determine which attributes of the federal right applied
in state courts. The Supreme Court has not addressed these issues in the context
of § 1983 actions, but it has provided some guidance in FELA litigation in which
it has not required state courts to follow the federal jury unanimity policy 469
but has treated the allocation of responsibility between judge and jury as a
matter of federal law.4 70
G. No-Exhaustion Policy
In Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida,471 the Supreme Court applied
a general no-exhaustion policy to § 1983 actions and held that § 1983 plaintiffs
need not exhaust state administrative remedies.472 A number of state courts,
4 66CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 804 (1871) (statement of Rep. Poland).
4 67The right to trial by jury in state court FELA cases is not derived from an explicit
provision of the federal statute but from the Court's conclusion that "the right to trial
by jury... is part and parcel" of the FELA remedy. Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., 319 U.S.
350,354(1943). The only statutory reference to the jury in the FELA statute is in 45 U.S.C.
§ 53 (1988), which deals with the role of the jury in reducing damage awards based on
the comparative negligence of the empoloyee. For a further discussion of these issues,
See STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 16, ch. 14; see also Rogers v. Missouri
Pacific R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508-09 (1957) (discussing the history of the proposed FELA
provision on the right to trial by jury and the congressional concern that the factual issue
of employer fault be decided by juries not judges).
468 See Margaret M. Koesel, Invading the Province of the Jury: Section 2135.21(C) and
Judicial Determination of the Amount of Punitive Damages, 15 OHIo N.U. L.REv. 55 (1988)
(concluding that removal of the power to assess punitive damages from the jury violates
Article I, § 5 of the Ohio Constitution). But cf. Digital & Analog Design Corp. v. North
Supply Co., 63 Ohio St. 3d 657, 590 N.E.2d 737, 742 (1992) (relying on Tull v. United
States, 481 U.S. 412,425-26 (1987), and the punitive nature of an award of attorney fees,
and "find[ing] no right under the Ohio Constitution to a jury determination on the issue
of attorney fees in a tort action").
46 9See Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916).
4 705ee Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
471457 U.S. 496 (1982).
472 Some federal courts had construed the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), as creating a flexible no-exhaustion policy. See Patsy, 457 U.S.
at 532 (Powell, J., dissenting). However, the Patsy Court rejected such an approach. Id.
at 516.
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however, initially viewed the Patsy no-exhaustion policy as only applicable in
federal courts. 473 But in Felder v. Casey,474 the Court applied the no-exhaustion
policy to state court § 1983 actions in the course of holding that state courts
could not apply notice of claim requirements to § 1983 claims. Most state courts
have recognized that Felder goes beyond notice of claim requirements and bars
the use of exhaustion of administrative remedy requirements in state court
§ 1983 litigation.475 Thus, in Gibney v. Toledo Board of Education,476 the Ohio
Supreme Court held that Ohio courts should not dismiss § 1983 actions for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The Patsy-Felder no-exhaustion policy must be contrasted with Parratt v.
Taylor477 in which the Court held that in cases involving random and
unauthorized actions, states can meet their obligation to provide procedural
due process by having adequate postdeprivation remedies. 478 Parratt,
however, does not impose an exhaustion requirement with which plaintiffs
must comply before filing § 1983 claims. Rather, it is an interpretation of the
requirements of procedural due process and a recognition that in limited
circumstances in which it is not feasible to provide predeprivation remedies, 479
the state may meet its constitutional obligation by providing adequate
postdeprivation remedies.480 The Ohio Supreme Court, in Cooperman v.
University Surgical Associates,481 recognized that Parratt was limited to
procedural due process claims and did not apply to claims involving
deprivations of substantive rights.48 2
473 See STEINGLASS, SECrION 1983 LrrICATION, supra note 16, § 17.3(b) n.34.
474487 U.S. 131 (1988).
475 See STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LMGATnON, supra note 16, § 17.3(b) n.51.10.
47640 Ohio St. 3d 152, 532 N.E.2d 1300 (1988).
477451 U.S. 527 (1981).
4 78 5ee also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (applying the Parratt requirement
to intentional acts). But see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (holding
Parratt inapplicable to established state policies).
4 79See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (limiting Parratt to cases in which it is
not feasible to provide predeprivation remedies). The Zinermon Court characterized the
plaintiff's claim as neither a challenge to an established state policy nor to a random and
unauthorized action. Nonetheless, the Court found Parratt inapplicable. Id. at 136-39;
accord Mertik v. Blalock, 983 F.2d 1353 (6th Cir. 1993) (observing that there are cases,
like Zinermon, that do not involve challenges to random and unauthorized conduct but
that also do not involve challenges to established state procedures).
48 OBoth the Sixth Circuit and the Ohio Supreme Court require plaintiffs with claims
to which Parratt is otherwise applicable to allege and prove the inadequacy of state
remedies. See Vicroy v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834
(1984); 1946 St. Clair Corp. v. City of Cleveland, 49 Ohio St. 3d 33,550 N.E.2d 456 (1990).
48132 Ohio St. 3d 191, 513 N.E.2d 288 (1987).
48 21d. at 297-98; see also Shirokey v. Marth, 63 Ohio St. 3d 113, 585 N.E.2d 407, cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 186 (1992). In 1946 St. Clair Corp., the court limited Parratt to procedural
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Despite the general no-exhaustion policy applicable to § 1983 claims, there
are limited circumstances in which Congress, expressly or by implication, has
authorized exhaustion of administrative remedies requirements. For example,
in § 1983 suits by prisoners, the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act 483
permits courts to stay judicial proceedings for up to ninety days while prisoners
use prison grievance procedures that are "plain, speedy and effective."484
Likewise, some members of the Court have suggested that there are special
concerns in the area of taxation that justify requiring taxpayers who wish to
bring § 1983 suits challenging the constitutionality of state tax policies485 to
first present their claims to state administrative agencies.486 Finally, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the ripeness requirement of Article III to
prevent property owners with regulatory taking claims from bringing suits
prior to obtaining a final administrative decision.4 8 7
The applicability of these special exhaustion requirements to state court
§ 1983 litigation depends on the source of the federal court requirement. The
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act does not expressly apply to state
courts, but state courts have treated it as applicable.488 With respect to tax
litigation, most state courts that have entertained § 1983 suits challenging the
constitutionality of state tax policies have done so on behalf of taxpayers who
first exhausted state tax remedies. 48 9 Finally, most state courts have assumed
due process claims involving purely economic interests, see 49 Ohio St.3d at 36, 550
N.E.2d at 460, but the Supreme Court's decision in Zinermon makes clear that Parratt
also applies to procedural due process claims involving nonecomomic interests. See
Zinermon, 494 U.S at 130-32 (treating Parratt as applying to deprivations of liberty
interests).
483 Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 352 (1980) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1988)).
48442 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1) (1988).
48 5Federal courts are limited in their ability to entertain suits involving state taxation
by the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988), and by principles of comity. See Fair
Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
486 See Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 136-37 (Brennan, J., concurring). Fair Assessment
preceded Patsy, and the full Court has not addressed the suggestion in the Fair
Assessment concurring opinion which would require taxpayers to exhaust state
administrative tax remedies before bringing § 1983 state tax challenges in federal court.
48 7See Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,186 (1985) ("[A]
claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property
interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the
regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to
the property at issue.").
488 See Casteel v. Vaade, 481 N.W.2d 476 (Wis. 1992) (rejecting a § 1983 exhaustion of
administrative remedies requirement that does not comply with the standards of the
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act). For a discussion of the applicability of this
requirement to state court § 1983 litigation, see STEINGLAss, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION,
supra note 16, § 17.4(a).
489 See STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 18.3(d). A number of state
courts, however, have completely shut their doors on § 1983 tax claims, relying on the
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that the ripeness requirement applicable to federal court regulatory taking
claims also applies in state courts, despite the strong argument that can be made
that state courts, which are not required to follow the ripeness and other
requirements of Article III, may entertain regulatory taking claims that federal
courts may not hear.490
H. Statutes of Limitations
Section 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, but the Supreme Court
has applied the borrowing principles authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1988,491 the
civil rights choice of law statute,492 to fill this gap in federal law with state
statutes of limitations. Under Wilson v. Garcia,4 93 courts must select a single
statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in each state, and this is the personal
injury limitations period.4 94 Some states, however, have multiple limitations
periods for personal injury actions, but in Owens v. Okure,495 the Supreme Court
held that in such cases the relevant period is found in the "general or residual
statute for personal injury actions."496
refusal of federal courts to entertain such claims. See, e.g., State v. Quill, 500 N.W.2d 196
(N.D.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 173 (1993). But see Bloomingdale's By Mail, Ltd. v.
Huddleston, 848 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992) (exercising jurisdiction and awarding attorney
fees to a prevailing taxpayer in a § 1983 tax refund action brought by a nonresident
mail-order business), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3002 (1993). State courts are also divided as
to whether taxpayers are required to exhaust state administrative tax remedies as a
condition of § 1983 actions. Compare Nutbrown v. Munn, 811 P.2d 131 (1991) (requiring
exhaustion), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1242 (1992) and Hogan v. Musolf, 471 N.W.2d 216
(1991) (same), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 867 (1992) with Murtagh v. County of Berks, 634
A.2d 179 (Pa. 1993) (rejecting exhaustion requirement).
4 90 See STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 6.6(a). But see Karches v.
City of Cincinnati, 38 Ohio St. 3d 12, 526 N.E.2d 1350 (1988) (applying the Williamson
ripeness test in a challenge to the constitutionality of a riverfront zoning ordinance).
49142 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). For a discussion of this complex statute, see Steven H.
Steinglass, Wrongful Death Actions and Section 1983, 60 IND. L.J. 559, 612-25
(1985)[hereinafter Steinglass, Wrongful Death Actions].
4 92Although § 1988, by its terms, appears to be addressed to federal courts, the
Supreme Court has treated it as applicable to state courts. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, 396 U.S. 229,240-41 (1969); see also STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note
16, § 10.5.
493471 U.S. 261 (1985).
4 941d. at 279-80.
495488 U.S. 235 (1989). The Owens Court also rejected the use of the statute of
limitations for intentional torts. Id. at 249.
4 96Id. at 250. The Owens Court, however, reaffirmed the Court's earlier rejection of the
residual limitations periods, while allowing the use of the residual personal injury
limitations period.
Our decision today is fully consistent with Wilson's rejection of a
state residual, or "catch-all," limitations provision as the appropriate
one for § 1983 actions. In Wilson, we rejected recourse to such pro-
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State and federal courts in Ohio disagree as to the proper § 1983 statute of
limitations. Immediately after Wilson, the Sixth Circuit, in Mulligan v. Hazard,49 7
selected the one-year period for enumerated intentional torts found in Section
2305.11 of the Ohio Revised Code.498 In Browning v. Pendleton,499 however, in
light of the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Owens, the Sixth Circuit
reversed itself and in an unanimous en banc decision selected the two-year
limitations period for bodily injury in Section 2305.10 of the Ohio Revised
Code.500 Despite Browning, a number of state courts in Ohio have expressly
rejected the Sixth Circuit's approach and applied the four-year limitations
period in Section 2305.09(D) of the Ohio Revised Code50 1 to § 1983 claims. 502
Browning only addressed the choice between one-year and two-year
limitations periods in the course of rejecting the Sixth Circuit's earlier embrace
of the one-year period. Subsequently, however, a Sixth Circuit decision broadly
construed Browning as having rejected the four-year period.503 Nonetheless,
any fair reading of Browning makes clear that the Sixth Circuit did not address
the application of the four-year limitations period to § 1983 claims.504
visions in the first instance, a position we continue to embrace.
Courts should resort to residual statutes of limitations only where
state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury
actions and the residual one embraces, either explicitly or by judicial
construction, unspecified personal injury actions.
Id. at 250 n.12.
4 97777F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1174 (1986);accord Miller v. Stevens,
37 Ohio App. 3d 179, 525 N.E.2d 533 (Wood Co. 1990).
498OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Anderson Supp. 1992) ("An action for libel,
slander, malicious prosecution, or false imprisonment... shall be commenced within
one year after the cause of action accrued . .
499869 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
500OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Anderson 1991) ("An action for bodily injury or
injuring personal property shall be brought within two years after the cause thereof
arose.").
501OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.09(D) (Anderson 1991) (four-year residual limitations
period "[floran injury to therights of theplaintiff notarising on contract nor enumerated
in sections 2305.10 to 2305.12, inclusive, 2305.14 and 1304.29 of the Revised Code.").
502 See Bojac Corp. v. Kutevac, 64 Ohio App. 3d 368, 581 N.E.2d 625 (Trumball Co.
1989) (expressly rejecting Browning); see also Weethee v. Boso, 64 Ohio App. 3d 532,582
N.E.2d 19 (Franklin Co. 1989),juris. motion overruled, 48 Ohio St. 3d 709, 550 N.E.2d 482
(1990). But see Francis v. City of Cleveland, 78 Ohio App. 3d 593, 605 N.E.2d 966
(Cuyahoga Co. 1992).
503Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Joint Vocational Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 926 F.2d 505 (6th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2917 (1992).
504Although federal district courts in the Sixth Circuit and other Sixth Circuit panels
were free to limit Browning to its rejection of the one-year limitations period, federal
courts in the Circuit cannot similarly limit the Hull court's interpretation of Browning.
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Moreover, a strong case can be made that the Sixth Circuit's adoption of the
two-year limitations period for claims involving bodily injury is simply wrong.
The Supreme Court in Owens had required the use of the residual personal
injury limitations period when there are multiple personal injury limitations
periods, and the Court identified Ohio as an example of a state in which
multiple limitations periods for intentional torts, including the two-year
limitations for bodily injury, made necessary the use of the general or residual
personal injury limitations period.505 Thus, it is difficult to reconcile the Sixth
Circuit's adoption of the two-year limitations period for claims involving
bodily injury with the Supreme Court's decision in Owens.506
L Survival/Wrongful Death Policies
As with statutes of limitations, § 1983 does not directly address either the
survival policies applicable to § 1983 claims or the availability of § 1983 as a
wrongful death remedy.507 The Supreme Court, however, has followed the
borrowing policies of § 1988 to fill this gap in federal law with the state survival
policy. Thus, in Robertson v. Wegmann,508 the Court instructed courts
entertaining § 1983 claims to borrow the state survival policy unless that policy
is inconsistent with § 1983's dual purposes of compensation and deterrence.
Robertson involved a § 1983 suit that abated under state survival policies, but
the plaintiff's death was unrelated to the claims in the suit.509 The Court,
however, suggested that when a death resulted from the complained-of act, the
action would not abate,510 and in Carlson v. Green511 the Court refused to permit
a Bivens action to abate under such circumstances.
A number of states, including Ohio, do not permit claims to survive when a
death is instantaneous. 512 Most courts, however, have relied on Carlson to
50OSQwens, 488 U.S. at 244.
506For a critical discussion of the Sixth Circuit's selection of a statute of limitations for
§ 1983 actions, see Steinglass, Sixth Circuit, supra note 165, at 504-12; see also Smalz,
Statute of Limitations for Section 1983 Claims in Ohio, supra note 17, at 10.
507For a discussion of § 1983 survival and wrongful death issues, see Steinglass,
Wrongful Death Actions, supra note 491; see also STENGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION,
supra note 16, ch. 21.
508436 U.S. 584 (1978).
509Id. at 594.
510Id. ("We intimate no view ... about whether abatement based on state law could
be allowed in a situation in which deprivation of federal rights caused death.").
511446 U.S. 14 (1980).
512 See Rubeck v. Huffman, 54 Ohio St.2d 20, 23,374 N.E.2d 411,413-14 (1978); see also
Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239, 242 n.4 (6th Cir. 1984) (relying on Rubeck and other Ohio
cases).
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reject state policies and to permit decedents' estates to pursue § 1983 claims.513
Similarly, in Jaco v. Bloechle514 the Sixth Circuit did not permit the abatement of
a § 1983 suit brought in Ohio by the survivors of an allegedly wrongful killing.
The more difficult issue involves the use of § 1983 as a wrongful death
remedy. Unlike survival policies, which permit the decedent's representatives
to continue the action that the decedent had prior to his or her death, wrongful
death policies address the claims of survivors for damages that they suffered
as a result of the killing of their decedent. Wrongful death actions were not
permitted at common law, but they are now widely recognized by both statutes
and judicial decisions.515
The Supreme Court has entertained § 1983 claims involving wrongful
killings, 516 but it has provided little guidance on the proper approach to the
use of § 1983 as a wrongful death remedy.517 Nonetheless, state and federal
courts have generally permitted survivors to seek recoveries for their own
losses, but they have followed a variety of approaches to reach this result.
Some courts have entertained § 1983 wrongful death claims by following the
Robertson approach to survival issues and relying on § 1988 to borrow state
wrongful death remedies. 518 Other courts have approached the § 1983
S13 See Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205,1237-38 (7th Cir. 1984); Heath v. City
of Hialeah, 560 F. Supp. 840, 843-44 (S.D. Fla. 1983); O'Connor v. Several Unknown
Correctional Officers, 523 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (E.D. Va. 1981). But see Jones v. George,
533 F. Supp. 1293,1302-04 (S.D. W. Va. 1982); Carter v. City of Birmingham, 444 So. 2d
373, 377-79 (Ala. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1211 (1984).
514739 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1984). In refusing to rely on Ohio law to require the survival
claim to abate, the Sixth Circuit inJaco did not cite Carlson but read the narrow holding
in Robertson as suggesting that a state abatement policy should not be borrowed under
§ 1988 when the alleged wrongful conduct caused the death. Id. at 244-45 & n.6.
515 See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 388 (1970) (noting that "the rule
against recovery for wrongful death is sharply out of keeping with the policies of
modern American maritime law'). Moreover, at the time the predecessor to § 1983 was
adopted in 1871, 30 of the 37 states had adopted wrongful death statutes. See Steinglass,
Wrongful Death Actions, supra note 491, at 573 n.78.
516 See, e.g., Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974).
517 The Court granted certiorari in Jones v. Hildebrant, 432 U.S. 183 (1977) (per
curiam), dismissing cert. as improvidently granted, 550 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1976) (upholding
use of Colorado wrongful death damage limitations in § 1983 actions), to address the
availability of § 1983 as a wrongful death remedy, but it dismissed the case after oral
argument. For a detailed discussion of Jones, see Steinglass, Wrongful Death Actions, supra
note 491, at 587-90.
518 See, e.g., Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961);
see also Rhyne v. City of Henderson, 973 F.2d 386, 390-91 (5th Cir. 1992) (adhering to the
view first expressed by the Fifth Circuit in Brazier that both state survival and wrongful
death causes of action are incorporated into federal law under § 1988); Bell, 746 F.2d at
1236 ("Where the constitutional deprivation sought to be remedied in a Section 1983
action causes death and the applicable state law would deem the action to survive or
would allow recovery for the damage claim at issue, courts generally apply the state
law."). The Supreme Court has construed § 1988 as not permitting the incorporation of
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wrongful death issues independently of state law and permitted survivors to
assert their own constitutional interest in their continued relationship with the
decedent.519 The First Circuit, however, in Valdivieso Ortiz v. Burgos,520 rejected
this approach and held that a stepfather and siblings did not have a
constitutionally protected interest in the association and companionship of
their adult son and brother who was unlawfully killed by the police.521
new and independent state causes of actions, see Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S.
701, 732-33 (1989); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693,703-04 (1973), but the use
of state wrongful death remedies in § 1983 litigation only expands the plaintiffs who
may sue defendants already amenable to suit under § 1983 for the same wrongful acts.
Moreover, in Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131,140 (1988), the Court defined the "deficiency
clause" of § 1988 as requiring federal courts to look to state law when federal law lacks
"universally familiar aspects of litigation considered indispensable to any scheme ofjustice." Given the widespread adoption of wrongful death remedies by states, see supra
note 515 and accompanying text, Felder provides additional support for the
incorporation of state wrongful death remedies into § 1983.
519See Bell, 746 F.2d at 1242-48; Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588,593-95 (8th Cir. 1974);
Espinoza v. O'Dell, 633 P.2d 455,463-65 (Colo. 1981), cert. dismissed for want ofjurisdiction,
456 U.S. 430 (1982); see also Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 509 n.7 (3d
Cir. 1985); Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1985). Even courts that
have recognized a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the parent-child
relationship have generally been unwilling to extend that liberty interest to permit
siblings to sue for the wrongful killing. See Bell, 746 F.2d at 1242-48; cf. Ascani v. Hughes,
470 So. 2d 207,211-12 (La. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 1001 (1985). But seeTrujillo
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1186,1190 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that siblings
have a constitutionally protected interest but requiring proof that the defendants
intended to interfere with that interest by killing the deceased sibling); Danese v. Asman,
670 F. Supp. 729, 737-39 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (siblings have a constitutionally-protected
interest in familial relationships), rev'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990).
520807 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1986).
52 11n taking this position, the First Circuit recognized the availability of a substantive
due process claim based on a violation of familial privacy interests when the state action
is directly aimed at the parent-child relationship. Id. at 7-9. Thus, § 1983 claims may be
brought when the state interferes in certain particularly private family decisions, see id.
at 8 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (procreation), and Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (choice of religious schools)), or where the
state seeks to change or affect the relationship of parent or child. See Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 8
(citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,753 (1982) (termination of parental rights), and
Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1,13 (1981) (determining paternity)). On the other hand, when
the state action does not interfere with the right to choose how to conduct family affairs
or is not directly aimed at severing the parent-child relationship, the First Circuit takes
the position that there is no violation of the familial associational right and only the
person toward whom the state action was directed may maintain a § 1983 claim for a
violation of the family associational right. See also Manarite v. City of Springfield, 957
F.2d 953 (1st Cir.) (minor daughter of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide does
not have a protected liberty interest in her familial relationship with her father because
the actions of the state that led to his death were not directed at the parent-child
relationship and only incidentally affected the relationship), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 113
(1992).
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An alternative approach to this issue treats § 1983, standing alone, as a
wrongful death remedy that permits a survivor (the "party injured" under§ 1983) to sue defendants who violate the constitutional rights of the
decedent.522 In Crumpton v. Gates,523 the Ninth Circuit held that a child could
bring a § 1983 action based on the alleged wrongful killing of his father even
though the child was a fetus at the time of the killing. In the course of its
opinion, the court noted that the text of § 1983 supports the availability of such
suits by third parties.
While § 1983 speaks of a "person" subjecting a "citizen ... or other
person" to a deprivation of civil rights, it specifically makes a remedy
available to "the party injured." Although we could read "the party
injured" merely as a shorthand reference to the civil rights victims who
could be either citizens or persons, we believe that the better reading,
consonant with the legislative history, is that Congress intended by this
provision to allow survivors to sue for their harm stemming from the
deprivation of a loved one's civil rights.524
The most novel approach to the availability of § 1983 as a wrongful death
remedy was the decision of the Tenth Circuit, in Berry v. City of Muskogee,525 in
which the court concluded that Congress envisioned a significant remedy for
wrongful killings. Although § 1983 does not permit a federal court to borrow
A variation of this approach is followed in the Tenth Circuit by the use of an intent
requirement that effectively precludes survivors from bringing constitutionally-based§ 1983 claims. See Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1190. Although the Tenth Circuit, which once
rejected the existence of a parents' constitutional right in their son's life, see Dohaish v.
Tooley, 670 F.2d 934, 936 (10th Cir.) ("[T]he § 1983 civil rights action is a personal suit.
It does not accrue to a relative, even the father of the deceased."), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
826 (1982), recognizes a constitutionally protected interest in the familial association,
albeit based on the First Amendment right of intimate association, it requires proof that
the defendants intended to interfere with that interest by killing the decedent. See also
Apocada v. Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Dep't, 905 F.2d 1445, 1448 (10th Cir. 1991)(refusing to reexamine the requirement in Trujillo that relatives of persons injured or
killed by state actors must establish an intent to interfere with a protected relationship
in order to bring a § 1983 claim based on violation of associational rights).
522See Steinglass, Wrongftd Death Actions, supra note 491, at 644-56; see also Greene v.
City of New York, 675 F. Supp. 110,114-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). But see Jaco, 739 F.2d at 241)(treating cause of action under § 1983 as "personal to the injured party and noting that
"[b]y its own terminology, the statute grants the cause of action 'to the party injured"').
523947 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1991).
5241d. at 1421 n.1. But cf. Purnell v. City of Akron, 925 F.2d 941,948 n.6 (6th Cir. 1991)
(noting that it had previously relied onJaco to hold that § 1983 provides a "cause of action
which is personal to the injured party" but "not address[ing] the merits of the difficult
question of whether the children of [the decedent] ... could state a claim for damages
under section 1983 based on the killing of their father").
525900 F.2d 1489 (10th Cir. 1990).
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new and independent state causes of action,526 the court concluded that "the
'new' cause of action theory would not warrant rejection of state wrongful
death remedies as appropriate to vindicate § 1983 violations when death
results." 527 Nonetheless, the court rejected the adoption of state wrongful death
remedies in § 1983 death cases. In taking this position, the Berry court relied on
the derivative nature of wrongful death claims and on the role of wrongful
death remedies as simply providing remedial assistance to effectuate
well-established primary rules of behavior otherwise enforceable under
§ 1983.528 The Berry court was concerned, however, about placing into the
hands of states the decision concerning the allocation of recovery in § 1983
actions. Thus, rather than borrow state law, it treated the remedy as a survival
action 529 and specified a broad range of both survival and wrongful death
damages that would be available in such § 1983 actions.530
The approach of the Tenth Circuit avoids the need to constitutionalize the
§ 1983 wrongful death remedy, while it creates a uniform § 1983 cause of action
and measure of damages not dependent on the vagaries of state survival or
wrongful death law. Nonetheless, given the broad range of wrongful death
damages available under Ohio law,531 the borrowing of the state wrongful
death remedy is the preferable approach for Ohio plaintiffs pursuing § 1983
claims in cases involving unconstitutional killings.532
526 See supra note 518.
5271d. at 1505.
5281d. at 1505 at n.22.
5291d. at 1506-07.
530 The court concluded that the following compensatory damages must be available:
"medical and burial expenses, pain and suffering before death, loss of earnings based
upon the probable duration of the victim's life had not the injury occurred, the victim's
loss of consortium, and other damages recognized in common law tort actions." Id. at
1507. In addition, the court concluded that "punitive damages may be recovered in
appropriate cases." Id.
53 1 See OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2125.02(B) (Anderson Supp. 1993).
532 The various approaches to the § 1983 wrongful death remedy issue are not
mutually exclusive, and plaintiffs pursuing such claims are well advised to preserve all
their options. It is also important for plaintiffs who wish to maximize the chances of
recovery to distinguish their survival and wrongful death claims and to pursue both,
when appropriate. Cf. Bass by Lewis v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173, 1187-90 (7th Cir.
1985) (reversing an award of wrongful death damages in a survival action); Gilmere v.
City of Atlanta, 737 F.2d 894, 898 n.8 (11th Cir. 1984) (upholding district court's
treatment of claim solely as a survival issue and its refusal to permit the plaintiff to
amend the judgment to treat the claim as a wrongful death action), vacated on other
grounds, 774 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986).
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J. Preclusion
Federal courts are required to give state court judgments the same preclusive
effect that state courts give them, 533 and this principle is applicable to § 1983
litigation.534 Thus, both state and federal courts entertaining § 1983 and related
actions look to state law for the applicable preclusion policies. 535 When prior
judgments are rendered by federal courts, the relevant preclusion policies come
from federal law. The principle that the court rendering a judgment determines
the scope of the judgment has guided federal courts in developing afederal law
of res judicata, 536 and federal law requires state courts to give federal
judgments the same full faith and credit that federal courts give them.537
State courts, however, tend to look to their own law of preclusion, rather
than federal law, when determining the preclusive effect of prior federal court
judgments. Usually, this does not result in different outcomes, but in states that
533 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988).
534 See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist., 465 U.S. 75 (1984) (claim preclusion); Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) (issue preclusion).
535 Under Ohio law of claim preclusion, a party is barred from relitigating claims that
the party or (those in privity with the party) actually litigated or could have litigated in
a prior proceeding. See Rogers v. City of Whitehall, 25 Ohio St.3d 67, 69,494 N.E.2d 1387,
1388 (1986); Norwood v. McDonald, 142 Ohio St. 299,305,52 N.E.2d 67, 71 (1943). This
principle, however, only bars the second suit where there is an "identity not only of
subject matter but also of the cause of action." Id. Thus "a judgment in a former action
does not bar a subsequent action where the cause of action prosecuted is not the same,
even though each action relates to the same subject matter." Id. The determination as to
whether a final judgment on a prior claim is res judicata as to a subsequent claim "must
be made from an examination of the essential operative facts stated as constituting
plaintiff's cause of action and the legal implications arising therefrom in each
proceeding." Norwood, 142 Ohio St. at 309,52 N.E.2d at 73. See also State ex rel. White v.
Franklin County Bd. of Elections, 65 Ohio St.3d 45, 47, 600 N.E.2d 656, 658 (1992) (per
curiam) ("The most accurate test for deciding if two cases are based on the same cause
of action is whether different proof is required to sustain them.").
536 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 87 (1982) ("Federal law determines the
effects under the rules of res judicata of a judgment of a federal court."). See generally
Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdicitonal Preclusion, Full Faithand Creditand Federal Common
Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (1986).
537 See Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353, 361-63 (1984) (treating the
collateral estoppel effect of a prior federal court ruling in state court as governed by
federal law); see also International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 713
P.2d 943,955 n.17 (Haw. 1986) ("In a subsequent state court action, the collateral estoppel
effect of a federal law ruling in a prior federal court adjudication is a question of federal
law."); Veiser v. Armstrong, 688 P.2d 796,799 (Okla. 1984) ("Federal law governs both
the preclusive and res judicata effect of the prior federal-court judgment."). Moreover,
the full faith and credit that state courts give federal judgments raises a federal question
ultimately reviewable by the Supreme Court. See generally Ronan E. Degnan, Federalized
Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741 (1976). For a recent discussion of these issues, see Watkins
v. Resorts Int'l Hotel and Casino, Inc., 591 A.2d 592 (N.J. 1991) (recognizing that the
federal law of claim preclusion, not the state "entire controversy" doctrine, governs the
preclusive effect of prior federal court judgments in state courts).
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define "claim" more narrowly than federal law, this difference can be
significant.538
These issues often arise in § 1983 litigation when federal court plaintiffs fail
to take full advantage of the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction to join
potential state law claims with their § 1983 claims.539 When federal courts
refuse to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims, most state courts entertain
the state law claims. 540 On the other hand, when plaintiffs fail to join state law
claims that are within the supplemental jurisdiction of the federal courts, both
state and federal doctrines of res judicata (or claim preclusion) generally bar
state courts from hearing the state cause of action.541
When federal courts lack the power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over state law claims, state courts should not refuse to entertain the state law
claims. For example, federal courts may not exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over certain state law claims as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman.542 Accordingly, plaintiffs often
bifurcate their claims by filing their state claims in state court and their federal
claims in federal court. In such circumstances, state courts should not require
federal court litigants to go through the futile task of attempting to join their
state law claims in federal court.
On the other hand, when federal courts have the power to entertain
supplemental state law claims, state courts are appropriately reluctant to
assume that the federal courts will exercise that discretion to decline to hear
the state law claims. Thus, state courts in such cases generally require plaintiffs
to either attempt to join the state law claims in federal court or to make a strong
showing that it would have been futile to do so.543 Some state courts, however,
have excused plaintiffs who failed to even attempt to join state law claims in
earlier federal court litigation by asking whether the federal court would have
538 See, e.g., Lamartiniere v. Allstate Ins. Co., 415 So. 2d 499 (La. Ct. App.) (narrowly
defining a "cause of action" for purposes of res judicata and permitting plaintiffs to
bifurcate their state and federal claims), writ denied, 420 So. 2d 442 (La. 1982); Cranwill
v. Donahue, 426 N.E.2d 337 (111. App. Ct. 1981) (relying on state definition of cause of
action to permit litigation of pendent claims dismissed by federal court).
53 9Federal courts may exercise supplemental (previously pendent) jurisdiction over
state law claims. See supra note 40.
540See, e.g., Terrell v. City of Bessemer, 406 So. 2d 337 (Ala. 1981); Merry v. Coast
Community College, 158 Cal. Rptr. 603 (Ct. App. 1979); DeLaurentis v. City of New
Haven, 597 A.2d 807 (Conn. 1991); Blazer Corp. v. N.J. Sports and Exposition Auth., 488
A.2d 1025, 1028 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); Toomey v. Blum, 426 N.E.2d 181 (N.Y.
1981); Rennie v. Freeway Transp., 656 P.2d 919, 924 at n.8 (Or. 1982). But see Mattson v.
City of Costa Mesa, 164 Cal. Rptr. 913 (Ct. App. 1980).
54 1 See City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Ct. App. 1978).
542465 U.S. 89 (1984) (erecting an Eleventh Amendment bar to litigation in federal
court of state claims for injunctive relief against state officials).
543STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LMGATION, supra note 16, at § 19.3(c) n.59.
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exercised jurisdiction over the state law claims,544 but plaintiffs who wish to
preserve access to a federal forum without risking losing their state law claims
are well advised to at least attempt to join those claims in the federal court
proceeding. 545
Ohio courts generally recognize these principles and entertain state law
claims that federal courts have declined to hear.546 Similarly, when § 1983
plaintiffs failed to join state law claims in federal court litigation under pendent
jurisdiction, the Ohio Supreme Court in Rogers v. City of Whitehall547 refused to
entertain the state law claim.548
Federal courts do not adhere to the requirements of mutuality, and the
Supreme Court has permitted both the offensive and defensive use of collateral
estoppel (or issue preclusion).549 Consequently, federal courts have precluded
parties from relitigating issues that were resolved against them in earlier § 1983
litigation. In states, like Ohio, that hold on to some aspects of mutuality,550
544 See, e.g., City and County of Denver v. Block 173 Assocs., 814 P.2d 824 (Colo. 1991)
(relying on the consistent refusal of federal courts to exercise pendent jurisdiction over
state law claims after the dismissal of federal claims to refuse to apply claim preclusion
to bar a state law claim after a federal court dismissed factually identical federal claim
at summary judgment; refusing to apply issue preclusion to issues that were not actually
decided in the earlier federal court case); seealso Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino,
Inc., 591 A.2d 592 (N.J. 1991) (holding that a federal court dismissal of a suit for
insufficiency of process or lack of standing is without prejudice and does not preclude
a plaintiff, who did not seek to raise a pendent state law claim in federal court, from
filinga state claim in state courtand arguing for standing under state principles); Stanton
v. Godfrey, 415 N.E.2d 103 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (entertaining federal claim for retroactive
welfare benefits that federal court could not award because of the Eleventh
Amendment); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 comment e (1982), and
Reporter's Note on (e) (p. 227-28).
545 It would serve little purpose to require a plaintiff to join a state law claim that was
barred by Pennhurst or that was unrelated to the jurisdiction-conferring federal claim to
go through the formal step of attempting to first join the state law claim in the federal
court proceeding. However, where the federal court would have the power to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim, a plaintiff would be taking a great
risk in concluding that this was the type of case in which a federal court would exercise
its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (Supp. 1111991), and decline to hear the state law
claim.
546 See, e.g., Deryck v. Akron City Sch. Dist., No. 13442, 1988 WL 87229, at * 1 (Ohio
Ct. App. Summit Co. Aug. 17,1988).
54725 Ohio St. 3d 67, 494 N.E.2d 1387 (1986).
54825 Ohio St. 3d at 70,494 N.E.2d at 1389. The Rogers court relied on state, not federal,
preclusion principles, although this did not produce a different outcome. Id.
549 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (permitting offensive use of
issue preclusion); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (permitting defensive use of issue preclusion).
550See Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., 2 Ohio St. 3d 193, 443 N.E.2d 978, 984
(1983) ("Ohio hascontinued the requirement of mutuality for the applicationof collateral
estoppel, as a general principle .... ).
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nonparties to earlier litigation may not use findings of fact and conclusions of
law against the parties in whose case both legal and factual issues were
resolved. When the earlier litigation was in federal court, however, state courts
may be required to set aside their own preclusion principles and give the
federal court judgment the same preclusive effect that federal courts would
give it. Thus, despite the unwillingness of the Ohio courts to embrace fully the
offensive use of collateral estoppel (or issue preclusion), 551 Ohio courts may be
required under federal principles to apply issue preclusion to permit nonparties
to take advantage of earlier judgments rendered against their adversaries.
Federal courts also apply the state doctrine of administrative res judicata to
preclude relitigation of factual issues that were determined in earlier
administrative proceedings. 552 Because this involves a borrowing process,
however, both state and federal courts will face the difficult task of determining
the contours of this doctrine in Ohio before applying it to § 1983 litigation.553
K. Attorney Fees
Prevailing plaintiffs in § 1983 actions are entitled to attorney fees as a result
of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,554 which added
fee-authorizing language to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.555 The Fees Act was adopted to
overrule a Supreme Court case which held that federal courts had no inherent
authority to award fees to prevailing parties under a private attorneys general
theory.556 The language in the Act, however, is not limited to federal court
litigation, and in Maine v. Thiboutot557 the Supreme Court characterized the
551See Hicks De La Cruz, 52 Ohio St.3d 71,369 N.E.2d 776 (1977) (permitting limited
offensive use of collateral estoppel); see also Goodson, 52 Ohio St.3d at 202, 443 N.E.2d
at 987 (discussing Hicks but making clear that the court had not fully embraced offensive
use of collateral estoppel, and affirming its adherence "to the principle [of mutuality] as
a general proposition").
552 See University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986).
553 For a discussion of administrative res judiciata in Ohio, see Randy J. Hart, Note,
Administrative Res Judicata in Ohio: A Suggestion for the Future, 37 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 595
(1989).
554Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976).
55542 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. Ml 1991) ("In any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of sections 1981,1981a, 1982,1983,1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public
Law 92-318, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, or title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.").
556 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
557448 U.S. 1 (1980).
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availability of attorney fees as an "integral" part of the § 1983 remedy 558 and
applied the Fees Act to state court § 1983 litigation.5 59
The Ohio appellate courts have recognized the applicability of the Fees Act
to § 1983 litigation in the Ohio courts. In making fees available, the Ohio courts
have followed federal standards under which prevailing plaintiffs are
presumptively entitled to fee awards except where defendants can point to
special circumstances that justify the denial of fees.56 0 For example, the Ohio
Courts of Appeals have upheld awards of attorney fees to plaintiffs who
prevailed on state law claims that were joined with substantial federal
claims.56 1
VIII. CONCLUSION
As this review of § 1983 litigation in the Ohio courts suggests, § 1983
litigation is no longer exclusively the province of the federal courts. And that
is how it should be in a system of judicial federalism. As Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr., a former state court judge, once observed, "one of the strengths of
our federal system is that it provides a double source of protection for the rights
of our citizens."562 In part, this means that state courts should pay close
attention to their own constitutions, but it also suggests the important role that
state courts should play in enforcing federal law.
5 581d. at 10.
55 9For a discussion of the application of the Fees Act in state courts, see STEINGLASS,
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 16, §§ 22.3, 22.4.
56OSee Doe v. Cuddy, 21 Ohio App. 3d 270, 487 N.E.2d 914 (Hamilton Co. 1985)
(reversing the refusal to enhance a fee award because fees were sought by a legal aid
society); Holden Arboretum v. City of Kirtland, 19 Ohio App. 3d 125, 483 N.E.2d 167(Lake Co. 1984) (reversing a fee award in favor of a prevailing plaintiff because of the
trial court's failure to properly exercise discretion).
561 See, e.g., Cincinnati ex rel. Kuntz v. Cincinnati, 79 Ohio App. 3d 86,606 N.E.2d 1028
(awarding fees to a plaintiff who prevailed on a state law claim that was joined with a
substantial § 1983 constitutional claim),juris. motion overruled, 65 Ohio St. 3d 1412, 598
N.E.2d 1165 (Hamilton Co. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1277 (1993); Doe, 21 Ohio App.
3d at 272-73,487 N.E.2d at 916-17 (affirming an award of fees to plaintiffs who prevailed
on a state law claim joined with a § 1983 claim). For a discussion of the availability of
fees to § 1983 plaintiffs who prevail on state law claims, see STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983
LITIGATION, supra note 16, ch. 23.
562William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 503 (1977).
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